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Abstract 
 
This research contributes to the growing body of knowledge about Fairtrade’s impact on 
producers by assessing voice and governance within producer organizations. I employ 
Fung and Wright’s (2003) framework of Empowered Participatory Governance (EPG) 
as a tool for understanding the challenges of collaborative governance as they relate to 
Fairtrade. EPG combines participation, decentralized decision-making, continuous 
deliberation and engagement, and co-operation between parties and interests, and as 
such is well suited to a consideration of Fairtrade governance. Through exploring EPG’s 
principles, design properties, and enabling conditions related to Fairtrade, I aim to learn 
more about whether or not this international system is truly achieving collaborative 
governance that enables individual producers to have a ‘stronger voice’. I consider Fung 
and Wright’s (2003) notion of countervailing power as a means of understanding how 
power structures may be challenged to the advantage of those who are typically 
marginalized within Fairtrade’s governance processes, and incorporate Hirschman’s 
(1970) work on exit, voice, and loyalty in order to explore alternatives to voice.  
 
This multiple case study focuses on Fairtrade coffee co-operatives in Tanzania. Over a 
period of two years, I conducted 139 individual interviews with key informants, 
managers, Board members, and producers in East Africa, held focus groups, and 
observed many events. Overall I found that Fairtrade creates opportunities for producer 
voice through its governance structures when (i) governance is collaborative and (ii) 
producers have substantial and equal access to capacity building. However, when 
individuals do not feel as though they have a voice, exit becomes a viable alternative. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Why Fairtrade? 
 
Fairtrade products have grown at a rapid pace in recent years. They are now available in 
125 countries and over 3,000 companies worldwide are involved with Fairtrade 
(Fairtrade International, 2013a). Despite challenging economic times, consumers spent 
4.8 billion euros on Fairtrade in 2012, of which over 1.9 million was spent in the United 
Kingdom (Fairtrade International, 2013a). Fairtrade International (FLO), the standard-
setting organization for Fairtrade, claims that “By buying into Fairtrade consumers 
support producers who are struggling to improve their lives”, citing price, premiums, 
partnerships, and empowerment as the four key benefits to producers (Fairtrade 
International, 2013b). With regards to the latter, a recent ten-year review of the 
Fairtrade literature confirms that there is strong evidence of empowerment impacts 
flowing from Fairtrade participation (Nelson and Pound, 2009). But just what is meant 
by the term ‘participation’ and how do individual producers benefit from participating 
in Fairtrade? 
 
According to FLO’s 2010-2011 Annual Report, “A major part of Fairtrade 
International’s global strategy is to give producers and workers a stronger voice within 
the system.” (Fairtrade International, 2012a) FLO’s 2013-2015 strategy commits the 
organization to working to “strengthen our global Fairtrade system, increasing the voice 
of producers […].” (Fairtrade International, 2013c) While various changes aimed at 
giving producers more of a voice within Fairtrade’s formalized governance structures 
have been made over the past decade, determining the impact on individual producers 
and their organizations is a challenging task. One thing is clear, however: an exploration 
of voice and governance must begin at the producer level – the pillar of the system. 
Unless there exist strong governance structures for producers and their organizations, 
initiatives at other levels of the Fairtrade system will be challenged.  
 
This study is informed by my own experience as a Fairtrade practitioner1, as well as 
Fairtrade research I conducted in Peru for my Master’s degree. Through this previous 
research I set out to explore the importance of the Fairtrade price, as well as the capacity 
building effects of the system. In order to do so, I engaged in a single case study of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Prior to this research, I worked in communications at Fairtrade Canada and Fairtrade cocoa co-operative 
La Siembra/Camino. 
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cocoa farmers at Cooperativa Naranjillo in Peru in 2009. Over four months, 62 
interviews, and many opportunities for participant observation, I found evidence of 
Fairtrade’s role in facilitating capacity building. I identified the usage of Fairtrade 
premiums as a causal mechanism, yet also illustrated the existence of multiple causation 
in this process due to the existence of other actors. Throughout the research I explored 
the importance of democratic organizational structures with regards to allocating 
Fairtrade premiums and identified potential issues of representation with regards to how 
decisions are made. As outlined in Sutton (2013a), in line with other analysts’ findings 
(Bacon, 2005, Nicholls and Opal, 2005, Raynolds et al., 2004), I also discovered that 
the Fairtrade price may be less important than other elements of the system. 
 
In this Tanzanian research I aim to contribute to the growing body of knowledge about 
Fairtrade’s impact on producers by assessing voice and governance within producer 
organizations. As Fairtrade works through the co-operative model for small producers, 
the governance system that I assess is the producer co-operative model. I employ Fung 
and Wright’s (2003) framework of Empowered Participatory Governance (EPG) as a 
tool for understanding the challenges of collaborative governance as they relate to 
Fairtrade. Through exploring EPG’s principles, design properties, and enabling 
conditions related to Fairtrade, I aim to learn more about whether or not this 
international system is truly achieving collaborative governance that enables individual 
producers to have a ‘stronger voice’.  
 
1.2 The Research Question 
 
This primary question I ask is: How does Fairtrade give producers a voice in decision-
making? I draw on a broad review of the literature, further outlined in Chapter Two of 
this paper, as well as qualitative fieldwork in East Africa, as a means of addressing this 
question. I approach this problems using Layder’s (1993) Research Map to outline the 
relevant literature, which also allowed me to narrow down my focus (Appendix 1).  
 
Based on the literature review and my own previous experience as a Fairtrade 
practitioner, I anticipated that I would find out that Fairtrade gives some producers a 
voice, but that there are also issues of representation with regards to who is involved 
and how decisions are made. I therefore incorporated various secondary questions, 
including: Which governance structures are in place? Who participates? Who might be 
left out? 
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1.3 Overview of the Methodology 
 
I employ a multiple case study methodology in order to examine the relationship 
between the Fairtrade system and participation in decision-making. As the country with 
the most Fairtrade producers in the world, Tanzania presents an interesting study focus. 
However, it is also the country’s rich history of African socialism and its contemporary 
policy environment that make for fascinating research. I selected three case studies: 
Fairtrade unions Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union (KNCU), Kagera Co-operative 
Union (KCU), and Karagwe District Co-operative Union (KDCU), as well as several 
breakaway groups that separated from KNCU years ago. 
 
I conducted the research in 2011 and 2012 over a period of two years, including six 
months in East Africa for three field trips. I held 139 interviews with Fairtrade and 
Tanzanian key informants, co-operative managerial staff and Board of Directors 
members, and small-scale coffee producers. I also held five focus groups, reviewed 
documents such as membership lists and financial data, and engaged in direct 
observation of farmers’ fields and homes, co-operative meetings, weighing stations, the 
coffee auction, factories, conferences, and Fairtrade premium projects. 
 
1.4 Chapter Outline 
 
Following this introduction, the dissertation is laid out in two parts: Part I comprises the 
contextual and literature review chapters, including the theory, methods, and case 
studies. Chapter 2 introduces Fairtrade and co-operative governance, the theoretical 
framework of Empowered Participatory Governance (Fung and Wright, 2003) as it 
relates to Fairtrade co-operatives, and Hirschman’s (1970) approach to exit, voice, and 
loyalty as a means of exploring alternatives to participation. In Chapter 3 I outline the 
country context of Tanzania, both historical and contemporary, as well as the coffee 
sector, while Chapter 4 provides an overview of the case study and field research. 
 
In Part II, I move on to discuss the findings. Chapter 5 focuses on how the findings 
from the Fairtrade co-operatives map onto the EPG model, identifying a partial fit. In 
Chapter 6, I explore exit as an alternative focus through a study of breakaway groups 
and coffee sales to private traders. In Chapter 7, I consider the potential of capacity 
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building to act as a countervailing power. Finally, Chapter 8 comprises an overview of 
the main findings, limitations, and recommendations from this research, as well as the 
conclusion. 
 
1.5 Findings and Contribution 
 
Overall my hypothesis proves true. While Fairtrade gives some producers a voice, there 
are issues of representation with regards to who is involved and how decisions are 
made. I therefore conclude that Fairtrade gives producers a voice in decision-making 
when (i) governance structures are collaborative and (ii) producers have substantial and 
equal access to capacity building. Only then might it be possible to say that producers 
have a voice in decision-making. Without collaborative governance structures in place, 
Fairtrade may fail in its efforts to facilitate producer participation. 
 
I find that, while producers are involved in decision-making, there are barriers to 
participation in deliberation, challenges with management and Board members, and 
heavy State involvement. Overall I find KNCU to be the most problematic of the three 
unions, the reasons for which are outlined in Chapter 5. As there is less of an 
opportunity for voice at this organization, producers are more likely to exit and I outline 
this process in Chapter 6. I identify these breakaway groups as a potential 
countervailing power, while also exploring individual exit among those who sell to 
private buyers. In Chapter 7 I consider how capacity building might serve to provide 
producers with enhanced options for voice and outline the essential role that capacity 
building can play. I find that various bodies currently provide capacity building, but that 
these efforts often privilege individuals such as managers or Board members. The 
exception to this is organic producers, who tend to benefit more than their conventional 
counterparts. I conclude that more capacity building is needed, particularly for women 
who experience many barriers to participation. 
 
I provide policy implications in Chapter 8, where I also attempt to disentangle the 
impact of Fairtrade from the co-operative model in order to determine how the findings 
map onto the EPG framework. I outline the importance of a potential shift in focus to 
the primary society, rather than the union, for Fairtrade. This comprises an 
understanding of group and individual exit and the countervailing power that this may 
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foster. I also outline the essential role of capacity building, as Fairtrade and other groups 
could be doing more to provide much-needed capacity building to producers. 
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PART I: THEORY, METHODS, AND CASE STUDIES 
 
Chapter 2: Collaborative Governance at Fairtrade Co-ops 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter explores theories of collaborative governance as a means of understanding 
how Fairtrade may give producers a voice in decision-making. I begin with an overview 
and definition of co-operatives and the Fairtrade system, considering the intersection 
between co-operatives and Fairtrade while hypothesizing that governance plays a key 
role in this relationship between Fairtrade and voice. As Fairtrade works through the co-
operative model for smallholder farmers, it is critical to consider how co-operatives 
function to facilitate - or potentially block - producer participation in decision-making. 
 
I then introduce Fung and Wright’s (2003), Empowered Participatory Governance 
(EPG) model as a theoretical framework for this exploration. EPG combines 
participation, decentralized decision-making, continuous deliberation and engagement, 
and co-operation between parties and interests. This approach emphasizes devolution to 
local units whilst maintaining centralized co-ordination and supervision, and as such is 
well suited to a consideration of Fairtrade governance. I aim to discern if EPG’s 
principles, design properties, enabling conditions, and institutional objectives provide 
an effective model for learning more about whether or not Fairtrade is truly achieving 
collaborative governance that enables individual producers to have a ‘stronger voice’. I 
also consider Fung and Wright’s (2003) notion of countervailing power as a means of 
understanding representation as it pertains to those individuals who are typically 
marginalized within Fairtrade’s governance processes. Through a review of the relevant 
Fairtrade, governance, and co-operative literature, I outline how Fairtrade, in theory, fits 
the model of EPG, and present this as an appropriate model. Finally, I bring in 
Hirschman’s notions of exit, voice, and loyalty, introducing the options that individuals 
might pursue when they do not feel that they have an opportunity to exercise voice in 
their co-operatives. 
 
 18	  
2.2 Defining Co-operatives 
 
Worldwide, over 800 million people are members of a co-operative2, ranging from 
small-scale to multi-million dollar businesses (International Co-operative Alliance, 
2012). A 1994 United Nations report suggests that co-operatives contribute to securing 
livelihoods for half the world’s population (International Labour Office, 2001). Co-
operatives play a major role in rural agriculture, as over 50 per cent of global 
agricultural production is marketed through co-operatives (Smith, 2004). While this 
model of enterprise is often associated with more traditional economic spheres such as 
agriculture and housing, co-operatives exist in many different sectors including funeral 
provision, schools, utilities, and the transport sector.  
 
According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), a co-operative may be 
defined as “an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their 
common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned 
and democratically-controlled enterprise.” (International Labour Organization, 2002) 
The International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) lists seven principles that are common to 
all co-operatives: open membership, democratic member control, economic 
participation, autonomy and independence, education, cooperation, and concern for 
community (see Appendix 2). As Chambo (2009) summarizes, there are four main 
characteristics of co-operatives that follow the ICA principles: they are formed by a 
group of people with a specific need, they are created freely by members who make 
contributions to assets, they are governed democratically, and they are independently 
owned and controlled. Individuals typically purchase shares in their organizations that 
allow them to become members. The ICA states that members can exert democratic 
control as follows: 
 
Cooperatives are democratic organizations controlled by their members, who 
actively participate in setting their policies and making decisions. Men and 
women serving as elected representatives are accountable to the membership. In 
primary cooperatives members have equal voting rights (one member, one vote) 
and cooperatives at other levels are organized in a democratic manner. 
(International Co-operative Alliance, 2012) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The term ‘co-operative’ is often written as ‘cooperative’. While I use ‘co-operative’ in this dissertation, 
I have left the word in its original format for the purpose of quotations and titles (ex: District Cooperative 
Officer) 
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While I utilize the ICA definition of co-operatives for the purpose of this research, the 
ICA definition and principles cannot be considered universally accepted. According to 
Tallontire (1999), the ICA’s conceptualization of co-operatives as part of a movement is 
one of various schools found in the co-operative literature, and has been criticized as 
being overly idealistic. She outlines two alternative schools of thought based on 
business and political motivations: (1) the functional school, which situates co-
operatives as tools for ensuring that farmers receive agricultural and marketing services 
whilst positioning co-operatives as a countervailing power to the private sector and (2) 
the local organizational development school whereby co-operatives relate to the self-
defined needs of people (Tallontire, 1999). I find elements of these two alternative 
conceptualizations in line with my findings, as farmers are often members of co-
operatives for strict economic purposes or may have needs related to, for example, 
training while not viewing themselves as members of a larger movement. Producers 
may therefore be members of the co-operative for reasons other than their social and 
cultural needs or aspirations, as the ICA definition implies. Various alternative co-
operative conceptualizations are based strictly on economic approaches, and economists 
studying farmer co-operatives tend to view co-operatives in three ways: (1) as a form of 
vertical integration for otherwise independent firms, (2) as an independent business 
enterprise similar to an investor-owned firm, and (3) as a coalition of firms with a 
diffuse decision-making structure (Staatz, 1989). While I find these first two definitions 
overly simplistic given the multi-dimensional reasons individuals have for joining, and 
staying in, their co-operatives, this third definition is of interest to this discussion of 
decision-making and addresses heterogeneity in a way that the ICA definition does not. 
 
This “diffuse decision-making” conceptualization views co-operatives as coalitions of 
participants who each possess their own objectives and will participate so long as they 
feel those objectives are being met. Staatz (1989) asserts that, when co-operative 
membership is heterogeneous, there is a need to balance benefits among its various 
members in order to preserve the stability of the organization. This is, of course, a 
delicate balance to achieve. While Booth (1985, 309-310) claims that the co-operative is 
capable of “meeting employee demands for participation in enterprise decision-
making,” Bonin et al. (1993) note that democratic decision-making is often considered 
cumbersome given the heterogeneous nature of workers. As Cleaver (2005b) observes 
in her research on social capital in Tanzania, voices, especially those of the poorest, are 
often excluded from public fora. Given the potential for participation to exclude many 
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of those who should be involved, it is important to consider exactly how decision-
making occurs in co-operatives, as well as who might be left out of these processes. 
Ownership and control are interlinked in the co-operative model. However, this 
connection is challenged by how actors, such as managers, ensure membership control, 
as well as the roles that elected Board members and appointed management officials 
take on (Jussila et al., 2007, Spear, 2004). Mellor et al. (1988, 174) suggest that 
“genuine participation in decision-making within cooperatives is severely limited.” 
They elaborate:  
 
For decision-making to rest on the basis of equality poses even more difficulties. 
While it is a fundamental principle of cooperation that one member receives one 
vote, we have argued that the realities of power are considerably different. […] 
Although, for most people, democracy remains the key element of cooperation, 
its practice can by no means be accepted as inevitable. (Mellor et al., 1988, 175) 
 
It is important to note that the term ‘co-operative’ is employed in diverse ways by many 
different organizations. While members may be able to participate directly in decision-
making in smaller co-operatives, larger co-operatives instead require a general 
committee to represent members. This is indeed the case in this research, as the 
secondary unions that I explore herein are extremely large, comprising between 20,000 
and 70,000 farmers each. Elected representatives are responsible for decisions related to 
the use of the Fairtrade social premium and the election of Board members, and 
decisions are taken at an Annual General Meeting (Prevezer, 2013). Delegates are thus 
“vested with the power to reach decisions in accordance with members’ interests.” 
(Mellor et al., 1988, 114) A high potential for conflict results from efforts to encourage 
participation in decision-making and successful meetings are therefore fundamental to 
the co-operative’s democratic health (Mellor et al., 1988, 117). This has clear 
implications for governance, as the democratic decision-making that is assumed 
according the ICA’s definition could foreseeably be challenged by an organization’s 
sheer size.  
 
Unfortunately, relatively little is known about co-operative governance. This topic tends 
to be under-theorized in comparison to the literature on corporate governance 
(Cornforth, 2004). Although some attempts have been made to combine theories, such 
as agency and stewardship theory, in order to understand the model’s complexity (see 
Cornforth 2004), relatively little attention has been paid to co-operative governance 
(Spear, 2004). While some authors have written about governance at the Board level in 
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relationship to co-operatives (Cornforth, 2002, Cornforth, 2004, Spear, 2004, Spear et 
al., 2007), there is not much in the academic literature about co-operative Boards. This 
has even been referred to as a “black box of governance” (Pettigrew and McNulty, 
1995). There is a particular gap in the literature on co-operatives in the global South, 
which differ greatly from their northern counterparts. Studies of co-operative 
governance tend to be based in Europe or North America, and little is known about the 
African co-operative context (Cornforth, 2002, Cornforth, 2004). As Shaw (2006a, 
1&6) states:  
 
The co-operative sector as a whole remains poorly understood and its specific 
governance challenges remain as yet largely unexplored. […] For many co-
operatives in developing countries, there is a further major challenge to the 
implementation of the [Co-operative] Principles – autonomy and independence 
have yet to become a reality. 
 
I aim to contribute to this gap in the literature on Tanzanian co-operatives. Other work 
on African co-operatives was underway in 2013 (Borda-Rodriguez and Vicari, 2013, 
Hannan, 2013, Hartley, 2012, Vicari and Borda-Rodriguez, 2013), and this research is 
therefore part of a small but growing body of literature aimed at exploring co-operative 
governance on the African continent. 
 
2.2.1 Co-ops and Fairtrade 
The co-operative structure is mandatory at Fairtrade’s Small Producer Organizations 
(SPOs), and the Fairtrade system incorporates this model as a fundamental element of 
its governance structures (Prevezer, 2013). This is more than simply a regulatory 
feature; there is also a clear alignment between co-operatives and Fairtrade. Develtere 
and Pollett (2008, 71) claim that the Faitrade movement resembles the co-operative 
movement’s “pursuit of economic development in a spirit of justice and solidarity.” As 
outlined in the Canadian Co-operative Association (CCA)’s 2010 Fairtrade resolution:  
 
[C]o-operatives are a fundamental part of the fair trade movement and the 
majority of fair trade producers are members of co-operatives and co-operatives 
provide a support network for small farmers who are amongst the poorest 
farmers on earth, […] the overall principles of fair trade as defined by the Fair 
Trade Labelling Organization have much in common with the principles of co-
operation. (Canadian Co-operative Association, 2010) 
 
Fairtrade follows the ILO’s Recommendation 193 on the promotion of co-operatives 
(Fairtrade International, 2011e). Recommendation 193, the only international legal and 
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policy framework on co-operatives, upholds the ICA Co-operative Principles while 
underscoring the business orientation of co-operatives and the role of the State in 
creating an enabling environment for these enterprises (Salazar-Xirinachs, 2012, Smith, 
2004). The Fairtrade certification standards state that members should be able to hold 
the Board of Directors accountable and that organizations “should have democratic 
structures in place and a transparent administration that allows members and the board 
to have effective control over the organization.” (Fairtrade International, 2011e, 30) The 
organization must have (a) a General Assembly as the highest decision making body 
where all major decisions are discussed and taken, (b) equal voting rights for all 
members (which may be done through a system of delegates), and (c) a Board chosen in 
free, fair, and transparent elections (Fairtrade International, 2011e).  
 
It is important to emphasize that the co-operative model exists separately from the 
Fairtrade system, although Fairtrade works through this structure for small producer 
organizations (Fairtrade International, 2011e). We must be careful not to conflate the 
two, as benefits may mistakenly be attributed to Fairtrade rather than the co-operative 
model. I therefore aim to disentangle the role of Fairtrade from the role of the co-
operative, although the two are, of course, interlinked.  
 
2.3 The Fairtrade System 
 
This section provides an overview of Fairtrade governance and the evolution of the 
certification system as a background to the upcoming discussion of EPG’s fit to 
Fairtrade. Fairtrade began as a means of connecting Southern producers with Northern 
partners via a system of rules and principles. While its roots can be traced back to 
various starting points, Fridell (2004, 2006) notes that the Fairtrade network first 
emerged during the 1940s. The early fair trade3 movement aimed to create alternative 
markets for producers in the global South, and was primarily composed of Alternative 
Trade Organizations (ATOs). However, fair trade underwent significant changes in the 
1980s, moving from a focus on handicrafts and specialized world shops towards 
agricultural commodities and mainstream commercial outlets such as supermarkets 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Within this paper I use the term ‘Fairtrade’ to refer to the certification and labeling system governed by 
Fairtrade International, and ‘fair trade’ to refer to the broader movement comprising both labeled and 
unlabelled goods. It should be noted that some of the authors quoted herein utilize these terms differently, 
and as such I have kept the original spelling when quoting secondary material. 
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(Anderson, 2013, Bennett, 2013, Cremona and Marin Duran, 2013).4 Instead of forging 
an alternative to conventional trade, it began to move towards carving out access to 
conventional markets. As a result, Fairtrade certification was born. The first Fairtrade 
certification system originated in the Netherlands in 1988, and in 1997 FLO (originally 
short for Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International, today known as Fairtrade 
International) was established as the membership-based international certification and 
standard-setting umbrella agency for Fairtrade (Bennett, 2013). Some of the great 
modern-day debates in Fairtrade centre around the topic of mainstreaming and a 
potential shift from a producer-led to a consumer-led model (Barrientos and Smith, 
2007). There are criticisms that Fairtrade no longer follows a ‘partnership’ model with 
producers in its approach and has instead been co-opted by corporate interests (Jaffee, 
2007, Raynolds, 2009). Anderson (2013), in contrast, argues that the origins of Fairtrade 
may have been idealized or misunderstood. This is clearly a nuanced debate and one 
that I do not engage in here; suffice it to say that Fairtrade has a complex and 
controversial historical and contemporary approach to governance.  
 
Today there are Fairtrade standards for over 300 raw products ranging from coffee to 
cotton, fresh fruit, and sports balls (Fairtrade International, 2013a). FLO (2013b) claims 
that Fairtrade aims to address the imbalance of power in trading relationships, unstable 
markets, and the injustices of conventional trade. A commonly accepted definition, 
created in 2001 by an association of fair trade networks known as FINE, is:  
 
Fair Trade is a trading partnership, based on dialogue, transparency and respect, 
that seeks greater equity in international trade. It contributes to sustainable 
development by offering better trading conditions to, and securing the rights of, 
marginalized producers and workers – especially in the South. (FINE, 2001) 
 
FLO has certification processes for both SPOs and hired labour situations; here I 
explore only the former. Upon joining the Fairtrade system, SPOs commit to various 
tenets including environmental sustainability, democracy, transparency, equal 
opportunities for women, and the abolition of labour abuses such as forced or child 
labour. These organizations must also meet buyers’ contract demands related to volume, 
timing, and quality. In exchange, they are guaranteed fair prices, access to advance 
credit, long-term contracts with buyers, and social and business development premiums. 
While FLO requires SPOs to be composed primarily of smallholders who run their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For a comprehensive overview of this evolution in Fairtrade, see Bennett (2013). 
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farms mainly through the use of their own and their family’s labour, up to 49 per cent of 
the output can be sourced from other suppliers who may depend on hired labour 
(Fairtrade International, 2011e). In addition, small producers are allowed to hire 
workers: migrant and temporary workers in the case of less labour-intensive goods such 
as coffee, and permanent workers for highly labour-intensive goods such as cane sugar. 
The heterogeneity amongst co-operative members is an important consideration, and 
one that I explore in a later section on representation. 
 
A General Assembly (comprising Producer Networks and Labelling Initiatives) and a 
Board of Directors govern the not-for-profit association FLO (see Figure 1). The Board 
is elected by the General Assembly and oversees the organization’s strategic direction 
and financial management, appointing the Chief Executive Officer and members of its 
six committees (Cremona and Marin Duran, 2013). FLO is a shareholder in the 
separately managed FLO-CERT - an independent, ISO 65 accredited certification 
company. Internationally, there are 19 National Fairtrade Organizations (NFOs), 
previously known as Labelling Initiatives (LIs) covering 24 countries across Europe, 
Japan, North America, Australia and New Zealand, and two marketing initiatives in 
South Africa and the Czech Republic engaged in Fairtrade certification. Countries 
participating in Fairtrade use these national licensing bodies and award the Fairtrade 
certification mark to products rather than companies (Doherty et al., 2012).  
 
As outlined by Nicholls and Opal (2005), Fairtrade International monitors co-operatives 
through FLO-CERT. FLO-CERT auditors visit on an annual basis, and randomly select 
primary societies to visit from the unions’ master lists. This is known as a group 
certification model, as it entails both an audit of the organization (the union in this case) 
as well as randomized visits to a sample of farmers. Shields (2013) finds that, while the 
audit may not be comprehensive or robust, it is of considerable depth as the auditor 
inspects many documents, conducts interviews, and holds a closing meeting. 
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Figure 1: Fairtrade’s Governance Structures 
 
Source: Fairtrade International (2013b) 
 
I primarily focus on three benefits of Fairtrade: price, premiums, and capacity building. 
These benefits came up frequently during interviews, and are also common themes in 
the literature. The Fairtrade price is the most studied of all the Fairtrade criteria, and 
Fairtrade publicity tends to focus on this aspect of the system (Becchetti, 2008, 
Prevezer, 2013). Overall, the findings on the financial benefits of the Fairtrade price are 
mixed. Many scholars highlight the role of the Fairtrade price in increasing household 
income levels and reducing poverty (Calo and Wise, 2005, Jaffee, 2007, Ruben, 2008) 
while others find that Fairtrade producers receive insignificantly higher, and at times 
even lower, incomes than their non-Fairtrade counterparts (Bacon, 2005, Beuchelt and 
Zeller, 2011, Granville and Telford, 2013, Zuniga-Arias and Segura, 2008). Unions 
receive the Fairtrade price for their coffee when they are able to sell to Fairtrade buyers, 
which may vary from high proportions of around 60 per cent for coffee to as low as five 
to ten per cent in the case of tea (Prevezer 2013). In the case of Tanzania’s coffee 
unions that I studied, this is typically somewhere between 15 and 50 per cent of sales. 
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How this money benefits the primary societies is another matter, as this can be very 
difficult to assess when all sales are not made to Fairtrade buyers.  
 
For many analysts, price is not the most important aspect of Fairtrade. As Nicholls and 
Opal (2005, 29) assert, “[T]he impact of the Fair Trade model goes beyond merely 
offering a fair price to producers, often encompassing important externalities and 
community benefits.” Similarly, in their study of seven Latin American Fairtrade coffee 
co-operatives, Raynolds et al. (2004) find that the social benefits of Fairtrade are as 
important as the economic benefits. During previous research with Fairtrade cocoa 
farmers in Peru, I concluded that the Fairtrade premium, rather than price, may be the 
most significant aspect of the Fairtrade system (Sutton, 2013a). The Fairtrade premium 
exists separately from the guaranteed minimum price. It consists of a lump sum of 
money paid annually to producer co-operatives, according to annual Fairtrade sales, and 
is available to the co-operative for discretionary spending. This money goes into a 
communal fund for workers and farmers aimed at improving their social, economic, and 
environmental conditions. These premiums are often used for community projects, with 
benefits extending beyond members to the wider population (CEval, 2012). However, a 
great deal depends on strong governance procedures for effective premium allocation, 
and this premium impact is relatively unexplored in the literature (Doherty et al., 2012). 
 
In the 2009 Charter of Fairtrade Principles, the World Fair Trade Organization (WFTO) 
and FLO cite capacity building and empowerment as core principles of Fairtrade 
(WFTO and Fairtrade International, 2009). As confirmation of the latter, throughout the 
Fairtrade literature, analysts often claim that participating in Fairtrade empowers 
producers (Dolan, 2010a, Granville and Telford, 2013, Moore, 2004, Nelson and Pound, 
2009, Nicholls and Opal, 2005, Raynolds et al., 2004); a ten-year review of the 
Fairtrade literature asserts that there is strong evidence of empowerment impacts 
flowing from Fairtrade participation (Nelson and Pound, 2009). These authors cite 
evidence in the literature of benefits to participation including producer knowledge of 
and perspectives on Fairtrade, social cohesion, an ability to resolve disputes, 
networking, and democratic organization. Reed (2009) lists increased market access, 
enhanced market knowledge, improved product quality, and broadened community 
benefits as basic components of the empowerment that Fairtrade aims to facilitate.  
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In terms of capacity building, a large-scale 2012 study commissioned by two FTOs 
(Fairtrade Germany and Max Havelaar Foundation Switzerland) on Kenyan flowers, 
Ghanaian cocoa, coffee and bananas in Peru, and cotton and tea in India found that 
Fairtrade led to increased education and training programs at producer organizations, in 
comparison to non-Fairtrade control groups (CEval, 2012). It noted that training 
programs are an important step towards participation in decision-making within the 
organization and that Fairtrade supports such programs (CEval, 2012). This study found 
that producers at all six organizations would like to receive even more training, while 
also noting that the low educational levels of producers posed challenges for training 
(CEval, 2012). Similarly, in their South African research with landless labourers, 
Granville and Telford (2013) identify capacity building effects including an adult 
literacy program, a farm management course, computer and financial training, and 
feelings of empowerment. Other analysts have also provided evidence of capacity 
building effects for Fairtrade producers and workers (Nelson and Pound, 2009, Reed, 
2009, Raynolds et al., 2004, Sutton, 2013a). 
 
Yet there remains a limited, and frequently depoliticized, understanding regarding the 
exact nature of Fairtrade participation, as well as how it may facilitate empowerment. 
The term ‘empowerment’, although frequently used with broad strokes in the Fairtrade 
literature, is open to endless definitions. As Cleaver (1999, 599) notes: “As 
‘empowerment’ has become a buzzword in development, an essential objective or 
participation, its radical, challenging, and transformatory edge has been lost.” In order 
to further explore Fairtrade participation and the decision-making processes within 
Fairtrade, I use theories on collaborative governance to frame this research. 
 
2.4 Empowered Participatory Governance 
 
Collaborative governance is a relatively new strategy of governing that has emerged in 
the past two decades. Operationalized by managers and policymakers, it has frequently 
been implemented in reaction to governance failures, or as organizations have grown 
and developed their institutional capacity (Ansell and Gash, 2008). As a result, it is 
open to different interpretations, although they do tend to center around common 
themes. Ansell and Gash (2008, 543) note in their meta-analytical review of the 
literature: “Collaborative governance, as it has come to be known, brings public and 
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private stakeholders together in collective forums with public agencies to engage in 
consensus-oriented decision making.” These authors claim that collaborative 
governance strategies are particularly suited to situations that require ongoing 
cooperation, as might be seen in the case of Fairtrade when groups at various levels of 
the system are required to make decisions related to Board appointments, Fairtrade 
premium allocation, or Fairtrade compliance monitoring. They state that collaboration 
implies that stakeholders will have real responsibility for policy outcomes and, as a 
result, they impose the condition that stakeholders are directly engaged in decision-
making, a criterion that is implicit in much of the collaborative governance literature 
(Ansell and Gash, 2008).  
 
Ansell and Gash (2008) suggest an examination of the critical variables that influence 
whether or not this mode of governance will produce successful collaboration, 
identifying these variables as: the prior history of conflict or cooperation, incentives for 
stakeholders to participate, power and resource imbalances, leadership, and institutional 
design. They also provide a series of factors that are crucial within the collaborative 
process itself: face-to-face dialogue, trust building, and the development of commitment 
and shared understanding. These authors view collaborative governance as a time-
consuming process that requires building trust among stakeholders, and argue that face-
to-face dialogue is a necessary but insufficient condition for collaboration. An important 
feature of Ansell and Gash’s theory of collaborative governance is that decision-making 
in collaborative forums is consensus-oriented; even if consensus is not reached, the 
parties strive to reach agreement in a deliberative forum.  
 
Fung (2006) similarly highlights the importance of the process, noting that although 
some participants may disagree with the group’s deliberations, they may be more easily 
reconciled to the outcome because, through these discussions, others have justified their 
positions. Fung and Wright (2003, 263) use the term Empowered Participatory 
Governance (EPG) and define it as: “[A] form of collaborative governance that 
distinctively combines popular participation, decentralized decision-making, practical 
focus, continuous deliberation and engagement, and cooperation between parties and 
interests that frequently find themselves on opposite sides of political and social 
questions.” EPG is both participatory and collaborative, emphasizing devolution to local 
units whilst maintaining centralized co-ordination and supervision, and as such is well 
suited to an exploration of Fairtrade governance. This theoretical framework has been 
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adopted by others to explore participatory budgeting in Brazil, decentralized planning in 
India, habitat conservation planning under the U.S. Endangered Species Act, and 
Chicago school governance and policing (Fung and Wright, 2003). While the use of 
EPG establishes a high benchmark for an analysis of Fairtrade, the potential 
identification of areas of weakness in Fairtrade’s fit with EPG may prove useful with 
regards to FLO’s efforts to strengthen producer participation (Sutton, 2013b). I 
incorporate various elements of Ansell and Gash’ (2008) approach to collaborative 
governance into the model utilized herein.  
 
2.4.1 General Principles 
 
2.4.1.1 Bottom-up Participation 
Various principles are fundamental to the EPG model, one of which is bottom-up 
participation, or the involvement of ordinary people. This does not imply that experts 
should not be engaged, but rather that they should not have exclusive decision-making 
power. Changes to Fairtrade governance in recent years, in what Tallontire (2009, 1005) 
refers to as “an effort to bring fair trade closer to its roots,” reflect the ever-evolving 
nature of the system’s formalized governance structures. The shift from an alternative 
market, based on connecting consumers with producers, to a product-based certification 
scheme is an important consideration as Fairtrade’s governance structures and, 
accordingly, the nature of producer participation, have evolved over the years 
(Tallontire, 2009, VanderHoff Boersma, 2002, VanderHoff Boersma, 2009). This 
inevitably poses challenges with regards to how the more than 1.3 million farmers and 
workers who belong to the Fairtrade system are engaged in it. Tallontire (2009) claims 
that FLO is working to enhance producer participation in governance, has recognized 
that it must provide space and resources for producer empowerment, and has 
accordingly altered Fairtrade’s standards and governance structures to facilitate greater 
producer participation. Other analysts are critical of Fairtrade’s governance structures 
(Bacon, 2010, Renard, 2005) and question the nature of producer participation in the 
system.  
 
Smith (2009) finds that, while it is essential to continuously assess FLO’s governance 
and practices, the organization has gradually responded to the need for improvement. 
FLO has created a standards and policy working group and a certification committee 
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(both including producers), has developed a producer support network of field Liaison 
Officers (LOs) known as the Producer Services and Relations Unit (PSR), and has 
increased producer ownership to 50 per cent with the 2011 restructuring of the General 
Assembly (Fairtrade International, 2011c). As seen in Figure 1, the General Assembly is 
now composed of equal numbers of producers and representatives from National 
Fairtrade Organizations (NFOs)5 around the world. FLO has also added producers to the 
Board of Directors, and there are now four producer seats on the Board, along with five 
NFO representatives, two traders, and three independents. FLO stated in its 2007 
Annual Report that this "demonstrates genuine stakeholder participation at the very 
highest level of FLO. Now sitting on the Board, producer representatives are better 
placed to shape the future direction of FLO.” (Fairtrade International, 2008, 23) 
However, as Bacon (2010, 134) observes: “The FLO board is also notable for the 
organisations that are not at the table, or, to put it more directly, the missing seats and 
the voices without votes.” Raynolds et al. (2007) similarly claim that these recent 
governance modifications have done little to curtail dissatisfaction with the certification 
system.  
 
In an effort to bring more producer voices to the table, FLO has supported the 
development of two regional producer networks in recent years: Fairtrade Africa (FTA) 
and the Network of Asian and Pacific Producers (NAPP). Along with the CLAC 
(Coordinadora Latinoamericana y del Caribe de Pequenos Productores de Comercio 
Justo) in Latin America and the Caribbean, FLO claims to maintain contact with 
producers through these three producer networks.  It emphasizes its support for the 
producer networks’ desire to take on greater responsibility within the system, citing 
capacity building as a means of accomplishing this and highlighting the importance of 
supporting the producer networks so that “over time they are on a more equal footing 
with the [National Fairtrade Organizations] as members of Fairtrade.” (Fairtrade 
International, 2009, 6) Currently, however, very little is known about the producer 
networks; there have been no studies on their effectiveness and, as such, analysts have 
called for independent research into this aspect of the system (Nelson and Pound, 2009). 
As this research is focused on Tanzania, the co-operatives that I explore belong to 
Fairtrade Africa. I interviewed several individuals from Fairtrade Africa but in the end 
decided not to focus on the producer networks. The reason for this is that most of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Previously known as Labelling Initiatives (LIs), NFOs market and promote Fairtrade products in 
consumer countries. 
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producers I interviewed had never heard of Fairtrade, let alone the regional networks, 
and a very different methodology would have been required for a study on the producer 
networks. However, I did collect substantial information on Fairtrade Africa throughout 
this process, and a brief overview of this network can be found in Appendix 3. 
 
Despite all these governance changes at the institutional level, there are barriers to 
individual participation in decision-making that may relate to, amongst other factors, 
producer skills, confidence, and knowledge. In their Latin American coffee study, 
Raynolds et al. (2004) highlight the socio-economic limitations of Fairtrade co-
operative members who may have little formal education or command of the languages 
of international markets. While these authors do not see these challenges as 
insurmountable, they identify participation as a complex term and find that the groups 
studied in their research struggle to achieve broad participation, as many producers feel 
unqualified to take on organizational activities. In an example from the global North, 
while discussing Vermont town meetings in an interview with Archon Fung (2004, 48), 
Jane Mansbridge states:  
 
To get anyone to a meeting who expects to be in a minority or not have the right 
words to explain himself or herself in a particular setting usually requires special 
effort, both to get members of those groups to the meeting and to increase the 
chance of being heard when they do attend. 
 
2.4.1.2 Deliberation 
A second principle of EPG is deliberation. In deliberative decision-making, participants 
listen to each other’s positions, consider them, and then generate group choices (Fung 
and Wright, 2003). This method is privileged in this framework over alternative forms 
of decision-making such as aggregation whereby the preferences of individuals are 
combined (as seen in the case of voting). In ideal deliberation, the only power that 
should prevail is, as Habermas puts it, “the force of the better argument.” (1984, 25) 
This is, as Cohen and Rogers (2003) describe, a force that is available to everyone 
involved. However, deliberation is also highly complex, as Iris Young notes in an 
interview with Archon Fung (2004: 50): 
 
To be democratic, deliberation must be widely inclusive of the major interests, 
opinions, and social perspectives of differently situated groups. The more social, 
economic, and political inequality among them, the more cultural differences 
they have, the wider the variance in value commitments, and the more 
contentious deliberation is likely to be.  
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With regards to deliberation in Fairtrade, the system requires that individuals at various 
levels of Fairtrade’s formalized governance structures engage in democratic decision-
making. Individual co-operatives are required to hold an annual General Assembly 
where producers (or their elected representatives) gather to discuss relevant issues and 
vote on issues such as how the Fairtrade premiums will be used. The specific methods 
for achieving co-operative democracy, however, are left open. While this approach to 
decision-making is often framed as deliberation within Fairtrade, it may in fact be closer 
to aggregation, given the emphasis on voting. As Fung and Wright (2003, 18) note, one 
danger is that “some participants will use their power to manipulate and enhance 
positions motivated by particularistic interests.” There is an expectation that producers 
can participate in this decision-making process as they know their rights; for example in 
the case of the Fairtrade premiums it is assumed that they know the dollar amount and 
understand the different ways that they can spend the premium (CEval, 2012). 
However, this may not always be the case. In cases where SPOs have many members, 
as will be seen in this field research, producers elect delegates to act as their 
representatives. Therefore, both the applicability of the model to Fairtrade’s voting 
processes and the role of power relations within this type of decision-making merit 
further exploration. 
 
According to Taylor, Murray et al. (2005), Fairtrade’s formal governance structures aim 
to achieve fairness and justice through democratic decision-making at all levels. As 
Doherty et al. (2012) note, democratic structures allow Fairtrade’s benefits to be shared 
in a more equitable way amongst producers. However, given the sheer number of 
producers involved in Fairtrade, this is highly challenging. As Francisco VanderHoff 
Boersma (2002, 20), one of the original actors in Fairtrade, noted almost a decade ago: 
“For some time there was no democratic participation within the [Fairtrade] system, 
which has only recently been partially resolved. There is a pyramid decision-making 
structure, where the top often does not communicate with the base.” VanderHoff 
Boersma (2009), seven years after his 2002 criticisms, again observes that there remains 
a need to democratize Fairtrade’s formal structures in order to give a greater voice to 
small producers. Bacon (2010) asserts that a fairer Fairtrade would involve more 
Southern civil society, grassroots stakeholders and consumers in the governance 
processes, combined with organizational reforms aimed at improving transparency, 
flexibility, and accountability. 
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Producers often possess very little knowledge of Fairtrade, and in many cases do not 
even realize that their organization is Fairtrade Certified (CEval, 2012, Dolan, 2010b, 
Getz and Shreck, 2006, Lyon, 2007a, Shreck, 2002, Smith, 2010b, Taylor, 2002). As 
Nelson and Pound (2009, 24) explain, “Whilst it could be said that Fairtrade is meeting 
the practical interests of these growers and workers, the strategic interests of individual 
farmers are not being met if they are not gaining awareness of Fairtrade.” These 
analysts unearth large discrepancies related to the level of information that producers 
are provided with. They find that individual producer knowledge of Fairtrade is limited, 
as more knowledge is housed at the co-operative management level (Nelson and Pound, 
2009). While it may seem quite surprising that producers often do not understand what 
Fairtrade is, this is in fact quite common (Taylor, 2002). Taylor (2002) outlines three 
levels of individual understanding: (1) farmers who know little about Fairtrade, (2) 
delegates who are provided with more information and have the ability to develop new 
skills and (3) elected leaders and technical advisors who develop contact with an 
increased number of people. As evidence of this, in their research on banana farmers in 
the Dominican Republic, Getz & Shreck (2006) find that the majority of farmers are 
uninformed about Fairtrade and feel disengaged from the certification process due to the 
fact that Fairtrade officials tend to spend time with leaders, rather than producers, when 
visiting. Despite this, there is evidence of Fairtrade’s effectiveness vis-à-vis how 
information is shared. Nicholls (2008, 6) highlights knowledge transfer as an indirect 
benefit of Fairtrade, claiming that the required organizational structure, specifically co-
operatives and representative bodies, results in “faster and more codified” knowledge 
transfer. He refers to the manner in which information is shared through the formalized 
communication channels found within the Fairtrade system, and attributes this to the 
fact that co-operatives must have representative bodies that are responsible for 
distributing the Fairtrade premiums.  
 
2.4.2 Design Properties 
Beyond these general principles, Fung and Wright list design properties that are integral 
to advancing the principles outlined above, two of which are devolution and centralized 
co-ordination. These authors highlight the importance of devolving power to local 
action units composed of individuals who are responsible for devising and 
implementing solutions, and who are held accountable for them. While these local units 
have considerable power and discretion, they are not autonomous; rather, there are 
linkages of accountability and communication. This is reflective of how SPOs are set 
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up, as the organizations belonging to Fairtrade have the power to make their own 
decisions. Of course, these decisions must be in line with the Fairtrade criteria as 
overseen by FLO, and there is therefore centralized supervision and coordination by the 
umbrella organization.  
 
Within this study I explore devolution at the level of producer organizations, 
considering the role of delegates. The General Assembly at the union is typically 
composed of delegates from each primary society, who ostensibly represent other 
members. Fairtrade premium allocation provides a useful means of assessing centralized 
coordination and devolution. Both the Fairtrade premiums and the Fairtrade 
Development Plan are voted on by the General Assembly of delegates at the union 
Annual General Meeting (AGM). Important questions to ask at this stage therefore 
relate to who participates in these meetings, and how decisions are made. 
 
The importance of assessing the delegate system is exemplified in a recent case study I 
conducted in Peru. While carrying out Fairtrade cocoa research with farmers, I 
discovered that all 32 delegates were male – elected through democratic processes, but 
all male nonetheless (Sutton, 2013a). These 32 male delegates are charged with 
representing groups of farmers and come together to vote on the usage of the Fairtrade 
premiums at the General Assembly. While they were elected through a democratic 
system as stipulated by Fairtrade, this poses a potential problem in that a wide range of 
interests may not be represented, and clearly illustrates a potential issue of low female 
representation at some producer co-operatives. 
 
2.4.3 Enabling Conditions 
The third element of EPG, after general principles and design properties, refers to the 
background conditions that may help or hinder EPG. The largest obstacle identified 
within the EPG model is that of power relations. Fung and Wright (2003, 18) are 
realistic about the danger of some participants attempting to use their power to 
manipulate decisions and state “While it may sometimes be difficult for a casual outside 
observer to distinguish between genuine deliberation and disingenuous posturing, the 
difference is nevertheless fundamental and generally apparent to participants.” 
Although these authors note that absolute equality is not required, they state that there 
must be sufficient equality of power between participants for the purposes of 
deliberation. Ansell and Gash (2008) claim that the collaborative governance process is 
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disposed to manipulation by strong stakeholders if some actors cannot participate 
equality or do not have the capacity or resources to participate. They outline the 
importance of developing measures to ensure that less powerful voices are represented 
and state: “If there are significant power/resource imbalances between stakeholders, 
such that important stakeholders cannot participate in a meaningful way, then effective 
collaborative governance requires a commitment to a positive strategy of empowerment 
and representation of weaker or disadvantaged stakeholders.” (Ansell and Gash, 2008, 
551)  
 
Some analysts assert that power is omnipresent in decision-making, as participation 
always incorporates power relations to a certain degree (Chambers, 2005, Cornwall, 
2004, Foucault, 1980). Chambers (2005) deems them unavoidable and necessary, noting 
that power relations must be acknowledged and managed well. Cornwall (2002, 2004) 
cites a need to understand power relations, asserting that it is essential to makes sense of 
them in order to understand participation in any given space. Foucault (1980), of course, 
views power as multidimensional and present in all interactions. He highlights the 
importance of understanding how power operates at multiple levels, noting, “Power 
must be analyzed as something that circulates, or rather as something which only 
functions in the form of a chain. It is never localized here or there…Power is employed 
and exercised through a net-like organization.” (Foucault, 1980, 98) As noted by Fung 
and Wright (2003), a certain degree of equality is required for the purposes of 
deliberation and democratic decision-making, and as such it is essential for 
organizations to understand and manage power relations. 
 
In this analysis I adopt the assumption that power is present in all interactions and has 
large implications for participation. Within Fairtrade, power relations are an extremely 
important consideration. As noted earlier, it is often those in elite managerial positions 
who are privy to the participatory discussions that FLO aims to foster. Lyon and 
Moberg (2010, 200) observe: “[…] discourses of reciprocity rarely penetrate beyond the 
small minority of well-travelled leaders from (Fairtrade) producer groups.” As one 
example of this, while engaged in ethnographic field research with Tanzanian Fairtrade 
beekeepers, Fisher (1997) identified a cleavage between management and producer 
representatives, as well as varying degrees of influence among these representatives. 
She notes that alliances and divisions amongst producers, as well as between them and 
the management are central to the co-operative’s performance (Fisher, 1997). Clearly, 
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there is a need to learn more about these governance issues in order to better understand 
the power relations that exist. Cornwall (2002, 5) claims that “issues of power and 
difference may not only undermine the very possibility of equitable, consensual 
decision-making, they may also restrict the possibility of “thinking outside the box”, 
reinforcing hegemonic perspectives and status-quo reinforcing solutions.” In their 
discussion on power, Ansell and Gash (2008, 551) assert: 
 
If some stakeholders do not have the capacity, organization, status, or resources 
to participate, or to participate on an equal footing with other stakeholders, the 
collaborative governance process will be prone to manipulation by stronger 
actors. […] If there are significant power/resource imbalances between 
stakeholders, such that important stakeholders cannot participate in a meaningful 
way, then effective collaborative governance requires a commitment to a 
positive strategy of empowerment and representation of weaker or 
disadvantaged stakeholders.  
 
In order for leaders to build broad and active participation, Lasker and Weiss (2003, 31) 
state that “the leaders need to get out into the community continually to see how people 
perceive the process, to establish new relationships, and to identify and engage new and 
diverse participants.” They argue that leaders must give participants a meaningful voice 
while encouraging participants to listen to each other. Furthermore, they must ensure 
that this is a broad array of diversity amongst participants in decision-making. As these 
authors outline:  
 
[C]ommunity collaborations appear to benefit from having leaders and staff who 
believe deeply in the capacity of diverse people and organizations to work 
together to identify, understand, and solve community problems. These kinds of 
individuals understand and appreciate different perspectives, are able to bridge 
diverse cultures, and are comfortable sharing ideas, resources, and power. 
(Lasker and Weiss, 2003, 30) 
 
I contend that a consideration of history is also key to understanding power dynamics. 
As this is not explicit in Fund & Wright’s model, I therefore borrow the element of 
‘starting conditions’ from Ansell and Gash’ (2008) model of collaborative governance. 
These starting conditions include (i) power-resource knowledge asymmetries, (ii) 
incentives for and constraints on participation, and (iii) prehistory of cooperation or 
conflict (initial trust level). I am primarily interested in the third element, as these 
authors claim that the history of cooperation or conflict is essential in determining the 
initial trust level. Ansell and Gash (2008, 560) note that “Collaborative governance 
strategies are particularly suited for situations that require ongoing cooperation.” As 
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Fairtrade governance requires the ongoing cooperation of those involved (i.e. in order to 
make decisions related to Board appointments, Fairtrade premium allocation, and 
Fairtrade compliance monitoring), it does meet the criteria. I therefore consider 
historical relationships at both the institutional and organizational level of Fairtrade 
governance in this study. As Ansell and Gash (2008, 553) outline: 
 
A prehistory of conflict is likely to express itself in low levels of trust, which in 
turn will produce low levels of commitment, strategies of manipulation, and 
dishonest communications […] On the other hand, a history of successful past 
cooperation can create social capital and high levels of trust that produce a 
virtuous cycle of collaboration. 
 
2.4.4 Institutional Objectives 
Participation is employed within EPG in two very different ways - as both a means and 
as an end in itself. While the procedural elements of EPG may be considered desirable 
in themselves, they will also be judged by their consequences. Fung and Wright 
therefore (2003) call for an exploration of effectiveness, equity, and participatory 
character as a means of understanding institutional objectives. They state that 
individuals who possess intimate information may know how best to improve the 
situation and may be more committed to implementing these solutions; overall, they 
claim that deliberative decision-making is likely to generate superior solutions. They 
note, “The learning capacity of the system as a whole, therefore, may be enhanced by 
the combination of decentralized empowered deliberation and centralized coordination 
and feedback.” (Fung and Wright, 2003, 25) They go on to highlight three features that 
lead to enhanced equity: delivering effective public action to those who do not generally 
enjoy this good, the inclusion of disadvantaged individuals who are typically excluded 
from these decisions, and deliberative group decision-making. Fung and Wright (2003, 
26) describe this ideal deliberative process: 
 
Parties make proposals and then justify them with reasons that the other parties 
in the group can support. A procedural norm of these groups is that they 
generate and adopt proposals that enjoy broad consensus support, though strict 
consensus is never a requirement. […] Since the idea of fairness is infused in the 
practice of reasonable discussion, truly deliberative decision-making should tend 
toward more equitable outcomes than those regulated by power, status, money, 
or numbers. 
 
How might broad participation serve to achieve development outcomes? Fung and 
Wright (2003) state that this occurs in two ways. Firstly, new channels of voice for 
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issues of importance to participants are established. Secondly, the quality of this 
participation may be higher. As Lasker and Weiss (2003, 29) assert: 
 
In addition to giving people voice, the [collaborative] process also combines the 
complementary knowledge, skills, and resources of participants so they can 
create new ideas and strategies together. When that happens, the way the group 
thinks about problems and the way it addresses problems are often very different 
from where any of the participants started. 
 
2.5 Theoretical Framework Overview 
In Table 1, I provide an overview of the theoretical framework. This framework is 
primarily based on Fung & Wright’s 2003 EPG model. However, I have also 
incorporated elements of Ansell & Gash’s (2008) collaborative governance framework 
that I find relevant to this discussion. The table below therefore outlines where there is 
overlap in these approaches, as well as which authors informed the various elements of 
the theoretical framework. 
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Table 1: Theoretical Framework Overview 
 
Source: Fung & Wright (2003), Ansell & Gash (2008) 
 
 
In reflecting on the applicability of EPG to practical cases such as Fairtrade, Fung and 
Wright (2003) suggest three considerations based on how well experiments conform to 
EPG, the model’s weaknesses, and the breadth of the scope. In order to assess the 
applicability of the EPG model to Fairtrade, I follow Fung & Wright’s critical 
dimensions of fit. This involves asking the six questions outlined in Table 2 below, to 
which I have added a third column ‘Within Fairtrade’ where I consider how to apply 
this to the case of Fairtrade. The interview schedule used in interviews with managers, 
as well as the questionnaire for producers (both of which are further outlined in Chapter 
Four), are structured around these six dimensions. 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Italicized terms are ones that I find less relevant to the research question and do not address herein. 
Fung & Wright’s (2003) EPG Model Ansell & Gash (2008) 
CG Model 
Procedural General 
Principles 
Practicality6  
Participation Stakeholders directly 
engage in decision-
making 
Deliberation Face-to-face dialogue 
Design 
Properties 
Devolution  
Centralized co-
ordination 
Shared understanding 
State-centric  
Enabling 
Conditions 
 
Power Relations Power and resource 
imbalances; leadership; 
trust-building 
Outcome-
related 
Institutional 
Objectives 
Effectiveness Institutional design 
Equity  
Participation  
History   Prior history of 
conflict/co-operation 
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Table 2: Critical Dimensions of Fit  
 
Source: Fung and Wright (2003) with author’s own additions 
 
 
Fung and Wright (2003) are very transparent about the potential problems with their 
EPG framework. In terms of their own criticisms of the model, they raise six primary 
concerns: (1) the domination of powerful actors, (2) “forum-shopping” by powerful 
individuals who use deliberative institutions when it suits them, (3) rent-seeking by 
interested parties, (4) a balkanization of politics, (5) apathy due to the high levels of 
commitment required, and (6) long-term sustainability (Fung and Wright, 2003, 33). I 
bear these criticisms in mind in my analysis, and also consider their final note on 
breadth of scope: overall they find that EPG makes a useful contribution to a large range 
of problems, while noting that it is not a strategy for universal reform. 
Dimension Question Within Fairtrade 
Deliberation How genuinely deliberative 
are the actual decision-
making processes? 
 
Is Fairtrade decision-making based 
on deliberation or aggregation? 
What is the level of face-to-face 
dialogue?  
How are the premium projects 
selected? 
Action How effectively are decisions 
translated into action? 
Is there the capacity or will to 
implement these decisions within 
Fairtrade co-ops? 
Are decisions upheld? 
Monitoring To what extent are the 
deliberative bodies able to 
effectively monitor the 
implementation of their 
decisions? 
Are the actors who make these 
decisions within Fairtrade’s 
governance structures involved in 
monitoring them (i.e. Fairtrade 
premium usage)? 
Can they hold responsible parties 
accountable? 
Centralized 
Coordination 
and Power 
To what extent do these 
reforms incorporate 
recombinant measures that 
coordinate the actions of 
local units and diffuse 
innovations among them? 
How are best practices and 
information shared across co-
operatives? 
Schools of 
Democracy 
To what extent do the 
deliberative processes 
constitute “schools for 
democracy”? 
Are the capacities of those who 
participate in Fairtrade increased? 
Are there other forms of capacity 
building? 
Outcomes Are the actual outcomes of 
the entire process more 
desirable than those of prior 
institutional arrangements? 
Has Fairtrade made a difference?  
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There are various limitations to the use of the EPG model in this research project. 
Overall, it sets out a number of prescriptive standards that are divorced from real world 
situations. As will be seen in Chapter 5, there are many areas of weakness in Fairtrade’s 
fit to EPG. While this is not surprising given the model’s potential limitations that Fung 
and Wright (2003) acknowledge, outlined in the previous paragraph, it does raise the 
issue of how relevant EPG is for understanding collaborative governance within 
Fairtrade. While acknowledging this as a challenge, I demonstrate that the potential 
identification of areas of weakness in Fairtrade’s fit with EPG may prove useful with 
regards to FLO’s efforts to strengthen producer participation and, as such, there is 
indeed value in using this framework. 
 
EPG is, in many ways, more of an application of a theoretical model than it is a 
theoretical framework in itself. While it has been utilized in innovative ways as a model 
for understanding strong collaborative governance, it may be less useful as a theory for 
analyzing how collaborative governance comes about. In order to address these 
theoretical limitations, I incorporate two additional theories: Ansell and Gash’ (2008) 
approach to collaborative governance and Hirschman’s (1970) work on exit, voice, and 
loyalty that follows in Section 2.7 on countervailing power.  This allows for an 
enhanced understanding of issues neglected in the EPG model such as prior history, 
trust, alternatives to voice, and the factors that may cause individuals to avoid exit. 
 
Additionally, EPG does not effectively address the issue of substantive, or meaningful, 
participation. Fung and Wright (2003) do remind us of the importance of exploring who 
gets left out and claim: “One lamentable fact of all contemporary democracies is that 
citizens who are advantaged in terms of their wealth, education, income, or membership 
in dominant racial and ethnic groups participate more frequently and effectively than 
those who are less well off.” (Fung and Wright, 2003, 34) However, the EPG 
framework is not well-suited to an exploration of substantive participation and does not 
ensure a thorough exploration of representation and diversity. In the following section, I 
turn to a discussion on representation and diversity as a means of learning more about 
who participates in Fairtrade governance and who gets left out. This involves moving 
beyond bottom-up participation and governance processes to explore issues of equity in 
more detail. The topic of gender equity emerges as a particularly important one at this 
stage, and leads to a later discussion of female representation, barriers to participation 
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for women, and capacity building. 
 
2.6 Representation and Diversity 
 
The previous section addressed the applicability of EPG to Fairtrade’s formalized 
governance structures, identifying a fit in many areas and also outlining several 
weaknesses. While it addressed issues such as barriers to participation and power 
relations, it is important to look beyond the vagueness of ‘producer participation’ to 
explore exactly which individuals are encapsulated in these efforts to foster more 
collaborative governance, as well as whose voices are heard. In this section I explore 
the category of ‘small producer’, considering heterogeneity at this level. In other words, 
I not only ask whether or not producers participate, but explore specifically which 
producers are more likely to be engaged in these collaborative processes. This is an 
important consideration as inclusion and diversity must be valued within collaborative 
governance, not only as normative principles, but for instrumental reasons: multiple 
perspectives may lead to more thoughtful decisions (Emerson et al., 2012).  
 
As outlined earlier, the category of ‘small producer’ comprises landowners and the 
landless, women and men, and leaders and non-leaders; there is therefore a great deal of 
heterogeneity at Fairtrade co-operatives. Spear (2004, 43), writing about Board 
composition at democratic member-based organizations such as co-operatives, notes 
that: “Issues of representativeness of the 1-5% that do elect the board must also be 
raised, since they are often dominated by people from the same social or cultural group, 
having higher incomes, better education, and being members of community elites 
(thereby further reducing trust and legitimacy).” Spear et al. (2007,10) identify another 
problem as ‘delegate syndrome’, whereby delegates may act in their own interests rather 
than doing what is best for the organization. As Fung (2006) notes, academic accounts 
of participatory small group decision-making often find them to be no more inclusive 
than other kinds of governance and decision-making. He elaborates: 
 
Voices of minority, less educated, diffident, or culturally subordinate 
participants are often drowned out by those who are wealthy, confident, 
accustomed to management, or otherwise privileged. Liabilities such as 
parochialism, lack of expertise, and resource constraints may impair the 
problem-solving and administrative capabilities of local organizations relative to 
centralized forms. (Fung, 2006, 8) 
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While Tallontire (2009) expresses optimism about recent changes to FLO’s governance 
structures and processes, she calls for an increased understanding of heterogeneity at the 
producer level. She claims that, although important governance changes have been 
made in FLO and producer voices are starting to be heard, a greater understanding of 
the diversity of producer agendas is still required. Dolan (2010b) finds in her in-depth 
study of a Kenyan Fairtrade tea factory that producer representation is a major challenge 
at both the international and local levels within Fairtrade. She asserts that Fairtrade is 
“marked less by collaboration and consent than by patronage and exclusion.” (Dolan, 
2010b, 34) Arce (2009, 1039) asserts:  
 
This suggests that policy decisions within the fair trade movement and 
businesses need to be based on a more differentiated view of the impacts of fair 
trade on producer communities, taking into consideration dynamic social 
processes and networks, including processes of social exclusion, in order to 
consider whether and how equity is to be achieved at the local level.  
 
Unsurprisingly, in her review of the Fairtrade literature, Le Mare (2008) finds that 
everyone does not benefit equally from Fairtrade. She highlights tensions in a system 
that requires participants to be democratically organized, depicting the organizational 
dilemma of equating, “on the one hand, the need for expert knowledge on coffee 
markets to inform decisions, with the desire, on the other hand, for the widespread 
involvement of farmers, who do not understand market mechanisms, in the decision-
making process.” (Le Mare, 2008, 1931) In their research on coffee farmers, Taylor, 
Murray et al. (2005) note that Fairtrade incorporates diverse actors with varying 
interests. As a result, bringing these individuals together poses many challenges for 
facilitating participation. In Fairtrade then, a great deal depends on the role that 
individual producers or their delegates have in governance forums, such as the Annual 
General Assembly, as well as how necessary cooperation is for tasks such as 
determining the usage of the Fairtrade premium. Dolan (2010b, 158) states, “[…] while 
participation is a lauded touchstone of fair trade and the key to [Fairtrade 
International’s] public credibility, producer representation remains a challenge at both 
international and local levels.” 
 
Drawing on a ten-month qualitative study with Tanzanian artisanal miners comprising 
focus groups and interviews, Fisher (2007) finds that opportunities are particularly 
limited for certain social categories including poor women, elderly people, and 
impoverished children. She outlines: “In this respect, although existing processes of 
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integration have to some extent incorporated claim holders into decision-making and 
communication processes, they have done little to bring out the ‘silent voices’ in 
artisanal mining.” (Fisher, 2007, 752) Similarly, in his 14-month anthropological 
research on Costa Rican coffee farmers and Nicaraguan migrant labourers, Luetchford 
(2007) finds that the most marginalized individuals within the coffee sector are landless 
workers, women, and migrants. He further claims “To be specific, what is obscured in 
this representation of the coffee industry, small farming families, the cooperative, and, 
by extension, fair trade, are inequalities between landed, land poor and landless, women 
and men, residents and migrants.” (Luetchford, 2007, 10) Smith (2010b), in her study of 
six organizations of banana farmers in four countries, also finds that Fairtrade has made 
limited progress in overcoming social inequalities, specifically with regards to how 
marginalized groups such as women and migrant workers participate in governance and 
act as representatives.  
 
Other studies specify the marginalized groups that tend to be left out of these processes 
altogether, in particular women, migrant workers, and landless people. In their meta-
analysis of 77 Fairtrade studies, Vagneron and Roquigny (2011, 10) observe that 
“different categories of beneficiaries have a different access to fair trade and the most 
discriminated social categories (e.g. women, temporary wage workers) benefit less from 
the positive impacts of fair trade.” They also note that 19 of 31 studies on inequality 
demonstrated that Fairtrade may even engender inequalities or exacerbate inequalities at 
the local level. These authors state that, by supporting a particular group of 
beneficiaries, Fairtrade has the potential to create conflict or highlight inequalities 
amongst individuals, such as women and men. They also find that Fairtrade may 
privilege some groups over others, or that the benefits may be restricted to a small 
group of individuals. In Fairtrade then, a great deal depends on the role that individual 
producers take on. Whilst SPO members may be able to participate directly in decision-
making in smaller co-operatives, larger co-operatives instead require a General 
Assembly of delegates to represent members. This once again highlights the importance 
of focusing on the various levels of Fairtrade governance, rather than only the primary 
co-operative.  
 
A consideration of gender equity is highly pertinent to this discussion of participation 
and representation. Rural women make up one quarter of the world’s population yet 
tend to have smaller and less profitable crops, receive five per cent of extension 
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services, and access only ten per cent of credit (United Nations, 2012a, World Bank, 
2012). According to Fairtrade International (2013b), producer co-operatives commit to 
many principles when they join the Fairtrade system, one of which involves ensuring 
equal opportunities for women, and FLO was in the process of creating a gender 
strategy at the time of research. The Charter of Fairtrade Principles (WFTO and 
Fairtrade International, 2009) highlights equal opportunities for women and FLO 
follows ILO Conventions 100 and 111 on non-discrimination.  
 
However, a review of the literature indicates that gender equity is not inherent in 
Fairtrade. While there are some concrete examples of gender equality at select 
organizations (Ronchi, 2002), this certainly cannot be assumed. As highlighted in two 
separate reviews of the Fairtrade literature (Le Mare 2008; Nelson and Pound 2009), 
much more needs to be done in order to further gender equity within Fairtrade. Nelson 
and Pound (2009, 33) claim that, “in most of the primary co-operatives Fairtrade is not 
having a significant impact on the prevailing gender inequalities and this is not a 
primary objective.” Taylor (2002) also finds that women do not play a prominent role in 
governance and that men tend to dominate decision-making in his study of seven cases 
in Latin America. Based on the same Fairtrade coffee meta-review, Murray et al. (2003) 
call for a strengthening of women’s participation in Fairtrade. 
 
While Fairtrade International has taken strides towards increasing female participation, 
placing women on committees and Boards of Directors, much remains to be done. The 
issue is not straightforward. As Cornwall (2003, 1330) reminds us, “Increasing the 
numbers of women involved may serve instrumental goals, but will not necessarily 
address more fundamental issues of power. There is no reason to suppose that women, 
by virtue of their sex, are any more open to sharing power and control than men.” White 
(1996, 7) also notes that “simply being there doesn’t ensure that women have a real say; 
and, even if they do, there is no guarantee that they will speak for others in a similar 
situation.” By simply adding women to the equation, as one might with imposed quotas, 
Fairtrade may indeed ignore the issue of difference.  
 
I do not attempt to assess the gender impact of Fairtrade, as this requires a separate 
study and alternative methodology. I do, however, highlight the importance of further 
research in this area and use a discussion of capacity building to highlight some of the 
challenges for women that training could serve to address. When I refer to gender, I 
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adopt the United Nations definition of “the social attributes and opportunities associated 
with being male and female and the relationships between women and men and girls 
and boys, as well as the relations between women and those between men.” (United 
Nations, 2013) It is also essential to note that ‘women’ are not homogeneous, in the 
same way that ‘small producers’ are not. As Smith (2013, 104) explains: 
 
[W]ealthier or more educated women, or women with assets such as land, may 
be in a relatively strong bargaining position and will experience different 
relations with men and welfare outcomes from poor women dependent on male 
relatives for access to all resources. 
 
How then to address the issue of representation, given the fact that, clearly, every 
individual who belongs to the Fairtrade system cannot be present or be an equal 
participant in decision-making? And how to establish this ‘stronger voice’ as Fairtrade 
aims to do? In the following section I introduce Fung and Wright’s (2003) notion of 
countervailing power as a means of understanding representation of those individuals 
who are typically marginalized within Fairtrade’s governance processes. 
 
2.7 Countervailing Power 
 
Collaborative governance emphasizes the importance of mobilizing those stakeholders 
who are typically less active and under-represented. As non-inclusive representation 
may threaten the legitimacy of collaborative outcomes, I consider how diversity may be 
promoted within EPG. While in a conventional adversarial model one might expect to 
find special interest groups and collective action, it is often assumed that these are not 
present within participatory collaboration. However, as outlined in the above discussion 
on representation and power relations, one can still find co-optation by elites and 
experts, as well as participatory ‘window dressing’ within this model. Fung and Wright 
note: “Both collaborative and adversarial modes of governance suffer from the 
characteristic danger that some interests and parties may be improperly subordinated for 
the sake of more powerful interests and groups.” (2003, 263)  
 
In their discussion of EPG, Fung and Wright introduce ‘countervailing power’ as 
essential to EPG, defining this as: 
 
[A] variety of mechanisms that reduce, and perhaps even neutralize, the power-
advantages of ordinarily powerful actors. […] Countervailing power is the too-
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simple concept that describes how powerful actors with privileged access to 
decision-making venues may be challenged and even defeated from time to time 
by the weak and less organized. (Fung and Wright, 2003, 260) 
 
Fung and Wright make four claims regarding countervailing power in collaborative 
governance. The first is that participatory collaboration, including EPG, will fail 
without countervailing power, as this presence can level the playing field and create 
conditions for fair collaboration. The second is that the forms of countervailing power 
often differ drastically between collaborative and adversarial models. They note that: 
“Participatory collaboration requires organizations with very different skills, sources of 
support, and bases of solidarity.” (Fung and Wright, 2003, 266) The third is that, as one 
might expect based on the second claim, countervailing power within these two 
governance models, adversarial and collaborative, is not interchangeable. The fourth 
and final claim is that, despite the fact that appropriately designed institutions can 
facilitate the presence of countervailing voices, collaborative rules and procedures will 
not necessarily generate suitable countervailing power as these sources typically arise 
outside of collaborative governance institutions.  
 
Yet where does countervailing power come from? And can it erode solidarity and 
support within the organizations of the actors it challenges? Fung and Wright (2003, 
266) note that there are “few conclusive findings regarding the operations, outcomes, or 
even prevalence of this emergent governance mode.” It may prove useful to learn more 
about whether or not countervailing power is present in Fairtrade and, if so, where it 
comes from and what its resulting impact is. Perhaps the 'stronger voice' that Fairtrade 
seeks to facilitate may only be established when there is a countervailing group (such as 
women, the illiterate, or migrant workers) who can ensure that collaborative 
participatory governance is truly representative. Therefore for collaborative 
participatory governance to exist in Fairtrade, and for these heterogeneous producer 
voices to be heard, the presence of a countervailing power may be necessary.  
 
As outlined in Appendix 4, the producer network for Latin America and the Caribbean, 
the CLAC, presents an example of a countervailing power within Fairtrade. Fairtrade 
Africa, in contrast, does not appear to exist within the institutional system as a 
countervailing power. This is particularly evident in its willingness to represent all 
Fairtrade organizations, comprising both co-operatives and plantations, in contrast to 
the CLAC’s decision to only work with small-scale producers. I do, however, identify 
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countervailing power in the form of breakaway groups in the Kilimanjaro region that 
have separated for the purpose of their marketing activities, yet continue to exert 
pressure upon the larger unions. Hirschman’s (1970) work on exit, voice, and loyalty 
provides a useful framework for exploring this. 
 
2.7.1 Exit, Voice, and Loyalty 
Hirschman’s (1970) book Exit, Voice and Loyalty articulates the manner in which 
people may choose to leave an organization if it deteriorates and they perceive a 
decrease in quality or benefit. Hirschman’s treatise explores how individuals respond 
when an organization deteriorates or demonstrates a diminished benefit to its members. 
While Hirschman’s theory begins with the firm, he notes that it is largely applicable to 
“organizations that provide services to members without direct monetary counterpart” 
(Hirschman, 1970, 3), indicating that it is germane to the co-operative model. He asserts 
that organizations may undergo a “repairable lapse” from time to time and purports that 
individuals have two options when this happens: exit and voice (Hirschman, 1970, 2). 
Individuals either withdraw from the relationship or attempt to improve the relationship 
through a complaint or proposal for change; for example, citizens under political 
repression may either emigrate or protest, employees may either quit their jobs or 
express their concerns, and co-operative members may either leave the co-op or protest 
at meetings. As an example, in his work on labour unions, Freeman (1980) observes 
lower exit rates for unionists whose grievance system provides them with a “voice” 
alternative. I contend that the facilitation of voice via collaborative governance may be 
one reason why these individuals and organizations stay in Fairtrade. If the Fairtrade 
system does indeed facilitate ‘voice’ as it purports to do, perhaps the value that 
stakeholders place on engaging in collaboration outweighs the costs of leaving the 
system. 
 
Both exit and voice can be used to identify signs of dissatisfaction or decline in an 
organization; however, there are large differences in these two approaches. Exit is 
linked to economic action, akin to Adam Smith’s (1776) invisible hand that describes 
the self-regulating nature of markets. When an individual, such as a dissatisfied 
customer or, in this case, a co-operative member, chooses exit, it is a neat and 
impersonal process; Hirschman (1970) therefore identifies an economist’s bias in favour 
of exit. Voice, in contrast, is information-rich, political, and complex; as Hirschman 
explains: 
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It is a far more “messy” concept […]; it implies articulation of one’s critical 
opinions rather than a private, “secret” vote in the anonymity of a supermarket; 
and finally, it is direct and straightforward rather than roundabout. Voice is 
political action par excellence. (Hirschman, 1970, 16) 
 
The greater the availability of exit, the less likely it is that voice will be used. However, 
the possibility of exit, whether it is made openly or simply understood, can strengthen 
the effectiveness of voice. In other words, willingness to use the voice mechanism is 
reduced by exit, but the effectiveness of voice is increased by exit (Hirschman, 1970). 
This is where Hirschman asserts that loyalty to the organization plays a role, as it may 
serve to reduce the possibility of exit, particularly when the alternatives are not 
appealing. He claims that, as a rule, “loyalty holds exit at bay and activates voice.” 
(Hirschman, 1970, 78) Loyalty may be defined as an important threshold that 
encompasses a commitment to stay with the organization, regardless of whether or not it 
changes (Saltman and von Ofter, 1989, Stryjan, 1987). Membership organizations, such 
as co-operatives, theoretically seek to have engaged members who are less likely to 
leave and typically aim to foster loyalty. According to Hirschman: “As a result of 
loyalty, these potentially most influential customers and members will stay on longer 
than they would ordinarily, in the hope or, rather, reasoned expectation that 
improvement or reform can be achieved ‘from within’.” (1970, 79) Loyalty can also 
raise the cost of exit and thus restore the balance; as a result of loyalty, “members may 
be locked into their organizations a little longer and thus use the voice option with 
greater determination and resourcefulness than would otherwise be the case.” 
(Hirschman, 1970, 83) 
 
Hirschman’s notion of exit, voice, and loyalty can be mapped onto the EPG framework 
that I employ in this research. As seen in Figure 2, should EPG’s General Principles, 
Design Properties, Enabling Conditions, and Institutional Objectives (as outlined in 
Chapter 2) not be satisfied, one can imagine a higher likelihood that individuals will 
choose exit. This exit option is, of course, moderated by the loyalty that they experience 
towards the co-operative. In contrast, should all of EPG’s principles be met, one can 
imagine that there is a higher likelihood of choosing voice. If this leads to genuine 
engagement in collaborative governance, a voice in decision-making may be achieved. 
However, if this voice is unheard or ignored, as will be seen in the case of the G32, the 
exit option might then be viewed more favourably by these individuals.  
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Figure 2: EPG, Voice, and Exit 
 
       PARTICIPATION AS 
 
 
 
 
 
         END   MEANS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           PRESENT? 
 
 
 
 
 
YES                NO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Source: Author’s own based on Fung and Wright (2003) and Hirschman (1970) 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
 
Overall, I conclude that we can use EPG to explore whether or not Fairtrade gives 
producers a voice in decision-making, as it appears to provide a suitable framework for 
this exploration of collaborative governance. The task of facilitating ‘stronger voices’ 
for producers within Fairtrade is highly complex. Fung and Wright’s (2003) EPG model 
provides a framework for unpacking the nature of producer participation that allows us 
to better understand the nature of collaborative governance. As I have argued, EPG’s 
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notions of bottom-up participation, deliberation, and power relations are essential 
governance considerations at various levels of Fairtrade, stemming from the 
institutional level of Fairtrade International to the organizational and individual level. 
While FLO has demonstrated a commitment to improving producer participation and its 
governance structures appear to be evolving accordingly, much remains to be done to 
ensure that individual producers are genuinely engaged. Therefore, a consideration of 
representation and exclusion is essential to any discussion of participation, and FLO 
may be able to develop more effective policies and standards by carefully considering 
heterogeneity, diversity, and the marginalized, as well as recognizing countervailing 
power, at the various levels of its governance structures. Hirschman’s approach to exit, 
voice, and loyalty provides a useful means of understanding countervailing power and 
the consequences of voices going unheard. 
 
There are also implications for practice, relating to Fairtrade co-operatives for small 
producers. Firstly, this chapter’s discussion is relevant to the capacity building efforts 
that FLO and other external organizations support and engage in. As highlighted in the 
discussions of bottom-up participation and representation, producers face many barriers 
to participation, as well as issues of potential inequity including a lack of representation 
within decision-making. Secondly, leadership and its accompanying power relations 
may require further attention by Fairtrade practitioners, as there is clearly the potential 
for imbalance at various levels of FLO. Thirdly, EPG provides a useful framework for 
assessing the nature of governance within FLO, and its application may be of interest to 
those individuals engaged in developing Fairtrade policy and standards.  
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Chapter 3: The Tanzanian Context 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Tanzania’s turbulent political landscape has played a large role in determining the 
nature of the country’s co-operative movement. In this chapter I outline the history of 
agricultural co-operatives in Tanzania, the contemporary policy environment, and the 
potential for member-based co-operatives. The history of socialism under Nyerere’s 
ujamaa affords an interesting contrast to today’s version of ‘African capitalism’, and the 
liberalization that followed in the early 1990s dramatically changed Tanzania’s 
agricultural policy. In order to understand the impact of these changes in the macro-
environment, it is useful to consider the country’s history throughout these periods of 
colonialism, independence, and post-structural adjustment liberalization.  
 
I also explore the contemporary policy environment. Along with other African 
countries, such as Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia (Borda-Rodriguez and Vicari, 2013, 
Develtere et al., 2008), Tanzania is currently experiencing a co-operative renaissance. 
The prospects for revival are strong and certification systems such as Fairtrade and 
organic offer unions new market alternatives. However, while the government claims to 
support autonomy and independence for these institutions, it is not clear that this is the 
case in practice. I incorporate an overview of Tanzania’s coffee sector here, which the 
unions that I include in this study all belong to. 
 
3.2 African Co-operatives 
 
According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), approximately seven per 
cent of the Africa population is affiliated with the co-operative movement (Marjurin, 
2012). The roots of this movement are, however, quite different from those of the so-
called developed countries, where co-operatives evolved more organically according to 
social movements and economic comparative advantage (Birchall and Simmons, 2009). 
Africa’s co-operative model suffers from a legacy of heavy State involvement based on 
the export strategies of colonial governments. African agricultural co-operatives 
typically evolved through colonial efforts to ensure export and marketing opportunities 
for cash crops such as coffee, bananas, and cotton. Historically, these co-operatives 
were used as a tool for grouping producers into clusters in order to facilitate collection 
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of essential export commodities and cost effectiveness (Develtere, 2008). As a result, 
many were imposed by the State rather than developed through grassroots initiatives. 
Co-operatives in Africa were utilized as tools of government policy, which 
compromised co-operative autonomy (Theron, 2010). Following independence, it was 
common for these newly sovereign states to take over co-operatives as a means of 
developing rural areas. African governments had the power to direct the affairs of these 
organizations and, in the case of agricultural co-operatives, State Marketing Boards 
processed and exported crops such as coffee, thereby controlling the industry 
(Wanyama, Undated). These co-operatives were protected from competition and 
granted monopolies, as will be seen in the case of Tanzanian coffee, but lost their 
autonomy (Develtere et al., 2008). As Wanyama (Undated, 2) notes, “Cooperatives 
were subsequently engulfed into State politics, thereby losing their voluntary character 
that is in tandem with the principle of democratic member control.”  
 
Following the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s structural adjustment policies 
implemented in the early 1990s, the liberalization period aimed to allow co-operatives 
to separate themselves from State control (Develtere et al., 2008). Support services were 
withdrawn, often without contingency plans, and legal frameworks were restructured in 
order to promote ICA principles (Wanyama, Undated). Despite this, many of these co-
operatives remained highly affected by the policies of their national governments. The 
World Bank, in the early nineties, found that government was often still highly involved 
following structural adjustment, contrary to the intended self-reliance of these 
organizations (Hussi et al., 1993). While African co-operatives became, ostensibly, 
member-run organizations, many retained government-run features following 
independence: they were still large, had somewhat inflexible governance structures, and 
were based on administrative regions (Tallontire, 1999). To complicate matters further, 
liberalization opened markets up to new actors who affected the monopoly status 
previously held by many co-operatives. These new buyers sought to maximize 
efficiency and offered competitive pricing (Wanyama, Undated). Many co-operatives 
collapsed, while others suffered from corruption and mismanagement as leaders 
experienced newfound freedom (Wanyama, Undated). Others, however, used this as an 
opportunity to reinvent themselves, perhaps restructuring or pursuing new markets and 
the acquisition of Fairtrade or organic certification. Wanyama (Undated) finds that, 
while this departure from State control was necessary, there remains a need for some 
form of government regulation. 
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While many of Africa’s co-operatives did not survive independence, some pursued what 
Develtere et al. (2008, x) refer to as a “third generation co-operative model rooted in 
local communities, giving voice to local producers, and building strength in local 
economies.” These authors identify a co-operative renaissance in Africa, particularly at 
the primary society level. Two of the key factors to success for the co-operatives studied 
are democratic governance and accountability, and these analysts claim that a better 
educated membership has emerged in recent years (Develtere et al., 2008, Shaw, 
2006a). However, successful co-operatives still struggle to distance themselves from the 
State and to achieve autonomy and independence; while government involvement is 
slowly decreasing overall, it remains a significant problem. These authors outline two 
distinct perspectives on co-operatives today: (1) they became ineffective when the State 
took over and (2) they are the way forward for African development. They note: 
 
[T]here is sufficient evidence to conclude that the cooperative sector has not 
withered away. Signs unmistakably indicate that cooperatives are still playing a 
determining role in the structuring of African societies: they are important 
economic operators in many sectors; they mobilize significant capital and social 
commitment; and they continue to be recognized by government and donors. 
(Develtere and Pollet, 2008, 39) 
 
Develtere and Pollet (2008) find that African co-operatives today tend to have a 
heterogeneous membership base that mixes the poor with those who are less poor, and 
that Board members tend to have higher literacy rates and more land than other 
members. They note that, as one might expect based on research into social capital, the 
poor stand to gain from their participation in these co-operatives. However, the need to 
purchase shares may be prohibitive for poorer farmers. In addition, co-operatives tend 
to be “initiated, composed and run by men” and male members and directors tend to 
dominate (Develtere and Pollet, 2008, 59). In his research on Kenya, Wanyama (2008a) 
explains that this is often due to the traditional male ownership of agricultural assets, 
such as land and livestock; despite the fact that women are the dominant producers in 
the agricultural sector, men are the majority shareholders because they legally own the 
family land. Notwithstanding the ICA’s first principle on open membership, gender 
remains a governance challenge at many of the co-operatives studied; levels of female 
participation are low and co-operatives tend to be male-dominated (Develtere et al., 
2008).  
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Hussi et al. (1993) claim that co-operatives in Africa have demonstrated, at best, 
‘mediocre performance’. Develtere and Pollet (2008) observe that less prosperous co-
operatives tend to struggle with weaknesses in leadership, management, and internal 
governance. Referring to this as the ‘black box’ of smallholder organizations, Shaw 
(2012) notes that it is not enough to simply be organized into a co-operative; rather, it is 
essential to closely examine issues related to governance, membership, and ownership. 
Many agricultural co-operative organizations have not yet attracted and cultivated 
quality management and the right leadership (Chambo, 2009). Chambo observes: “This 
has put more strains on the implementation of good governance programs of 
transparency, accountability and member participation for the development and 
expansion of the co-operative enterprise in Africa”. (2009, 11) He calls for a review of 
member education, and a new generation of co-operatives attracting more effective 
management and good leadership. As Danda & Bamanyisa (2011, 234) note, 
“Adherence of leaders to major foundations and principles of good governance, 
including participation, transparency, effectiveness, equity, rule of law and 
accountability, are cornerstones for strong and resilient co-operatives honestly serving 
members.” 
 
Pollet (2009, 28), in his survey of nine African countries, finds that co-operatives in the 
East African countries of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda “are developing well and are 
becoming more prominent as a civil society force.” The number of co-operatives and 
co-operative membership in Tanzania has been on the rise in recent years. Pollet (2009) 
notes that Tanzania had 5730 registered co-operatives in 2005 and 8597 in 2008, 
approximately 80 per cent of which were deemed active, and that membership in co-
operative increased from 600,000 to 1,600,000 during this same period. He attributes 
this expansion to intensive promotional work by the Cooperative Development 
Department in Tanzania that “created conditions favourable to formation of 
cooperatives.” (Pollet, 2009, 5) It should be noted, however, that many of these 
organizations are Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs) rather than agricultural 
co-operatives.7   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs) are defined as “organisations formed by individuals who 
freely pool their financial resources together and make them available for the provision of a range of 
financial services to the members.  They are user-owned financial institutions where the members 
mobilise savings and later, place them at the disposal of members to finance their economic needs.” 
(Chambo 2004) 
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3.3 Country Context: Tanzania 
 
In sub-Saharan Africa, 63 per cent of the population lives in rural areas where they are 
typically active in agriculture; the United Republic of Tanzania is above this average 
with a rural population of 75 per cent in 2010 (World Bank, 2012a, World Bank, 2013). 
Tanzania relies heavily on export crops and the country’s main agricultural exports 
include tea, cotton, cashew nuts, fruit, vegetables, and coffee - the subject of this 
research project. While the agricultural sector has under-performed in recent years, the 
Tanzanian government is investing a growing share of its budget in agriculture (World 
Bank, 2013). Further details on Tanzania are provided in Appendix 5. 
 
An understanding of the country’s history, and the role of the State, is critical to this 
study’s exploration of governance in the co-operative sector. The past century in 
Tanzania has seen the development of Africa’s first native coffee co-operative, post-
independence co-operative support followed by disbandment of the co-op sector, and 
post-liberalization capitalism. According to Bee (1996), Tanzania’s co-operative history 
can be classified into six main periods, outlined in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Tanzania’s Co-operative History 
 
 
Source: Bee (1996) 
 
3.3.1 Colonialism and Independence 
Dating back to the 1880s, French Jesuit missionaries were the first to introduce Arabica 
coffee, one of the country’s most important crops, into Kilimanjaro (Tanzania Coffee 
Board, 2010). During the German colonial period, which began in the 1880s, agriculture 
was organized into three production spheres: white settlers, plantation companies, and 
African smallholders (Ponte, 2002). This did not change much with the commencement 
of the British colonial period in 1919, and in 1925 the Kilimanjaro Native Planters 
Period Classification 
1925 – 1961 Growth of indigenous co-operatives 
1961 – 1967 Nationalistic period: expansion of co-operatives 
1967 – 1976 Infusion of the ujamaa ideology into co-operation 
1976 – 1984 Dissolution of co-operatives and parastatalization  
1982 – 1991 Reinstatement of co-operatives and retreat of the parastatal sector 
1991 on Deofficialization of co-operatives and privatization 
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Association (KNPA) was formed in order to bulk and market Chagga (Bantu-peaking 
indigenous people) coffee in the Moshi District. This was also intended, according to 
the Tanzania Coffee Board (2010), to protect the interests of small farmers. This was 
the first indigenous association of Africa coffee farmers and was created in order to 
address the monopoly of the crop by European settlers (Develtere et al., 2008). It did 
not, however, become a co-operative until 1932 when the Cooperatives Ordinance was 
enacted. In 1933 KNPA became the Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union (KNCU), 
one of the case studies I explore, and was registered with 11 primary cooperative 
societies. Aside from KNCU, the colonial government did not generally support the 
development of the co-operative movement. It did, however, intervene in crop 
marketing in the 1940s, at which time Marketing Boards were established for most 
crops and were used to keep farm gate prices low (Ponte, 2002).  
 
In 1961, Tanzania ushered in a new era of independence and nationalization with the 
election of Julius Nyerere, also known as mwalimu (Swahili for teacher, Nyerere's 
profession prior to joining politics). He held the presidency from 1961 to 1985 after 
being elected in a one-party election. Nyerere unified the population through the 
common language of Swahili and his party's policies aimed to promote a cohesive 
national identity in lieu of tribal alliances. Early in his presidency, Nyerere supported 
and worked to expand co-operatives, at times into areas with little co-operative tradition 
or experience playing a large supervisory and regulatory role in expanding the 
“government-enforced cooperative movement.” (Baffes, 2003, 2) With the Arusha 
Declaration of 1967, Nyerere’s Tanganyika African National Union party's Policy on 
Socialism and Self Reliance, he outlined the ideals of ujamaa (familyhood or 
brotherhood). This radical plan committed Tanzania to a socialist approach to 
development; Nyerere viewed self-help as the means towards rural development and, as 
such, co-operatives became an important tool for achieving this self-reliance through 
economic growth. However, this model of development was challenged by many factors 
including low export commodity prices and the 1970s oil crisis. 
 
3.3.2 Villagization and Liberalization 
Over time, Nyerere’s support for the co-operative model shifted. The era following the 
Arusha Declaration was characterized by heavy government intervention, land 
nationalization, and strict agricultural marketing control (Ponte, 2002). In the early 
1970s, Nyerere moved the majority of the country's population to farms in a 
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controversial forced villagization program. Up to 11 million people moved, either 
voluntarily or forcibly, between 1973 and 1976 (Mapolu, 1990). While the 1975 
Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act declared these villages to be multi-purpose co-
operatives, in 1976 the government abruptly announced the disbandment of all co-
operative unions (Bryceson, 1983). Nyerere justified this with claims that co-operatives 
could not cope with his “quick march to socialism.” (Birchall and Simmons, 2010, 474) 
The government dissolved and liquidated all co-operative societies on assertions of 
inefficiency, corruption, and undemocratic practices (Bee, 2011).  All land became 
common property managed by the State, and from 1976 to 1982 co-operatives were 
replaced with crop authorities responsible for marketing agricultural produce directly 
from the villages. Cooperatives became parastatals, losing both their assets and their 
independence. According to Kanyinga et al (1994, 38), “From 1964 until the early 
1980s Tanzania was the site of one of Africa’s furthest-going forms of statism, that is, 
of systematic efforts by the state to penetrate/dissolve civil society and remould it in the 
image of the state itself.”  
 
In the early 1980s, Tanzania's agricultural production stagnated due to external factors 
such as weak international demand for agricultural products and deteriorating 
international terms of trade, combined with public overspending and excessive 
government intervention (Ponte, 2002). As a result, there were calls to revive co-
operatives (Tallontire, 1999). Six years following their dissolution, Tanzanian 
parliament reinstated marketing co-operatives with a 1982 Co-operative Societies Act. 
However, as Tallontire claims (1999, 185): 
 
The 1982 Co-operative Societies Act that reinstated the unions did not tackle 
many of the problems in the marketing system, nor problems endemic to co-
operatives prior to their abolition. Co-operatives in Tanzania were essentially 
government institutions operating in a monopoly marketing system. 
 
Resisting the World Bank and International Monetary Fund's structural adjustment 
policies, Nyerere eventually stepped down in 1985 after five terms as president. In 
1986, Nyerere's successor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, embraced market liberalization and 
negotiated structural and economic adjustment programs with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (Ponte, 2002). The co-operative unions had 
amassed huge debts by 1989, which the government publicly admitted responsibility for 
and later forgave 88 per cent of (Birchall and Simmons, 2010). 
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The 1991 Cooperative Societies Act made co-operatives autonomous from the 
government. Factories were established to replace the parastatal companies of 
Tanzania’s Coffee Marketing Board system, and the co-operative unions lost much of 
the coffee curing market share (Ponte, 2002). Private traders, both local and foreign, 
rapidly eroded the dominance of co-operatives in the marketing of agricultural products. 
These private companies were now able to go straight to the coffee farm to buy, and 
farmers could sell to these private buyers rather than the co-operative.  
 
There remains a legacy of government intervention in Tanzania today. The country’s 
co-operatives remain suspicious that the government will one day again take over or 
disband co-operatives, and there continues to be a perception that today’s co-operatives 
still belong to the government (Chambo, 2006). According to Birchall and Simmons 
(2010), loyalty has suffered: 
 
The loyalty of farmers, some of whom have still not been paid for crops sold to a 
co-op some years ago, will take a long time to get back. Linked to this is the 
question of governance in the two key coffee unions, Kagera (KCU) and 
Kilimanjaro (KNCU). There has been reform, and both unions are making an 
impact on farmers’ incomes through fair trade. However, a careful watch needs 
to be made to ensure they remain well governed and managed in a ‘lean’ way so 
that the maximum of benefit goes back to the farmers. (Birchall and Simmons, 
2010, 493-494) 
 
3.4 Contemporary Structures and State Intervention  
 
So what role should Tanzania’s government play? According to Pollet (2009), the 
government can (1) opt for absence and deregulation, (2) limit its role to legislation and 
co-operative recognition, (3) facilitate co-operatives by providing training, promotional 
campaigns, and financial audits, or (4) involve the co-operative movement in 
policymaking. Pollet (2009, 28) finds that some East Africa co-operatives, including 
Tanzania’s, are “developing well and are becoming more prominent as a civil society 
force.” For example, Tanzania’s cooperatives have been invited to participate in poverty 
eradication policy papers, such as East Africa’s Vision 2020 strategy (Pollet, 2009). 
However, not all the depictions are positive. Shaw (2006a) observes that Tanzania’s 
governance standards are lacking; low levels of education may thwart effectual 
management and are linked to problems of democratic control. 
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Tanzania’s co-operatives today fall under the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security 
and Cooperatives, which supervises the agricultural co-operative sector and is 
responsible for its legal monitoring (see Figure 3). The Cooperative Development 
Department (CDD) is the main external contact for most primary and secondary co-
operatives. The CDD ensures that rules and policies are followed through visits to the 
AGMs and primary co-operative societies (PCSs)8. The CDD oversees the Tanzanian 
Federation of Cooperatives (TFC), which is the umbrella body for all co-operatives in 
Tanzania. The TFC exists to promote and co-ordinate all co-operative societies in 
Tanzania and is a member of the International Co-operative Association (TFC & CDD, 
2006). However, as most of the country’s apex bodies have collapsed (aside from 
tobacco) there are not many members remaining. Birchall and Simmons (2010), in their 
comparison of Tanzanian and Sri Lankan co-operative reform efforts, find that the TFC 
requires restructuring in order to respond to the needs of the country’s co-operatives. 
However, they voice their suspicions that the Tanzanian government is keen to “keep 
the empire going” rather than make the TFC a leaner structure that can address the 
needs of primary co-operatives (Birchall and Simmons, 2010, 493).  
 
Within the CDD, there is a Registrar of Cooperative Societies, appointed by the 
government, who oversees the implementation and enforcement of co-operative laws 
and rules. According to Part III of the Cooperative Societies Act, the Registrar’s duties 
include registering, promoting, inspecting, and advising co-operatives, so this body is 
quite highly involved in the societies’ activities (The United Republic of Tanzania, 
2003). The Registrar has representatives known as District Co-operative Officers 
(DCOs) at the district level and Assistant Registrars at the regional level (see Figure 3). 
For coffee farmers, there is also a District Agricultural Officer (DALDO) who oversees 
all agricultural activities including field officers, and a District Coffee Subject Matter 
Specialist (DCSMS) who is responsible for providing education and advice, as well as 
seeds from the Tanzanian Coffee Research Institute (TaCRI), to the area’s coffee 
growers.  
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 I use the term Primary Co-operative Society (PCS) interchangeably with primary society. 
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Figure 3: Tanzania’s Agricultural Co-operative Structures 
 
 
Source: Author’s own 
 
 
Recent years have seen substantial co-operative reform in Tanzania, as outlined in the 
policies below. It is even possible that Tanzania’s co-operatives are evolving to embrace 
the ICA’s principles that deteriorated over the course of the country’s tumultuous co-
operative history, as the government’s policies over the past decade may indicate a 
trend in this direction. Tanzania’s Development Vision 2025 ambitiously aims to 
facilitate the graduation of Tanzanian from a developing to middle-income country, and 
situates co-operatives as instrumental to attaining sustainable human development (The 
United Republic of Tanzania, 2005, 3). The country's 2002 Cooperative Development 
Policy was introduced in order to address issues in the country’s co-operative sector 
such as entrenched leadership, political interference, and a lack of member involvement 
in decision-making. This policy was created with the purpose of “enabling co-
operatives to get back on to the development path and at the same time become more 
responsive to the needs of their members.” (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2002) A 
New Cooperative Societies Act was then developed in 2003, providing the necessary 
legislation as well as direction on how to set up and run the country’s co-operatives in 
line with the ICA co-operative principles (Birchall and Simmons, 2010, TFC & CDD, 
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2006). The implementation of these policy reforms is through the government’s 
Cooperative Reform and Modernization Project (CRMP), outlined in detail below.  
 
3.4.1 The Cooperative Reform and Modernization Program (CRMP)  
The Cooperative Reform and Modernization Program (CRMP) of 2005-2015, which is 
being overseen by the CDD, aims to address some of these aforementioned issues and 
exists to translate policies and supporting laws into strategy. Although this is not an 
independent project, it was put together by a group of individuals from government, 
non-governmental organizations, and academia, with assistance from the ILO, and 
“represents a wide consensus of opinion about how to transform the new policy and 
supporting law into workable strategies and plans.” (Birchall and Simmons, 2010, 487) 
CRMP seeks to promote good governance, defined as “a framework for promoting 
transparency, accountability and predictability in organisations”, as well as to empower 
members (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2005, 13). It identifies problems such as 
poor management, inappropriate co-operative structures, corruption, lack of co-
operative democracy, weak supporting institutions, and a general inability for 
Tanzania’s co-operatives to compete in a liberalized economy (Bibby, 2006). The 
project states that thus far the involvement and participation of members is weak and 
that co-operative leadership is often associated with untrustworthiness, corruption, and 
poor leadership (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2005). CRMP asserts: “[I]t is only 
when the grassroots membership is empowered that Tanzania will see a true emergence 
of democratic and economically viable cooperatives.” (The United Republic of 
Tanzania, 2005, 1 & 18)  
 
As CRMP notes, the participation and involvement of members in cooperative affairs is 
quite limited. It attributes this to the problematic role of Tanzania’s secondary co-
operative unions, which in the past amassed heavy debts and engaged in fraudulent 
practices that led to public mistrust (Birchall and Simmons, 2010). Bibby (2006) 
observes that, as the number of co-operative levels increases, it becomes more 
challenging to ensure direct member participation. Secondary and tertiary societies 
often fail to meet the needs of the primary co-operatives, and the maintenance of these 
massive co-operative structures is expensive (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2005). 
Recent government documents outline a potential future prioritization of the primary 
over the secondary: 
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In [the] future, the plan is to make the primary society the main cooperative 
level and to make sure they are all independent and viable. Higher-level 
cooperatives should facilitate networking for member societies, provide market 
information, conduct lobbying and advocacy and act as the main link of co-
operators to partner organisations in cooperative development. (TFC & CDD, 
2006, 3) 
 
The government is clearly calling for changes in the co-operative sector, which would 
seem to indicate that it has recognized some of the problematic issues in its past 
approach to co-operatives. While it is promising to see past issues acknowledged, there 
is no real evidence that Tanzania’s government is genuinely working to change this 
today. Unfortunately, CRMP may simply be another neo-liberal tool that will not result 
in any genuine change. Chambo (2006, 3-5), an academic and practitioner who has 
worked closely with many of Tanzanian’s co-operatives, questions their future of these 
organizations: 
 
[O]ne question which comes in, is whether the Reform and Modernization as 
seen in the CRMP, will eventually produce autonomous co-operative 
organizations in Tanzania, where members feel, act and govern themselves. […] 
If power and authority is not given to the members through the basic instruments 
of policy and law, the CRMP is partially demobilized. 
 
3.4.2 Member Empowerment in Cooperatives (MEMCOOP) 
A more concrete, and arguably more effective, example of how the issue of 
empowerment is being addressed at the membership level is the Member Empowerment 
in Cooperatives (MEMCOOP) project. This endeavor provides an interesting example 
of how issues of participation might be tackled through education and capacity building 
at the membership level. A total of 171 primary societies in the Kilimanjaro and Arusha 
regions participated in the MEMCOOP pilot project between 1996 and 2003, and it later 
expanded into other regions. It was, in part, overseen by the Moshi University College 
of Co-operative and Business Studies (MUCCoBS), previously the Moshi Co-operative 
College, which is a quasi-independent institution and a member of the ICA. 
MEMCOOP emphasized educating members, rather than just leaders, on six themes: 
general co-operative knowledge, production improvement and quality, general business 
education, organizational development, entrepreneurship, and empowerment for good 
governance (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2005). It also aimed to give members 
the tools to evaluate the performance of their primary societies (Birchall and Simmons, 
2010). An example of a MEMCOOP primary society is Mamsera, which I explore 
within this research.  
 64	  
 
According to the CRMP, it is easy to see the differences between primary societies 
where MEMCOOP has been put into place, and where it has not (The United Republic 
of Tanzania, 2005). In terms of price only, not to mention benefits such as social 
development and capacity building, in 2003-2004 the MEMCOOP societies sold at an 
average price of TSh (Tanzanian Shilling)9 1,286.02 per kg, compared to non-
MEMCOOP societies which had an average price of TSh 600 per kg (The United 
Republic of Tanzania, 2005, 21). In MEMCOOP primary societies, members deal with 
the coffee crop directly and negotiate bank credit, transport, and curing alternatives, and 
members are familiar with auction prices, quality, and buyers (Danda and Bamanyisa, 
2011). These authors note: 
 
The bottom-line of member empowerment is the fact that if the engine of 
development of any co-operative system is the membership, then the members 
must be entrepreneurs who practice cost effective business, leadership and put in 
place the basic instruments and procedures of good governance. (Danda and 
Bamanyisa, 2011, 237)  
 
 
3.5 The Coffee Market 
 
Coffee is one of the most highly traded agricultural products in the world, and one of 
few internationally traded commodities still produced by smallholders today. Despite 
the fact that coffee is a labour-intensive crop that often offers low financial returns, 
there are over 25 million coffee farmers in the world (Fairtrade International, 2013b). 
Brazil and Vietnam together produce nearly half of the world’s coffee, Africa is 
responsible for 12 per cent of world volume, and Tanzania’s share is just below one per 
cent of world production (TCB & TCA, 2012). Sustainable standards, such as Fairtrade 
or organic, are becoming increasingly important in the industry and may offer farmers 
and organizations the opportunities to obtain price premiums (TCB & TCA, 2012). 
 
Coffee can be of the Arabica or Robusta variety, with Arabica representing 60 per cent 
of the world’s total and Robusta the remaining 40 per cent (TCB & TCA, 2012). The 
price of Arabica coffee is determined on the New York ‘C’ futures market, while the 
London ‘LCE’ futures price is for Robusta coffee. Globally, the coffee market is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 As of November 2013, the exchange rate was approximately 1 GBP: 2,618 TSh. 
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characterized by volatile prices. The collapse of the International Coffee Agreement in 
1989 created a drastic change in the world coffee market and left many farmers with a 
massive decrease in the value of their crops. Coffee prices reached their lowest in 2002 
at US$0.45 per pound; at this time production costs were estimated at US$0.90 to 1.00 
per pound, a clear loss for farmers (Fairtrade International, 2013b, Renard and Perez-
Grovas, 2007).  Fairtrade has sought to address these price fluctuations and in 2013 
offered a floor price of US$1.40 per pound for Fairtrade Arabica coffee, and US$1.05 
for Fairtrade Robusta. Should the market price be higher, organizations receive the 
market price. It is important to note here that the Fairtrade price is paid to the 
organization, not the individual coffee growers; as such, the amount paid to the 
individual depends on the organization’s operating expenses (Lyon, 2010). As outlined 
in Chapter 2, there are additional benefits to Fairtrade, such as a Fairtrade premium of 
US$0.20 per pound which is intended for use by producer organizations for social and 
economic investments at the community and organizational level (Fairtrade Canada, 
2013).  
 
3.5.1 Tanzania’s Coffee Sector 
As one of Tanzania’s main agricultural export commodities, coffee accounts for 
approximately five per cent of the country’s total export value and generated export 
earnings of roughly US$100 million per year between 1982 and 2012 (TCB & TCA, 
2012). In 2012, Tanzania produced one per cent of the world’s Arabica coffee and was 
the third largest Arabica producer in Africa (EPOPA, 2013). The country’s Coffee 
Industry Development Strategy 2011/2012 claims that the coffee industry provides 
direct income to over 400,000 farmer households and supports the livelihoods of 
approximately 2.4 million people (TCB & TCA, 2012). Tanzania produces 0.8 per cent 
of the world’s total coffee output with 50,000 tons a year, of which 70 per cent is 
Arabica and 30 per cent is Robusta (Tanzania Coffee Board, 2010). The country exports 
over 90 per cent of its coffee on the international market and the main buyers, in 
decreasing order, include Japan, the US, Germany, Italy, and Belgium (TCB & TCA, 
2012). 
 
Although there are also large-scale, typically foreign-owned plantations in Tanzania, 
coffee is mainly a smallholder crop in Tanzania and over 90 per cent of the country’s 
coffee is grown on small-scale farms of 0.5 to three hectares (Tanzania Coffee Board, 
2010). The term ‘smallholders’ (as opposed to large-scale farmers) is typically 
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employed in reference to the size of the landholding, market relations, and the type of 
farming. It is estimated that there are between 400,000 and 500,000 smallholder coffee 
growers for both Arabica and Robusta in Tanzania (Mmari, 2012, Tanzania Coffee 
Association, 2009). Farmers tend to be engaged in subsistence agriculture, and holdings 
are subdivided amongst children and decrease in size over time (Mbilinyi, 1975). 
Mmari (2012) warns that land-related challenges stemming from colonial legacies, 
government policy, and population density, leading to frequent disputes over land and 
the insecurity of tenure, may limit the growth of smallholder agriculture in Tanzania, 
despite the abundance of the nation’s land. Tanzania has the highest number of 
Fairtrade farmer members of the 63 countries around the world where Fairtrade exists; 
the country had 148,200 small producers in 2010 and the bulk of them were coffee 
farmers (Fairtrade International, 2011d).  
 
Coffee is a labour-intensive commodity. Farmers take on a great deal of risk when they 
plant their seedlings, as the average coffee tree takes three to four years to bear fruit. 
Transaction costs, a complex value chain, little transparency, governance issues, access 
to credit, minimal capacity building, a lack of clean water and the effects of climate 
change, such as increasing temperatures and changes in rainfall patterns, all pose 
challenges for the country’s coffee farmers (for a SWOT analysis, see Appendix 6) 
(TCB & TCA, 2012). Major coffee producing regions of the country depend heavily on 
the crop for income (Mbilinyi, 1975). The mild Arabica from the Kilimanjaro region is 
recognized for its quality due to the area’s volcanic soils, while Robusta tends to 
demonstrate higher productivity while requiring larger plots than Arabica and attracting 
a lower price. Arabica coffee in Tanzania is grown at higher elevations of 700 to 1700 
meters, while Robusta generally grows at altitudes of 200 to 800 meters and is mainly 
produced in the Kagera region (Tanzania Coffee Board, 2010).  
 
Coffee quality fluctuates greatly, and much depends on the initial process of harvesting, 
pulping, washing, drying, and sorting. Quality is impacted by factors such as materials 
and cleanliness of water used, and as such can vary greatly between smallholders. 
Unfortunately, Tanzania’s coffee quality has deteriorated over time and yields have 
decreased (TCB & TCA, 2012). Tanzania’s annual production over the past thirty years 
has stagnated at approximately 50,000 tons and yields have continuously decreased, 
thus leading to lower prices for producers (TCB & TCA, 2012). This is due to, among 
other factors, ageing coffee trees, poor husbandry, the spread of coffee diseases, and a 
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lack of new high-yielding, disease-resistant coffee varieties (Baffes, 2003). Tanzanian 
coffee suffers from problems with Coffee Berry Disease (CBD), Leaf Rust, and insect 
damage, and the majority of Tanzania’s coffee farmers do not use chemicals or 
fertilizers in their fields (Baffes, 2003). Coffee trees typically become unprofitable at 20 
to 25 years of age, and most of the country’s coffee trees are well beyond this age; in 
Kilimanjaro the average age of trees is over 40 years (TCB & TCA, 2012). 
 
Poor farm maintenance and improper intercropping contribute to this problem, thus 
highlighting the importance of training for farmers. Citing the quality potential of 
Tanzania’s mild Arabicas and Robustas, the country’s Coffee Industry Development 
Strategy states a mission of increasing coffee production to 80,000 tons in 2016 and 
100,000 tons by 2012 (TCB & TCA, 2012). It aims to do this through improved 
productivity, including replacing old trees with improved varieties and applying good 
agricultural practices, as well as expanding production to new areas. It notes the 
importance of extension support in the field, claiming that this will be achieved through 
training and capacity building to facilitate technology transfer (TCB & TCA, 2012). 
The strategy also mentions streamlining the value chain and suppressing unnecessary 
intermediaries, as well as improving harvest and post-harvest activities including 
enhanced processing equipment such as central pulpery units (CPUs). This is in line 
with Kilimo Kwanza, the country’s ‘agriculture first’ strategy that aims to increase 
agricultural production across Tanzania (TCB & TCA, 2012). The Tanzania Coffee 
Board (TCB) and Tanzanian Coffee Association (TCA)’s Coffee Industry Development 
Strategy 2011/2012 commits Tanzania to increase production and productivity (through 
access to inputs and the adoption of good agricultural practices), improve efficiency of 
the value chain (including the functioning of the Moshi auction), support overall coffee 
quality improvement (through capacity building, enhanced equipment, and the 
development of CPUs), and explore new market opportunities for sustainable coffee 
(such as Fairtrade) (TCB & TCA, 2012). 
 
3.5.2 Primaries and Unions 
Tanzania’s coffee industry primarily consists of a two-tier co-operative system of 
primary co-operative societies and unions (Parrish et al., 2005). Farmers come together 
to form primary societies, and these primary societies are members of unions, also 
known as secondary societies. Part IV of the 2003 Cooperative Societies Act states that 
the objective of a primary society is three-tiered: to raise the standard of living of 
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members, to facilitate the operations of its members, and to provide services including 
agricultural inputs, collecting, processing, and marketing of members’ products (The 
United Republic of Tanzania, 2003). Primary societies must comprise a minimum of 50 
people for agricultural societies (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2003). In order to 
join a primary society a farmer must be 15 years of age, although s/he may not join a 
committee until the age of 18, and be capable of paying fees and acquiring shares (The 
United Republic of Tanzania, 2003). Each member is entitled to one vote and may 
attend the primary society AGM to record his/her vote; these meetings must occur at 
least once a year (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2003).  
 
Unions are also required to hold an AGM where producers (or their elected 
representatives) come to discuss and vote (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2003). 
According to Part IX of Tanzania’s Co-operative Act, at this meeting decisions are 
made about the election or removal of Board members, the adoption of the annual 
balance sheet, money available for distribution, honoraria for Board members, the 
Board report, and the acquisition of property (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2003). 
This supreme level of governance comprises representatives from all primary societies, 
also referred to as delegates, who come together to elect Board members, determine 
how Fairtrade premiums will be used, and make decisions related to the budget. Of 
course, not all farmers have the opportunity to attend the union AGM; instead two to 
three elected individuals typically act as representatives. Co-operatives at both the 
primary and secondary level require a Board of Directors. Members are responsible for 
electing this Board, and Tanzania’s co-operative law states that the Board must consist 
of between five and nine people (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2003). One third of 
the Board is replaced through elections every three years, as there is a maximum nine-
year Board term (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2003). The Board members are 
unpaid but may receive an honorarium from the society; the Board also appoints a 
General Manager to manage the general affairs of the primary society (The United 
Republic of Tanzania, 2003).  
 
Beyond governance structures and decision-making, this two-tier co-operative model 
determines the basic operations of farmers and their primary societies within the coffee 
trade. Once coffee cherries are ripe and ready for harvest, farmers pick and bring them 
to the primary society for collection. The processing varies across primary and 
secondary societies, and differs according to the type of coffee grown. For a detailed 
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overview of coffee processing, please refer to Appendix 7. In all cases, the primary 
society assembles the coffee and delivers it to the union. Unions grade their coffee 
according to quality, moisture content, and the size of the beans. Once coffee has been 
cured and graded by organizations, samples are taken to the TCB for cupping. The TCB 
analyzes the coffee to determine if it indeed qualifies for the grade that the organization 
has awarded it. It then provides samples to exporters ahead of the auction, as well as 
information on suppliers, grades, and volumes. Coffee is sold through the national 
coffee auction, which occurs weekly in Moshi. Unions can either sell to private buyers 
at the auction, or if they wish to export directly can sell and then repurchase their own 
coffee (Parrish et al., 2005). The State regulations restricting this auction process seem 
much more cumbersome than the direct export of coffee might be. The union pays 
farmers a first payment when the coffee is collected and additional payments as 
appropriate at later dates, depending on the price the coffee fetches in the auction. The 
process from bean to cup is outlined in Figure 4, including the role of the various actors 
involved. As seen in this diagram, farmers can also sell directly to private traders and I 
explore the impact of this competitive force in Chapter 6. While the choice of buyer has 
implications for the price and promptness of payment, the chain does not differ 
drastically as everyone must go through the auction. 
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Figure 4: The Post-Liberalization Tanzanian Coffee Chain 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on Baffes (2003), Parrish (2005), and author’s own interviews 
 
 
3.5.3 Government Regulation and the Auction 
As a result of the conditions imposed by the international financial institutions that 
oversaw the country’s liberalization process, Tanzania’s government aims to minimize 
its involvement in the coffee sector (Pirotte et al., 2006). The State does, however, 
maintain a regulatory function; this is achieved through the TCB. In its latest 
incarnation, the TCB is a statutory body that was created through a 2001 Act of 
Parliament. Originally established under the Coffee Ordinance in 1961, the TCB’s 
original purpose was to act as an agent of the unions for the purpose of selling their 
coffee. The TCB over time began to take on more activities requiring deductions, or 
levies, from the export price, such as providing inputs for disease control and collecting 
an export tax (Moshi, 1980). Following the dissolution of the co-operative unions, the 
Tanzania Coffee Board was renamed the Coffee Authority of Tanzania in 1977. This 
structure lasted eight years until, after 1982 and the reinstatement of co-operatives, it 
became the Tanzania Coffee Marketing Board and oversaw auction purchases by 
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private buyers (Baffes, 2003). This Board eventually became a marketing agent, 
reverting back to its original name of Tanzania Coffee Board in 1993. 
 
Today the TCB is a government body whose mandate is to regulate the coffee industry 
in Tanzania, including all matters pertaining to coffee production and marketing. It is 
housed under the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives along with 
the Tanzania Coffee Research Institute (TaCRI, a non-profit, semi-autonomous 
organization) and the Tanzania Coffee Association (TCA, a private association of 
coffee traders created to resolve disputes between co-operatives and traders following 
the liberalization of the 1990s) (see Table 4). The TCB oversees all coffee-related 
activities in Tanzania and providing export licenses. There is a ten-person Board 
overseeing governance and in 2009/2010, both KCU and KNCU had a representative on 
the Board of the TCB.  
 
Table 4: Tanzania’s Coffee Institutions 
 
Institution Entity Functions & Responsibilities 
Ministry of 
Agriculture, Food 
Security and 
Cooperatives 
Government Supervises the sector, providing legal and policy 
guidelines. 
Tanzania Coffee 
Board (TCB) 
Statutory Body Regulates the coffee industry, advises the 
government on policies and strategies for the 
development of the coffee industry, issues 
licenses and permits, and runs the coffee auction. 
Tanzania Coffee 
Research Institute 
(TaCRI) 
Non-profit 
Membership 
Organization 
Conducts coffee research, breeds disease-
resistant coffee varieties, sells seedlings to 
farmers, and provides training and technical 
assistance. Members include coffee farmers, 
processors and the government. 
Tanzania Coffee 
Association 
(TCA) 
Private sector Private association of coffee traders created to 
resolve disputes between co-operatives and 
traders. 
 
Source: Based on Baffes (2003) and author’s own interviews 
 
 
The TCB organizes the weekly coffee auction held in Moshi every Thursday. According 
to the TCB & TCA (2012, 14), “The auction system is believed to have multiple 
advantages including better prices for the value chain as well as better control over 
exports.” However, the amount of time between the purchase of coffee from the 
producer and the moment it sells in the auction can be quite long, posing risks such as 
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international price volatility and uncertainty for the buyer. The result is that buyers 
manage risk by offering low prices to producers, which are not always compensated by 
an adequate second payment when the price is higher. According to the TCB & TCA’s 
2011/2012 Tanzania Coffee Industry Development Strategy, farmers typically receive 
65 per cent to 75 per cent of the auction price of their coffee, and may get as little as 50 
per cent of the auction price; the remainder is used to cover organizational expenses 
(TCB & TCA, 2012). As Baffes (2003) observes, there are issues with Tanzania’s 
coffee sector, such as high taxes and licensing procedures, that must be addressed. The 
auction is mandatory and the TCB possesses a great deal of power, which Baffes (2003) 
claims should be minimized; he states that the TCB should only be responsible for 
disseminating pricing and related information, as well as monitoring coffee statistics 
such as auction sales. For more on the Moshi Coffee Auction, please see Appendix 8. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
Tanzania’s co-operatives are clearly part of the co-operative revival occurring on the 
African continent. However, today’s co-operatives do not adhere to the ICA’s principles 
and definitions, despite the Tanzanian government’s claims of working toward this. 
Without well-functioning co-operatives to operate through, it is challenging to see how 
Fairtrade might succeed in giving producers a voice in decision-making. It is also 
difficult to tell if Tanzanian co-operatives have truly evolved from their colonial and 
nationalistic roots, comprising previous eras of high government intervention, or if they 
continue to be employed as tools of the government. 
 
Tanzania’s co-operatives have gone through many transformations throughout the past 
century, and the political landscape has played an enormous role in determining the 
evolution of the country’s co-operative movement. Nyerere’s socialism and the 
transition to ‘African capitalism’ had a tremendous impact of the country’s agricultural 
policy, and the country’s co-operatives have been forced to adapt to these changes. 
While today’s structures aim to facilitate independence and autonomy, in reality the 
government continues to play a major role in the sector. Truly member-based co-
operatives, while arguably the way forward, are not yet a reality in the country. In order 
to understand the future potential of these member-based organizations in Tanzania, in 
Chapter 4 I introduce coffee co-operatives as a case study. 
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Chapter 4: Methods and Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapters 2 and 3, I explored the topic of producer voice in decision-making through 
a consideration of the secondary literature. In this chapter I switch to the field study 
component of the project and outline my methodological approach to assessing voice in 
decision-making. This study comprises a multiple case study of Tanzania coffee co-
operatives and entailed field research over a period of two years. Respondents included 
individuals at various levels in the hierarchy: practitioners based in the global north 
including Fairtrade International staff, individuals at Fairtrade Africa and Fairtrade East 
Africa, KNCU co-operative staff and Board of Directors members, and small-scale 
producers at the village level. Through this in-depth qualitative study, I aimed to capture 
the perspectives of multiple stakeholders in order to tell the story of collaborative 
governance at these organizations and to learn more about how individuals participate 
in Fairtrade decision-making.  
 
In this chapter I situate the research problem within an appropriate methodological 
context and outline my approach to the study. I first discuss the philosophical 
underpinnings of my approach and explain my qualitative approach. I then outline the 
multiple case study before moving on to its design elements, such as the subjects for 
study and data collection.  Finally, I consider both the limitations of the study and 
reflexivity as a means of understanding my role as a researcher, including potential 
biases that I may bring to the project. 
 
4.2 Approach to the Research 
 
I take a qualitative approach to this topic, locating the discussion within an interpretive 
paradigm and adopting a constructionist ontological position; as such, I aim to 
undercover the means by which both individuals and groups construct and perceive 
social reality. Interpretivism, in contrast to a natural scientific model one might find in 
quantitative research, explores the social world by examining “the interpretation of that 
world by its participants.” (Bryman, 2001, 264) Social construction rejects the idea of 
universal knowledge, beginning with the premise that the human world varies from the 
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natural, physical world and is shaped by cultural constructs (Patton, 2002). 
Constructionism considers the numerous realities that people create to guide their 
interactions and therefore involves “constructing knowledge about reality, not 
constructing reality itself.” (Shadish, 1995, 67) Two people can interpret the world very 
differently but live in the same empirical world, even though one’s truth may not 
correspond with objective reality. This is supported by Thomas’s theorem: What is 
defined or perceived by people as real is real in its consequences (Patton, 2002, 
Thomas and Thomas, 1928).  
 
As I adopt a constructionist orientation, it is essential for me to consider the perceptions 
and worldviews of respondents while at the same time recognizing my own accounts as 
constructs rather than objective descriptions (Bryman, 2001). I am interested here in 
how interviewees make sense of their world, and an interpretive methodology allows for 
a collaborative approach to the construction of meaning through interaction with 
interviewees. Rather than distancing myself from respondents, I interact with them. This 
allows me to recognize knowledge production as an ongoing process and to consider my 
own biases (Allen, 2007), which I further reflect on in a section below on reflexivity. 
 
I locate this research within both a social justice and feminist framework. Using a social 
justice approach, I aim to present many different experiences and perceptions and 
demonstrate that diverse voices must be heard and valued (Stockdill et al., 1992). As I 
set out to learn about “voice”, I give added weight to the viewpoints of those with less 
power and privilege (Weiss and Greene, 1992). One example of a marginalized group in 
African agriculture is women; as such, I aim to capture and report their experiences. 
This has implications for the project design, such as the decision to over-sample 
women.  I adopt a feminist perspective, which rejects a positivist paradigm (Brooks and 
Hesse-Biber, 2007, Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2007). Research has a tendency to be 
androcentric in nature, and a feminist approach challenges the structures and ideologies 
that oppress women and other marginalized groups. As a researcher adopting a feminist 
standpoint, I aimed to minimize the power differences between myself and interview 
respondents (Harding and Norberg 2005).  
 
In line with a constructionist approach, I use qualitative methods, which are typically 
employed to study social phenomena with a focus on the people involved (Bryman, 
2001). I incorporate feminist methodologies, which Harding and Norberg (2005, p. 
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2013) note may provide a means of turning individuals in disadvantaged social 
positions into “powerful intellectual and political resources.” Feminist methods are 
holistic and incorporate all stages of the research process, from the development of the 
primary question to the findings (Hesse-Biber, 2007a). Interviewing is particularly 
valuable to feminist researchers who wish to gain insight into the world of their 
respondents, and is useful when one wishes to learn about the lives of respondents 
living in a particular community (Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2007). Hesse-Biber (2007a, 
117) explains that (i) reflexivity and (ii) the types of questions feminists ask are key to 
adopting feminist methods: 
 
Research that gets at an understanding of women’s lives and those of other 
oppressed groups, research that promotes social justice and social change, and 
research that is mindful of the researcher-researched relationship and the power 
and authority imbued in the researcher’s role are some of the issues that engage 
the feminist researcher. 
 
I endeavoured to make this project participatory where possible as a means of treating 
respondents as subjects or agents, rather than objects, of research. As Eberhart and 
Smith (2008) explain in their FLO-commissioned Methodological Guide for Assessing 
the Impact of Fairtrade, participatory approaches serve to avoid the imposition of 
preconceived notions, as well to ensure that important effects or observations are not 
overlooked. These authors note,  
 
A key principle of the methodology is the interpretation of Fairtrade impact 
within the local context of producers and workers, giving precedence to the 
goals, priorities and views of those that Fairtrade aims to support, while 
recognising the heterogeneity of individual perspectives. (Eberhart and Smith, 
2008, 8)  
 
I interviewed Fairtrade key informants prior to selecting the research topic and question, 
developed the producer questionnaire in consultation with some of the producers, 
organizations, and stakeholders involved, and shared the findings with respondents in 
Tanzania for their feedback. Buch and Staller (2007) assert that researchers may engage 
in sharing the findings with the communities they study prior to publishing, in order to 
ensure accuracy in how respondents are portrayed. In Section 4.4 on design I further 
outline how I engaged in participatory methods and shared the findings with 
respondents. 
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4.3 Empirical Context: A Multiple Case Study of Tanzanian Co-operatives 
 
I adopt a case study design, the purpose of which is to provide rich, detailed data about 
a case (Babbie and Benaquisto, 2002). This method allows investigators to explore the 
features of real-life events, such as small group behaviour or organizational processes. It 
is an appropriate method for exploratory research comprising how and why questions, 
and is flexible enough to incorporate quantitative data (Yin, 2009). The use of a how 
question in this project is considered explanatory in nature, and therefore favours case 
studies as one if its preferred methods (Yin, 2009).  This approach is also flexible in that 
it can incorporate multiple methods, both qualitative and quantitative, such as a survey 
within a case study. Case studies tend to incorporate many data sources, including 
interviews, observations, and survey data, and can be used to create theoretical 
constructs (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). A multiple case study approach is 
appropriate here as I aim to inductively build theory on collaborative governance at co-
operatives. 
 
Criticisms of the case study method include a potential lack of rigour on the part of the 
researcher, the fact that they may provide little basis for scientific generalization, or the 
concern that they take too long and result in massive documents (Yin, 2009). I 
attempted to avoid these potential flaws by using data triangulation, including both 
qualitative and quantitative data, which according to Patton (2002) strengthens a study 
by combining methods. I also aimed to avoid erroneous generalizations and limited the 
breadth of the study. As per Yin’s (2009) guidelines, I created a case study protocol to 
increase the study’s reliability before beginning the project, which comprised the 
study’s purpose, interview questions, data collection procedures, and report outline. 
 
While a single case study is used to focus attention on a sole example of a social 
phenomenon, the multiple case study is a variation that allows a researcher to study 
more than one instance, as I do here (Babbie and Benaquisto, 2002). In order to select 
the case studies, I developed a sampling frame - a list of elements from which a 
probability sample is selected (Babbie and Benaquisto, 2002, 180-1). The sampling 
frame in this case was “accredited Fairtrade organizations in the global South” and was 
created using registries from FLO and Fairtrade Africa (2011a). I selected three unions 
from Fairtrade Africa’ s dataset of Tanzanian Fairtrade co-operatives, of which there are 
19, for various reasons as outlined in Table 5. I used purposive nonprobability sampling 
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(Babbie and Benaquisto, 2002, Patton, 2002) to select organizations based on this 
criteria. Purposive sampling allowed me to choose information-rich cases strategically 
and I engaged in typical case sampling in order to illustrate or highlight what might be 
viewed as normal or average (Patton, 2002).  
 
Table 5: Criteria for Selecting Unions 
 
 
Source: Author’s own based on Hartley (2012) 
 
 
4.3.1 The Three Cases 
This research focuses on three Fairtrade unions that met this criteria: KNCU, KCU, and 
KDCU, and the farmers that belong to them. These unions are extremely large, with two 
of them comprising between 60,000 and 70,000 individual farmers, and they differ 
according to size, structure, coffee type, and various additional attributes. Table 6 
provides an overview of these three organizations, while Figure 5 illustrates their 
geographic location. 
 
Criteria for unions Explanation 
Country Tanzania has more Fairtrade producers than any other 
country in the world (Fairtrade International, 2012b). It 
also presents an interesting country context for assessing 
participation due to its historical evolution of co-
operatives as well as the contemporary environment. 
Commodity (coffee) The product category is held constant in order to ensure 
some similarities among organizations. Coffee is the 
single most important Fairtrade product (Lamb 2008) 
and Fairtrade coffee production currently comprises 
almost half a million farmers around the world 
(Fairtrade International, 2011a). 
Established for over 20 
years 
Unions needed to be well established in order to limit 
variation in structure and history. 
Fairtrade Certified for 
over 10 years 
Length of time involved in Fairtrade may affect results 
and impact; 10 years was set as a minimum. 
Geographically accessible Due to cost and time limitations, villages needed to be 
within three hours of each town in order to allow day 
trips. 
Willingness to participate Participants needed to be interested and willing to share 
their time for the research. 
Diversity in gender at 
leadership and 
management levels 
Organizations with female leaders and managers were 
included. 
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Table 6: Overview of KNCU, KCU, and KDCU 
 
Characteristic KNCU KCU KDCU 
Members 70,000 60,000 22,000 
# Primary Societies 67 126 80 
Region Kilimanjaro Kagera Karagwe (District 
in Kagera region) 
Primary Coffee Type Arabica Robusta  Robusta  
Average Annual 
Harvest 
Unknown 8,000 tons 5,000 tons 
Year Established 1933 1950 1950 as KCU; 
1991 as KDCU 
Joined Fairtrade 1993 1990 1990 (as part of 
KCU) 
% Sold Fairtrade  30-50% 50% 15-20% 
% Organic 16% (11 primary 
societies) 
20% 20% 
% Female 6% 20% 18%  
Processing At individual farm Central 
processing unit  
At KDCU factory 
 
Source: Author’s own, KNCU (2013), KNCU (2011), KCU (2013), KDCU (2013)  
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Figure 5: Location of KNCU, KCU, and KDCU 
 
 
 
Source: WorldandCityMaps.com; Author’s additions 
 
 
The first union in this study, the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union (KNCU), is a 
second-level co-operative union in the Kilimanjaro region that grew out of the 
Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association of the 1920s. It is deemed Africa’s oldest 
coffee co-operative union (KNCU, 2013). The largest of the three unions that I study, 
the organization represents approximately 70,000 farmers organized into 67 primary 
societies around the foothills of Kilimanjaro, and maintains a head office in Moshi. 
KNCU’s farms are located in the four Kilimanjaro districts of Siha, Hai, Moshi Rural, 
and Rombo in agro-ecological zones grouped according to altitude and rainfall. All of 
KNCU’s producers are located between 1000 and 2000 meters above sea level and 
harvest their coffee during different months based on location; the harvest season begins 
in late April and runs until February (KNCU, 2013). The ethnic group in Kilimanjaro is 
the Chagga, a group of Bantu-speaking indigenous Africans who are known for their 
business prowess (Kanyinga et al., 1994). The Chagga maintain a patrilineal system of 
descent and inheritance (Mtei, 2012), which has implications for coffee ownership and 
gender equity. Although land ownership is not a pre-condition for membership, primary 
society members must own coffee. As a result, very few women are members of the 
union, and widows tend to be the exception (although they often register their land in a 
KNCU	  
KDCU	  
KCU	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son’s name). Of KNCU’s 70,000 members, only 4200 were female at the time of 
research.  
 
The second case, Kagera Co-operative Union (KCU), originated in the 1930s as the 
Bukoba Native Cooperative Union (KCU, 2011) and is located near the Ugandan 
border. It is Africa’s oldest Fairtrade coffee co-operative, having joined the Fairtrade 
system in 1990 (Fairtrade International, 2013d). Today, it has 60,000 members at 126 
primary societies in the Kagera region. KCU’s head office and farmers are situated in 
the Kagera region of northwest Tanzania, on the shore of Lake Victoria, and the union 
has a small export office in Moshi. KCU comprises the three districts of Bukoba, 
Muleba, and Misenye, which combined cover approximately 150,000 square km. The 
tribal group in this region is the Haya, another Bantu-speaking group.  
 
The third union is Karagwe District Co-operative Union (KDCU) in western Tanzania 
near the Rwandan border. KDCU was created in 1991 when it amicably defected from 
KCU. According to the union’s website: “This came as a response to the need of 
Karagwe district farmers to own a Union that would be able to service their members 
within manageable distances.” (KDCU, 2013) As the region where KDCU’s members 
are located has extremely high Robusta coffee productivity, this group was in a position 
to form its own union. KDCU has 22,000 coffee farmers, of which nearly 4,000 are 
female – a very high female ratio in comparison to KNCU. Coffee growers are spread 
out across four districts: Kituntu Maloura, Bugene Nyaishori, Nyabionza, and Kiasho 
Murongo. The Nyambo tribe, also a Bantu group, is in this area. 
 
4.3.1.1 Value Chain 
Coffee processing differed drastically amongst the three unions. KNCU’s Arabica 
farmers dry, ferment, and then pulp their coffee on their individual farms with small 
hand pulpers, often borrowed from neighbours, before delivering the beans to the 
primary society. In contrast, KCU’s Robusta farmers deliver coffee beans to the primary 
society for drying and sorting, while KDCU’s sorting and processing is entirely done at 
the factory. 
 
At KNCU, Arabica coffee farmers use hand pulpers to process coffee cherry into 
parchment; this is known as wet processing and is considered a highly labour intensive 
technique (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2000) (see 
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Appendix 7). After pulping, farmers allow the beans to ferment for two to three days, 
before drying them for seven to ten days and delivering them for sale at the primary 
society. Each primary society has a Secretary-Manager who is responsible for sending a 
weekly text message to KNCU’s Procurement office with updates of the current coffee 
quantities in storage. The KNCU Procurement office collects the coffee parchment from 
the primary societies and transfers it to the Tanganyika Coffee Curing Company 
(TCCCo) for the curing process before it is taken to the auction. The union is therefore 
responsible for financing, transporting, marketing, and supervising the sale of coffee. 
KNCU has its own in-house liquorer for cupping and grading beans, as well as ensuring 
the quality of the union’s coffee. KNCU primarily sells to organizations in the United 
Kingdom (UK), United States (US), and Germany. 
 
Unlike KNCU’s mild Arabica coffee, KCU sells primarily Robusta coffee, along with 
some hard Arabica. Robusta has a 30 per cent higher crop yield than Arabica (KCU, 
2011), is less expensive to produce, and is often used in coffee blends. KCU’s farmers 
pick and dry the coffee beans, but there is currently no wet processing for their Robusta 
and hard Arabica beans; instead, this method is known as dry processing (see Appendix 
7). The PCS has centralized pulping machines, and the pulped coffee then goes to the 
curing company. KCU sells both green beans, which are hulled at its Bukop dry mill in 
Bukoba and instant coffee powder, which is manufactured at its Tanica factory. Instant 
coffee manufacturing is crucial for KCU’s farmers in order to sell their non-exportable 
coffee. Coffee beans for export are stored near Bukoba in a warehouse before travelling 
to the port; while the organization’s export office is in Moshi (due to the coffee auction 
being there), aside from samples for auction purposes, the coffee never arrives in 
Moshi. The Moshi office also has a liquoring section where it tests coffee. Many of 
KCU’s customers are in Germany (up to 70 per cent), and the union also sells to 
customers, both Fairtrade and non-Fairtrade in the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
other European countries. 
 
Similarly to KCU, KDCU sells primarily Robusta coffee (80 per cent of total 
production) as well as some hard Arabica (20 per cent). KDCU’s members grow their 
coffee in a highly competitive environment due to the region’s high crop productivity. 
The coffee trees in the region are quite young and therefore produce high levels of 
coffee; when KDCU split from KCU it engaged in a large expansion project and planted 
many trees. All coffee is centrally grouped at the union level and cherries are delivered 
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to the KDCU factory for hand sorting, primarily by women, prior to processing. There 
are 556 employees at the factory and these individuals are generally employed on a 
seasonal basis from July to April. KDCU’s primary buyers include companies in the 
UK, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, and the union also exports to Brazil, Germany, 
and Japan (KDCU, 2013).  
 
It is important to note here that higher sales to Fairtrade markets do not necessarily 
result in stronger governance structures. Organizations must adhere to co-operative 
principles and other standards in order to join Fairtrade, irrespective of how much of 
their product they are actually able to sell as Fairtrade on the market. Therefore, I would 
not have expected organizations that sell higher quantities of Fairtrade coffee, such as 
KNCU and KCU as indicated in Table 6, to have better governance structures than 
those who sell less, such as KDCU. While I did observe diversity across these three 
unions related to the quantities they are able to sell to Fairtrade buyers, I do not purport 
that Fairtrade demand influences the strength of governance. An organization selling 
1% of its coffee to Fairtrade buyers, for example, could have excellent governance 
structures in place if the co-operative is strong. Theoretically, all organizations should 
be working towards strengthened governance structures regardless of the quantity of 
Fairtrade product they are actually able to sell. 
 
4.3.1.2 Leadership and Management 
At all three unions, the supreme level of governance is the AGM, composed of member 
representatives from the primary societies. This group is responsible for electing and 
overseeing the Board of Directors. The Board of Directors then appoints a General 
Manager, who hires staff members. Board members are unpaid but receive a seating 
allowance when they attend meetings, and have their subsistence costs covered. At all 
three organizations the Board and management conduct workshops with members every 
year, on topics such as cooperative leadership, marketing, gender, and Fairtrade. The 
three union structures vary slightly, but all adhere to Figure 6’s depiction. 
 83	  
 
Figure 6: Union Organizational Structure 
 
 
Source: Author’s own 
 
 
At KNCU the AGM comprises two representatives from each primary society. One of 
these individuals is a representative from the primary society’s Board of Directors, 
while the other is a regular member from the cooperative. As far back as the mid-1990s, 
academics at MUCCoBs have been highly critical of KNCU’s AGM and have identified 
this as more of a celebration rather than a meeting or debate (Tallontire, 1999). At the 
2010 AGM, KNCU began encouraging primary societies to bring a minimum of one 
woman onto the Board of Directors, but there is not currently a quota. There has never 
been a woman on the union’s Board and at the time of research KNCU had five Board 
members. The management structure incorporates four departments: Commercial, 
Farmers Technical Services (which comprises extension officers who provide training 
to farmers on quality improvement, fertilizers, and coffee diseases), Finance & 
Administration, and Tourism (which runs coffee tours, cultural village walks, and other 
community-based tours).  
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KNCU has a history of corruption and mismanagement (Prevezer 2013). In 1969, the 
government had to instate a new General Manager at the union due to corruption, and 
there was theft at various PCS Boards (Moshi, 1980). In her 1990s research on the 
organization, Tallontire (1999) outlines criticisms of KNCU, including accusations that 
the organization is bureaucratic, unresponsive, and caters to members who are better 
off. During my research in 2011-2012, I found ongoing issues with management, 
leadership, and a general disconnect between the primary society and the union, as well 
as instances of misconduct, which I further elaborate on in Chapter 5. 
 
KCU has a Board of Directors of seven people and sends three representatives sent to 
the AGM: two from the Board and one from membership. It has 5 departments 
including Personnel/Admin, Organic/Fairtrade, Accounts, Marketing, and Export. There 
are 110 staff members, including 40 employees at the Bukop factory. A 2002 study by 
MUCCoBS and Twin Trading identified a lack of interaction between leaders and 
farmers, as well as potential management issues that led to KDCU’s split from KCU 
(MUCCoBS, 2002).  
 
The KDCU Board consists of seven people. KDCU has 32 staff; three are located in the 
KDCU export office in Moshi, with everyone else located at the head office in 
Kayanga. There are also over 500 seasonal workers at the factory. The organization has 
four departments including Administration, Finance, Internal Auditing, and Marketing. 
Along with KCU, KDCU has also struggled with mismanagement and leadership 
problems in the past: it temporarily lost its Fairtrade certification in 1997, when several 
members of the management team and Board were arrested and charged with corruption 
(OPM & IIED, 2000). A new management team and Board were appointed in 1998, and 
KDCU was readmitted to the FLO register.  
 
4.3.1.3 Assets & Social Programs 
KNCU owns a hotel, a café, a paddy hulling company, an old cotton ginnery, a shop 
selling farmer inputs, various houses that it rents out, four farms that it leases, and a 
multi-story building in Moshi where its head office is located (KNCU, 2012). One of 
KNCU’s most important, yet potentially ill-fated, assets is part ownership of TCCCo, 
the 91-year old milling plant located in Moshi that is currently struggling to overcome 
debt due to increased competition from private curing companies in the region (Temba, 
2011). The factory was built by a German in the early 1920s, became British property in 
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1947, and was nationalized following the Arusha Declaration. In 1984, TCCCo was 
returned to its initial owners: KNCU and the Tanganyika Coffee Growers Association 
(TCG). KNCU was not as fortunate in recovering all of its assets: when the union was 
abolished under Nyerere’s forced villagization program in 1976, the Ministry of 
Agriculture took over its independent coffee research station; KNCU also lost several 
central pulping units in the process (Moshi, 1980). This is evidence of some of the 
murky boundaries between the State and co-operatives, and I explore this further in 
Chapter 5’s discussion of external governance. 
 
KNCU also has a Fairtrade tourism project known as Kahawa Shamba, which I had the 
opportunity to visit. Since 2011, KNCU has been rolling out a health plan whereby 
funds are automatically deducted from farmers’ pay if over 50 per cent of the farmers in 
a primary society agree to support the program and to date, 7,000 farmers have 
benefited (KNCU, 2013, MicroEnsure, 2013). There is also an Educational Fund 
financed through Fairtrade premiums, and KNCU has provided scholarships to 410 
secondary school children over the years (KNCU, 2012). KNCU has received assistance 
from NGOs and ATOs including TechnoServe, the Green Development Foundation, 
Twin Trading, and Cafédirect over the years. UK-based ATO Twin Trading assisted 
KNCU in setting up its export office and liquoring department, trained the export 
manager, and helped the organization access grants (OPM & IIED, 2000). KNCU is 
also involved in a Joint Marketing Initiative with Twin, through which Twin claims 
KNCU doubled its direct export volumes between 2007 and 2010 (Twin, 2012). This 
project aims to promote and develop KNCU’s coffee and add value; KNCU was one of 
two pilot organizations and the success of the project has now led to its expansion to 
additional organizations.  
 
KCU owns two hotels, various office buildings, and a store that sells office supplies. 
KCU originally owned three schools, primarily for the children of KCU’s farmers, but 
these are now government-run. In 2004, KCU achieved over fifty per cent shares in the 
Tanica factory - the region’s only factory set up by the Nyerere government in the 
1960s to produce instant coffee powder (Fairtrade Foundation, 2005). Fairtrade 
premiums were used for this purpose and the remaining shares belong to KDCU (22 per 
cent), the Tanzanian Federation of Co-operatives (TFC), the TCB, and Tanica workers. 
KCU also owns the Bukop factory for dry processing, which was operating at 60 per 
cent capacity at the time of research. KCU has received capacity building support from 
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Twin Trading and Cafédirect in the past, and World Vision also runs projects in the 
region. Farmers mentioned challenges with regards to accessing credit: focus group 
members in Kasharu noted that there was not yet a Savings and Credit Cooperative 
(SACCO) in the region and that while, in the past KCU had provided loans to farmers 
and even paid for students to attend school, the loans from the PCS were no longer there 
(Focus Group 5). 
 
When KDCU left KCU, they were given a building, houses, and other physical capital. 
Today KDCU also owns a factory for Robusta processing, which was running at 90 per 
cent capacity at the time of research. Shares in the factory are mainly held by KDCU, 
and the government also has shares. Many employees benefit from the SACCO and use 
these funds to send their children to school. The factory workers can receive loans of up 
to 10 million TSh at a low interest rate, although these loans are only available to 
permanent workers. KDCU also owns a hotel, a processing facility, and a secondary 
school, and possesses shares in various financial institutions and facilities (KDCU, 
2013).  
 
4.3.2 Breakaway Groups:  The G32 and Mamsera 
I also selected two deviant cases beyond these three unions, even though they did not 
meet all of the criteria outlined in Table 5: the Group of 32 (G32) and Mamsera. I 
learned about these breakaway groups during interviews with academics and co-
operative managers in Tanzania, and was interested in finding out more about why these 
individuals left KNCU as a group. As I had a flexible model during the research, as well 
as ample time to expand the project, I was able to incorporate these groups. According 
to Patton (2002), this type of extreme or deviant case (outlier) sampling allows learning 
from unusual manifestations of the phenomenon of interest - breakaway groups, in this 
case. As Patton (2008, 244) suggests, “being open to following wherever the data leads 
is a primary strength of qualitative fieldwork strategies.” He refers to this as 
opportunistic or emergent sampling, and it entails following new leads during 
fieldwork, taking advantage of the unexpected, and demonstrating flexibility in order to 
add to the richness of the research.  
 
The breakaway groups that I explore are located in the Kilimanjaro region and are 
collectively known as the G32. The G32 is composed of 32 primary societies, formerly 
belonging to KNCU, who signed a memorandum in 2003 and split away from the 
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union. Tanzania’s Co-operative Act allows one third of a union to make binding 
decisions and as such 32 co-operative societies endorsed this idea (Wa Simbeye, 2013). 
Commonly referred to as the G32, this group is registered as the Kilimanjaro New 
Cooperative Initiative – Joint Venture Enterprise (KNCI-JVE) and received legal 
recognition in 2007 (Wa Simbeye, 2013). The creation of the G32 was overseen by 
leaders from the primary societies who joined this group, some of whom had previously 
worked in management or held leadership positions at KNCU (Mmari, 2012). Their 
amassed knowledge of the union’s weaknesses and possible alternative arrangements 
may have helped them to convince KNCU’s members to support this decision (Mmari, 
2012). There were various reasons for the split. According to Mmari (2012) the impetus 
for the G32 departure included KNCU’s failure to provide advance payments for coffee 
crop procurement, high union coordination costs, and widespread maladministration. 
The G32 primary societies are located in all four of KNCU’s regions, and I visited two 
G32 primary societies: Keryo (Rombo) and Lukani/Losaa (Hai). Keryo is organic and 
Lukani/Losaa is conventional. There are some major differences between these primary 
societies and KNCU’s other groups, and price is one of them. Unlike at KNCU, it is up 
to the primary society to determine its own coffee payment to farmers. 
 
The second breakaway group that I explore is Mamsera Rural Primary Co-operative 
Society, herein referred to as Mamsera. Mamsera left KNCU in 2003 as a member of 
the G32, and then separated a year later to become an independent primary society. 
Mamsera has invested in developing its primary society; it has a hardware shop and 
sells bricks along the main street. Farmers also receive inputs, such as sprayers and 
tools. There is a local SACCO where people can obtain loans, as well as a Village Co-
operative Bank (VICOBA) that provides an informal lending program. Beyond these 
extensive social products, Mamsera attributes much of its success to a strong female 
leader and I explore this in Chapter 6. Research on Mamsera illustrates that this primary 
society has been highly successful since departing from KNCU and, subsequently, the 
G32. Donge and Mbeiyererwa (2011), in their comparative analysis of co-operatives in 
the region (including primary societies belonging to KNCU), claim that Mamsera has 
been more successful in marketing its coffee than have other primary societies. In their 
work on Tanzania’s co-operatives, Birchall and Simmons (2009) highlight the influence 
of Mamsera in recognizing the importance of farmers having their own scales (so that 
they know they are not being cheated, which was occasionally mentioned as a problem 
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during my interviews) and providing access to affordable inputs such as tools and 
sprayers. 
 
4.4 Research Design 
 
I build on my theoretical framework and analysis of Tanzania’s co-operative sector in 
order to develop a research design that addresses how Fairtrade gives producers a voice 
in decision-making. The design entails an exploratory field research stage, followed by 
a multiple case study of the three Tanzanian coffee unions. In this section I outline the 
interview subjects, data collection process, analysis and coding while also reflecting on 
reflexivity and ethics. The process I followed is outlined in Figure 7 below. 
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Figure 7: Research Process 
 
 
 
4.4.1 Subjects for Study 
While the aggregate group that I study is the organization (the co-operative), the unit of 
analysis is the individual. This is because I am interested in how different individuals 
behave in terms of their participation in decision-making; although I generalize about 
aggregates, I am referring to individual participation (Babbie and Benaquisto, 2002). In 
other words, I am asking: How does Fairtrade give individual producers a voice in 
decision-making? 
 
In order to learn more about this, I used criterion sampling (Patton, 2002) to identify 
groups of individuals who could share knowledge on this topic. In line with Eberhart 
and Smith’s (2008) methodological guidelines, I aimed to collect diverse perspectives 
and sought out people with different views.  These four groups are: 
(1) Fairtrade key informants: practitioners based in the global North, traders, 
and staff of FLO and Fairtrade Africa 
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(2) Tanzanian key informants: union managers and leaders, government 
officials, academics, and NGO workers 
(3) Co-operative managers, staff and Board of Directors members 
(4) Producers 
 
Gaining access to the field can be a difficult and lengthy process. I was fortunate to 
have worked as a Fairtrade practitioner and to be familiar with some of the 
organizations included in the sampling frame. I also had the opportunity to attend a 
BioFach organic conference in Nuremberg, Germany in February 2011 as well as a 
Fairtrade Africa Annual General Meeting in Accra, Ghana in November 2011. I met 
many representatives from Fairtrade co-operatives in Africa at both events. A key 
person I met, whom I consider a gatekeeper given her role in helping me to obtain 
access to others (Buch and Staller, 2007), was the Fairtrade Co-ordinator from KDCU. 
She was very interested in my research, and told me all about Tanzania’s co-operative 
history. She also invited me out to visit her organization during my fieldwork. Through 
my contacts in Fairtrade and the knowledge acquired through the discussion with this 
original gatekeeper, I was able to obtain references to individuals at other Tanzanian 
unions, who warmly welcomed me to visit during the exploratory research. I timed my 
visits to coincide with the coffee harvest so that farmers would be available for 
interviews in all three regions. 
 
Appendix 9 contains an anonymous list of Group 1 interviewees. The first interview 
respondents I selected are herein referred to as Group 1 key informants. Group 1 
includes individuals in both the global North and global South who are Fairtrade 
experts. Examples include traders and importers situated in the global North, academics, 
and employees of Fairtrade International and Fairtrade Africa. I used purposive 
sampling to choose these individuals, as well as snowball sampling based on 
recommendations from interview subjects. Elite interviews allow for inferences to be 
made about a larger population’s characteristics and decisions, especially when the 
sampling frame contains too large a number of individuals to interview (Tansey, 2007). 
As Goldstein (2002, 669) highlights, “getting the interview” is a sampling issue. I have 
been involved in the Fairtrade movement for many years and worked in Fairtrade 
certification at Fairtrade Canada; as such, this stage was relatively straightforward as I 
was able to use my former position as clout for getting the interviews.  
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Secondly I held Group 2 key informant interviews in Tanzania with experts including 
union managers and leaders, academics, government officials, and NGO workers (see 
Appendix 10). I was fortunate to have selected Moshi, Kilimanjaro as a base, as this is 
very much the hub of coffee activity in the country (as the weekly auction is held here) 
and I had easy access to many individuals and organizations. Although I had originally 
estimated that I would require approximately ten interviews in this group, these 
discussions proved highly useful and insightful and snowballed into many introductions 
and interviews. In total I held 40 interviews with this group and the sampling strategy 
was akin to Group 1’s. It was through these Group 2 interviews that I came to learn 
about the breakaway groups, which became a highly important finding of this study. 
These interviews were typically between one and two hours long.  
 
Following a slightly different format, I held 15 semi-structured Group 3 interviews with 
managers and members of the Board of Directors at the unions and breakaway group in 
order to learn more about these organizations (see Appendix 11). I allocated a field trip 
for this specific purpose, as these individuals tend to have vast knowledge and in many 
cases I required multiple interviews for follow-up questions and interpretation of the 
research findings. These interviews were typically between 45 to 60 minutes in 
duration, and purposive and snowball sampling were again used here. 
 
For the Group 4 producer-level interviews, I spoke with small-scale producers, 
including indigenous producers and women (see Appendix 12). I aimed to interview 
producers in villages with similar production levels per population, as the volume of 
coffee produced and sold is a determinant of individual income; however, this was often 
challenging, as ease of access and willingness to support the research were priorities. As 
such, I aimed to select villages with production average levels that were not outliers 
(either extremely high or extremely low). Due to the fact that I had to be introduced by 
the union, I also anticipated that I could be guided towards societies that might be 
considered ‘star’ co-operatives as a means of showcasing the union’s work, as seen in 
Tallontire’s (1999) work with KNCU. Although I requested ‘average’ societies and did 
not travel with union staff unless absolutely necessary (in order to avoid any association 
with the union), I assume that these societies should display better than average effects.  
I also interviewed quite a few Board members and Secretary-managers in this group, 
who would be expended to possess a higher level of knowledge than producers given 
their role. Therefore, if these individuals report that they have little knowledge of 
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Fairtrade and are the ones responsible for conducting meetings on Fairtrade premium 
knowledge, we can likely infer that producers know even less. 
 
While at KNCU I interviewed producers at four primary societies: Uru North Njari 
(Moshi Rural), Uru North Msuni (Moshi Rural), Kibosho Central (Moshi Rural), and 
Kyengia (Hai). Uru North was organic and the other two PCSs were conventional.  I 
visited three PCSs at KCU: Izigo (Muleba), Katoro (Bukoba), and Kasharu (Bukoba). 
The first two were certified organic, while the third was not, although KCU’s coffee 
tends to be organic as farmers generally use manure, rather than chemicals, as fertilizer. 
At KDCU I visited three primary societies during this research: Mabira (Kituntu 
Maloura), Nyakianja (Bugene Nyaishori zone), and Niakikika (Nyabionza), and only 
Niakikika is organic.   
 
There is, of course, diversity within these primary societies and I cannot generalize 
about all producers based on my interview sample. Within primary societies, some 
farmers are younger and healthier, possess more coffee trees, or have more productive 
farms (typically because their coffee trees are younger). While I collected data on age, 
the size of the farms, the number of coffee trees, coffee production levels, and 
additional crops, I did not notice a pattern in terms of healthier farms or age leading to 
enhanced participation in governance. While it could be that a large-scale survey may 
have unearthed these differences, my major findings in terms of diversity within co-
operatives related to the distinction between men and women and the privileged 
position of those in leadership positions, and I explore both in the findings. 
 
Table 7 outlines the subjects in each group. While I generally followed this order for the 
interviews – beginning with Fairtrade key informant interviews and drilling down to 
Tanzanian experts, co-op managers, and producers - there was often overlap amongst 
the four groups, as I might learn something in a Group 3 interview and then return to 
speak with a Group 2 interviewee about it in a second interview. 
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Table 7: Overview of 4 Interview Groups  
 
Group Description # People 
Interviewed 
# Interview 
Occasions 
Location Date 
1 Fairtrade key 
respondents 
16 19 London, U.K. 
Accra, Ghana 
Nairobi, Kenya 
Kiambu, Kenya 
Tukuyu, 
Tanzania 
2011-2013 
2 Tanzanian 
key 
respondents 
40 57 Accra, Ghana 
Moshi, Bukoba, 
Kayanga and 
Tukuyu, 
Tanzania 
August 2011 – 
October 2012 
(Research trips 
1, 2, and 3) 
3 PSC 
managers and 
leaders 
15 15 11 Tanzanian 
villages 
May – October 
2012 
(Research trips 
2 and 3) 
4 Producers 68 68 13 Tanzanian 
villages 
May – October 
2012 
(Research trips 
2 and 3) 
TOTAL 139 159   
 
4.4.2 Data Collection Methods 
It is essential that the data fit the research question (Hesse-Biber, 2007b). I collected 
data via a combination of techniques: interviews, focus groups, non-participant 
observation, and document review. The combination of various methods facilitates data 
triangulation, accounting for both reliability and validity (Babbie and Benaquisto 2002, 
99). I took a phased approach to the project, and the list of field trips and events is 
provided in Table 8.   
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Table 8: Field Trips and Events 
 
 
4.4.2.1 Exploratory Research 
In the first phase I held key informant interviews with individuals in Tanzania, Kenya, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Germany, and the UK and spent two weeks conducting exploratory 
research in East Africa. The purpose of these interviews was to learn more about 
Fairtrade governance, to develop an appropriate research question based on a literature 
review and conversations with practitioners, and to identify organizations to involve. On 
my first field trip I visited a coffee union in Moshi, Tanzania (KNCU), a tea co-
operative in Tukuyu, Tanzania (RSTGA) and a coffee co-operatives in Kiambu, Kenya 
(Ndumberi). At all three co-operatives I visited, the managers discussed the importance 
of Fairtrade and democratic decision-making. In contrast, overall, the producers I met 
knew very little about Fairtrade, if anything at all, and generally had no idea how they 
benefitted from participating in the system. This confirmed to me that Fairtrade 
governance merited further investigation and helped me to develop the research plan. 
Phase Event Location Date Purpose 
Phase 1: 
Exploratory/ 
Scoping 
BioFach 
Organic 
Conference 
Nuremberg, 
Germany 
February 
2011 
Identify potential 
co-operatives; set 
up key informant 
interviews 
Research Trip 1 Tanzania & 
Kenya 
August 2011 
(2 weeks) 
Meet with coffee 
and tea producers, 
as well as members 
of Fairtrade Africa, 
and engage in key 
informant 
interviews. 
Africa Fairtrade 
Convention 
Accra, Ghana November 
2011 
Observe meetings 
and training 
sessions; engage in 
key informant 
interviews. 
Phase 2: 
Tanzanian 
Key 
Informant 
Interviews 
Research Trip 2 Tanzania & 
Kenya 
May 2012 Interview Group 2 
key informants; 
pilot producer 
questionnaire. 
Phase 3: 
Producer 
Interviews 
Research Trip 3 Tanzania & 
Kenya 
July – 
October 2013 
Interview producers 
and key informants, 
collect documents, 
observe meetings, 
and share findings 
with all groups for 
feedback. 
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4.4.2.2 Interviews 
As outlined in Section 4.3.2, this qualitative study entails face-to-face interviews with 
four groups: key informants (Groups 1 & 2), managers and Board members (Group 3) 
and producers (Group 4).  To develop the interview guide and producer questions, I 
followed Archon & Fung’s Critical Dimensions of Fit (see Table 2). As the purpose of 
this project is to determine whether or not Fairtrade fits the EPG model, these 
dimensions allow some insight into questions that may be of high importance. I 
recorded all Group 1, 2 and 3 interviews, with written consent from interviewees. 
 
I began this study by interviewing Group 1 individuals in order to learn about 
governance and to develop the research question, and they therefore contributed to the 
initial study construction. I interviewed 16 individuals in this category using a mix of 
semi-structured interviewing and an unstructured, also known as informal 
conversational, format which ensured maximum flexibility and allowed questions to 
flow from the immediate context (Patton, 2002). This format was utilized in order to 
allow flexibility with regards to the wording and order of questions, as it allows the 
interviewer to answer questions and make clarifications, as well as add probes between 
subsequent subjects (Berg, 2007). The questions and the sequence were not strictly 
predetermined and I adapted to a new direction in the flow of conversation when 
necessary. These interviews were typically between one and two hours long and I 
recorded them. I created an interview guide, provided in Appendix 13, which lists the 
issues or questions I explored. I developed this in order to ensure that I pursued similar 
lines of enquiry with each individual (Patton, 2002).  
 
Following Patton’s (2002) qualitative research techniques, I asked questions that were 
relevant to particular individuals. As such, every individual was not asked about every 
topic listed, and these lists of questions or topics were intended to serve only as a guide 
for the interview.  I used Kvale’s (1996) list of research questions, comprising 
introductory, follow-up, probing, specifying, direct, indirect, structuring, and 
interpreting questions, as well as silence, in order to achieve an effective balance of 
being active as an interviewer without being too intrusive. In many cases I deviated 
from the interview guide during Group 1 and 2 interviews to pursue a more unstructured 
format and allow new themes to emerge. Aside from providing very useful information 
and helping me to select the villages to visit, these interviews helped me to determine 
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which questions ranked highest with regards to relevance and importance, thereby 
facilitating the interview design for Group 4 interviews. I then interviewed the 40 Group 
2 individuals using a similar format, following the interview guide used in Group 1 
interviews. 
 
I used a slightly different format for Group 3 interviews, shifting towards a semi-
structured approach. This allowed me the flexibility I required to skip questions or ask 
follow-up questions, while also keeping me on track (see Appendix 14 Interview Guide 
for Group 3 interviews). This structure differed from Group 1 and 2 interviews in that 
questions were more formalized and I asked them in a general order. I held some of 
these interviews in Swahili, and therefore I did not have the same ability to ask follow 
up questions as I did in the Group 1 and 2 interviews. Some were recorded while others 
were not, depending on the context. 
 
The interviews with Group 1, 2, and 3 respondents provided me with the information I 
required to develop the questions for Group 4 interviewees. I used a structured 
questionnaire format, similar to a survey, with some open-ended questions for Group 4 
interviews. This questionnaire was based on a survey developed by Granville and 
Telford (2013) in their Fairtrade field research in South Africa. All interviews were 
done face-to-face; I (through a translator) asked the questions and wrote down 
respondents’ answers. As Babbie (2002) explains, it was essential that my presence did 
not affect a respondent’s perception of the questions and I aimed to be a neutral 
medium.  
 
However, this was at times challenged by the location of the interviews. I frequently 
held interviews at coffee weighing stations as this was an effective way to locate 
interview subjects. I would simply wait for them to arrive to sell their coffee to the co-
operative and, recognizing that farmers have very busy schedules, ask them to take the 
time for a short interview without causing much of an interruption in their day. The 
trade-off was that I did not always have control over who was listening in. While I 
sought out private spots, such as a bench under a large tree or an unused office, people 
would linger nearby at times. I noticed that this was particularly true when I interviewed 
women; on several occasions the male Secretary-Manager would pop in to ‘check’ on 
everything. In Chapter 7, I reflect on some of the barriers that women face in terms of 
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the cultural context and the male-dominated coffee sector, and the challenge of securing 
private interviews with women is a clear indication of these barriers. 
 
In other cases, I had to travel quite far to reach farmers in their homes. At times, a two-
hour drive might be followed by a two to three hour walk around steep coffee fields in 
order to locate someone at home. When interviews were held in front of the residence, 
typically on benches or stools, neighbours and children tended to find our presence 
interesting and would often come by to listen in. Alternatively, when we went inside 
there could be several children and a husband or wife also sitting in the interview room, 
as many houses consisted of only one or two rooms. This was particularly challenging 
for interviews with women, as at times the men attempted to answer for their wives. 
After this happened the first time, I addressed the issue by having my translator explain 
to everyone that I was interested in the woman’s responses only, and would interview 
the man separately afterwards if he wished. I occasionally then asked the male family 
member a few questions after the interview with the woman, in order to give him an 
opportunity to share his views. While this worked quite well, these follow-up interviews 
were discussions that I did not incorporate in the findings; I did not want to interview 
more than one person in a family because men and women typically share the farm. 
However, this approach proved quite effective in allowing me to hear the views of the 
women I interviewed in such situations.  
 
Overall, the interview location entails potential implications for the results of this study. 
Farmers may have been less willing to admit sales to private buyers or women may 
have avoided discussing gender disadvantages due to these factors I have outlined 
above. As such, the likely impact on the responses in my survey is that I may have 
underestimated the degree to which farmers sell to private traders or women experience 
gender discrimination. I discuss this further in Chapter 6’s overview of the findings. 
 
The interview guide for Group 4 respondents can be viewed in Appendix 15, and the 
Swahili version is in Appendix 16. Group 4 interviews required translation services, and 
these costs were therefore factored into the project budget. I held producer interviews in 
Swahili or local Bantu languages such as Chagga, employing three translators in 
Tanzania. These individuals signed both a confidentiality agreement and a contract (see 
Appendices 17 and 18). I held all producer interviews in person in community meeting 
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facilities, cocoa fields, farms, and gathering points. While I did not record this set of 
interviews, I transcribed interview notes in a field journal. 
 
I piloted my questionnaire with two producers at Uru North, Moshi in May 2012 on my 
second field trip. Berg (2007) outlines the importance of a pre-test schedule that 
incorporates a practice interview, the purpose of which is to ensure that all necessary 
questions have been asked, that the questions elicit the type of responses sought, and 
that the language is meaningful. As suggested by Miner-Rubino and Jayaratne (2007), I 
not only asked individuals to respond to questions but also asked them to provide 
feedback on the wording of questions. 
  
As David Karp explains (cited in Hesse-Biber 2007), in-depth interviewing allows one 
to engage in simultaneous processes of data collection and analysis, and the two should 
inform each other. I wrote memos from day one and summarized my field notes daily, 
coding them according to theme and at times dictating into my digital recorder. The 
early data helped me to determine which themes to pursue and which ideas to 
reevaluate. It also allowed me to move in new, unanticipated directions. After ten 
interviews I reevaluated the interview guide in order to assess what I was learning or 
failing to learn (Karp cited in Hesse-Biber 2007). While there is no clear cut-off point 
for case study research, as Yin (2009) prescribes, I conducted interviews until I felt that 
I had confirmatory evidence and had attempted to investigate rival hypotheses, such as 
the involvement of external organizations in giving producers a voice. 
 
4.4.2.3 Focus Groups 
Focus groups are defined by Bryman (2001, 503) as “a form of group interview in 
which: there are several participants (in addition to the moderator/facilitator); there is an 
emphasis in the questioning on a particular fairly tightly defined topic; and the emphasis 
is upon interaction within the group and the joint construction of meaning.” Focus 
groups differ from in-depth interviews as they comprise an interview with multiple 
respondents (Leavy, 2007). Chambers (1994c) claims that focus groups may be 
preferred over individual interviews for four reasons: (1) they may be more efficient 
when time is limited (as was sometimes the case in this research), (2) there may be an 
overlapping knowledge spread that covers a wider field than an interview with one 
member might, (3) there is instant triangulation, and (4) one might be able to address 
more sensitive topics. I studied focus group techniques prior to beginning this project, 
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and have hosted focus groups in the past through a previous job in marketing. As such, I 
felt well equipped to lead these discussions. I used a focus group guide (see Appendix 
19), deviating from it where necessary, and tracked all seating arrangements in my 
notes. There are, of course, limitations to focus groups; these include limited control on 
the part of the researcher, data that is difficult to analyze, and possible problems of 
group effects (Bryman, 2001). 
 
I held focus groups primarily when it was more convenient due to respondent time 
availability or comfort level (as in the case of an all-female group). I held five producer 
focus groups in total (see Appendix 20 for a list of focus groups). Leavy (2007, 173) 
claims that the main appeal of this method for feminists is the ability to “conduct ‘with 
disenfranchised groups and the ability to access “subjugated voices’” as this technique 
is useful for accessing knowledge from a marginalized group. While focus groups are 
known to facilitate open expression among members of marginalized social groups 
(Neuman, 2006), they can also limit the discussion to one or a few topics. There is also 
a risk of a “group effect” that can facilitate knowledge building by creating a comfort 
level, or in other cases be detrimental as individuals may dominate the conversation 
(Leavy, 2007). I found this to be true in some focus groups where one individual would 
always speak first. My role as moderator was therefore key, and entails the degree of 
control that I chose to exercise. This was further challenged by the fact that focus 
groups had to involve simultaneous translation into Swahili by my translator, and 
everything was slowed down as I waited for the translation in order to take notes. I did 
not use a digital recorder as these focus groups were at times held with respondents who 
did not wish to be interviewed individually, and I felt that this could pose an additional 
challenge. 
 
4.4.2.4 Direct Observation 
I engaged in non-participant observation (meaning that I was not myself a participant, 
but rather a simple observer) on a regular basis, as a means of gathering data in a natural 
setting (Babbie and Benaquisto, 2002, 308). I was overt about my role as a researcher, 
and introduced myself to individuals as a PhD student from Queen Mary conducting 
Fairtrade research on participation and representation in Fairtrade. During all three field 
trips I visited farmers’ fields and homes, co-operative meetings, weighing stations, the 
coffee auction on numerous occasions, factories, conferences, and Fairtrade premium 
projects such as a school and a pine tree farm. I also followed field officers around on 
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visits. I even attended the wake of a factory employee who was killed in a road 
accident, as a sign of respect while I was staying in Kayanga. I was based in an office at 
MUCCoBS and had the opportunity to observe and interact with academics in this 
location. I also spent time in all three union offices, as well as the Kahawa (coffee) 
building where the auction was held, and feel that throughout this time Group 2 
interviewees developed a necessary level of comfort with my presence. This also 
allowed me to be readily available when necessary and my translator was always 
nearby.  
 
Based on Chambers’ (2007, 2008) approach to assessing whose knowledge and reality 
counts, I crafted a list of observations. At all events I attended I made observations 
about the following, recording everything in a field journal: Where are meetings held? 
Who is invited? Where do people sit? How do people participate? Who speaks? Who is 
listened to? What are the power dynamics? This allowed me to complement my 
knowledge of individuals with observations about their day-to-day activities. I do, 
however, acknowledge that in many cases my presence may have affected their 
activities. 
  
4.4.2.5 Document Analysis 
Finally, I supplemented the research with a review of written and electronic materials 
including meeting minutes, letters, emails, financial data, co-op reports, Fairtrade 
premium spending information, and membership lists. I also reviewed marketing 
materials, presentations, videos, newsletters, websites, and related communications, as 
well as related media stories. 
 
4.4.3 Coding and Analysis 
Following data collection, I searched for meaning within the data; memoing and coding 
provide two important tools for accomplishing this (Hesse-Biber, 2007b). The aim at 
this stage was to interpret the data and unearth patterns or themes. I used coding, the 
development of concepts and categories, and memoing, writing down these ideas during 
the coding process and then elaborating on them, to bring order and coherence to these 
responses and to search for similarities and dissimilarities (Babbie and Benaquisto, 
2002). I searched for patterns and themes, compared and contrasted responses, 
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contextualized incidents and experiences, and engaged in the challenging process of 
data reduction, choosing which threads to pull (Buch and Staller, 2007).  
 
I developed a provisional coding system of established themes ahead of the first key 
informant interviews, which built upon the theoretical framework and literature review. 
This allowed me to organize and pre-code the large quantities of data that I began to 
amass, and I organized these codes as ‘nodes’ using nVivo software. In order to 
determine these initial themes I relied on my theoretical propositions as per Yin’s 
(2009) guidelines, and the EPG framework determined many of the codes at this stage, 
such as ‘bottom-up participation’, ‘deliberation’, and ‘power relations’.  Beyond EPG-
related themes I also focused on broad categories such as ‘coffee’, ‘co-operatives’, 
‘Fairtrade premiums’, and ‘governance’.  
 
As the research progressed, additional themes emerged and I therefore engaged in an 
iterative approach to coding. Examples of new codes included ‘capacity building’, 
‘competition’, ‘breakaway groups’, and ‘gender’. I entered new codes in nVivo as they 
arose in interviews, and regularly reviewed existing categories to assess their 
importance to the research. I eliminated some categories as the research went on. For 
example, I had originally planned to focus on the Fairtrade producer networks and 
created several codes for this topic including ‘Fairtrade Africa’, ‘CLAC’, and 
‘governance of producer networks’. However, as my focus shifted away from the 
producer networks, I eliminated these nodes in nVivo and shifted this material to a node 
on background information. 
 
While in East Africa, I wrote out field notes every day. I either did this on my computer 
at night, regardless of how exhausted I was, or by hand in a notebook during gaps in 
interviews. I found it essential to do this while the ideas from the day were still fresh in 
my mind, and I filled 13 notebooks with my notes throughout the three trips. On days 
with fewer interviews planned, I took advantage of the time off to plug these notes into 
the appropriate nVivo coded categories. This allowed me to process the information as I 
went and to notice unexpected discrepancies or new categories. For example, while 
coding during some producer interviews during my third research trip, I began to notice 
that I had notes coded under ‘training’, ‘education’ and ‘gender’ that all fit the theme of 
‘capacity building’. Therefore, I added ‘capacity building’ as a node and this became a 
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key finding in the research. Overall, I found that this flexible approach to coding led to 
a thorough and effective analysis of the data. 
 
Analyzing case study evidence is one of the most challenging elements of case study 
(Patton, 2002). As Miles and Huberman (1984, 16) state: “One cannot ordinarily follow 
how a researcher got from 3600 pages of field notes to the final conclusions, sprinkled 
with vivid quotes though they may be.” I was fortunate to have conducted previous 
Fairtrade fieldwork in Peru, and feel that this experience helped me to more effectively 
collect, code, and analyze the data while limiting human error. I transcribed all 
interviews myself, and analyzed data with the use of a computer-assisted tool, QSR 
NVivo software. I used pattern-matching logic to compare the empirical patterns with 
the predicted ones, which serves to strengthen the validity of the research (Trochim, 
1989, Yin, 2009). Additional codes emerged throughout the data analysis process, such 
as ‘exit’ and ‘capacity building’ and I incorporated these as well; therefore, I coded into 
two broad categories of expectant and emerging themes (Layder, 1993). As Buch and 
Staller (2007) note, while it is useful to enter the field with a variety of formal and 
informal theories, this process is often iterative and requires the researcher to refine or 
reformulate her theoretical ideas. 
 
It is important to note here that the process of data collection often overlapped with 
coding and analyzing; as such, I often engaged in observation and analysis at the same 
time, iterating between theory and data (Eisenhardt, 1989a). I shared results with 
stakeholders in this research on an ongoing basis, as I wanted to collect continuous 
feedback on my findings. As Buch and Staller (2007) explain, many ethnographers 
share findings with the community they study before publishing anything in order to 
obtain feedback from the community and ensure accuracy in the reporting. I found that 
these presentations (at all three union headquarters, MUCCoBS and the Kenya Co-
operative College) helped me to analyze some of the findings in a much more effective 
and meaningful way than might otherwise have been possible. 
 
Causality is complex; a cause-and-effect relationship is an emergent property of various 
interacting conditions and cannot be considered a linear process; as a result, it can be 
challenging to say something meaningful about its isolated components (Steinberg, 
2007). Variables may be sufficient but unnecessary for the outcome, or, as seen in the 
case of multifinality, may follow different pathways to varying outcomes (Bennett and 
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Elman, 2006). Throughout this process I therefore considered equifinality, or multiple 
causation (George and Bennett, 2005, Ragin, 1987). Patton’s (2008) theory of 
contribution provides a framework for understanding the important distinction between 
attribution and contribution. As an example of this, I hypothesized that actors outside of 
the Fairtrade system also play a role in facilitating capacity building and aimed to 
confirm or disconfirm this hypothesis in interviews with key informants. 
 
4.4.4 Reflexivity  
Reflexivity is the process through which a researcher “recognizes, examines, and 
understands how his or her own social background and assumptions can intervene in the 
research process.” (Hesse-Biber, 2007a, 129) As is common to all qualitative work, 
complete objectivity is impossible. Through a consideration of reflexivity the researcher 
is identified as a significant figure who determines that collection, selection, and 
interpretation of data (Finlay and Gough, 2003). Feminist researchers consider 
reflexivity throughout the entire process, which entails self-reflection on one’s values, 
attitudes, biases, lived reality, and experiences regarding the research process (Hesse-
Biber, 2007a).  
 
While the researcher is the primary ‘instrument’ in a project, this individual also brings 
shortcomings and biases to the work; it was my responsibility to identify and monitor 
these (Merriam, 2002). As it is impossible to possess a neutral or value-free position, I 
therefore reflected on how my emotions, values, and political standpoints may affect the 
research. I was aware of the fact that I approached this project with certain opinions, 
both conscious and unconscious. I strove to appreciate and depict the world 
authentically while being self-analytical, politically aware, and reflexive in 
consciousness throughout the research process (Patton, 2002, 41). Recognizing that I 
am a product of my society’s social structures and institutions, I was conscious of my 
role as an observer and the impact it could have on my findings.  
 
As part of this, I considered how my previous experience as a Fairtrade practitioner 
could lead to a bias in my approach, as the research inevitably reflects my personal 
identity and ideology. One potential bias relates to my own background as a Fairtrade 
practitioner. Before commencing this project, I worked in Communications at Fairtrade 
Canada and a Fairtrade ATO named La Siembra Co-operative. Through this experience 
I had previously come into contact with some of the people I interviewed. While this 
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helped me to access some of the Group 1 interviewees, it may have also affected how 
some of these individuals viewed and related to me. 
 
I also considered the power implications of my gender and race. There are sensitive 
issues of gaining access, trading on friendships, and the politics of reporting (Buch and 
Staller, 2007). Hesse-Biber (2007a, 139-140) rightly questions: “Can a middle-class, 
white female interview a woman from the Third World who is living in poverty?” As a 
white middle-class female, I considered how my gender, race, ethnic background, and 
social class affected the research process. As a woman, my gender at times posed 
advantages, such as allowing me to interview female respondents who might not have 
felt comfortable with a male interviewer. However, my gender also posed challenges 
with regards to how I was perceived, particularly by men in male-dominated Tanzanian 
society. My race was also an important consideration. At times it helped me to achieve 
access to respondents, as there was a certain ‘status’ related to being a foreigner in 
Tanzania. In many cases I was granted access to senior officials or managers whom I 
would have undoubtedly had difficulty accessing in the U.K. However, my whiteness 
also made it clear that I was an outsider, which at times posed difficulties with regards 
to how I was perceived. This was not easy to ignore given the constant references that 
were made to me as ‘mzungu’ (white person in Swahili). For example, people may have 
been unwilling to talk freely about certain topics with me, as Tallontire (1999) finds 
during discussions of corruption during her research in Tanzania, as they may have 
associated me with traders, auditors, or donors.  
 
4.4.5 Ethics 
Ethical principles are essential to observe throughout the entire research process, be it 
the truthful reporting of data or accurate referencing for contributions (Miner-Rubino 
and Jayaratne, 2007). The participants in this project included members of vulnerable 
populations and I adhered to strict ethical guidelines regarding anonymity, the consent 
process, photos, and videos. Confidentiality of data was important in all interviews due 
to the sensitive nature of some of the documents I reviewed, such as meeting minutes.  
 
I obtained a two-staged ethical approval. Queen Mary, University of London provided 
the Ethics Clearance, recorded as QMREC2011/54, included in Appendix 21 and 22 of 
this report. I applied for ethical clearance in two stages because I wished to begin key 
informant interviews prior to developing the full research plan. As such my first 
 105	  
clearance was granted in July 2011, quite early in the project, and permitted me to 
engage in fieldwork and elite interviews, but not producer-level interviews.  Full ethical 
clearance was granted in May 2012, in advance of the producer interviews. 
 
Beyond the strict ethics clearance, I also have responsibilities related to how I gain 
access to people, the process of obtaining consent, and the politics of reporting people’s 
experiences (Buch and Staller, 2007). This project adheres to the foremost ethical rule 
of social research of bringing no harm to respondents (Babbie and Benaquisto, 2002). In 
the case of village-level interviews, additional sensitivities such as potential illiteracy in 
the consent-granting process were addressed. I obtained informed consent, either 
written or oral, for all interviews. I gave a letter of information  (Appendix 23) and a 
consent form (Appendix 24) to participants in Group 1, 2 and 3 interviews, and I sought 
permission for digital recordings during these interviews. In the case of producer 
interviews and focus groups, I read an abridged version to the respondent; my translator 
read it in Swahili or a local dialect where necessary. 
 
4.5 General Limitations 
 
The methodology for this study has a number of possible limitations. I used a 
triangulated approach to strengthen each method while minimizing the weaknesses 
(Patton, 2002). However, I must consider this study’s limitations vis-à-vis my role as 
researcher, working with translators, the sample size, and limited documents and 
records. 
 
Firstly, there are limitations related to my role as researcher. There is a possibility that I, 
as observer and interviewer, may have affected the situation in some unknown way 
(Patton, 2002). Respondents may have felt compelled to reflect more positively on 
Fairtrade if they associated me with a Fairtrade organization; through my previous role 
as a practitioner, I risked being perceived as a Fairtrade affiliate. In order to address this 
possible conflict of interest, I introduced myself as an independent researcher known to 
Fairtrade Canada. I may also have distorted responses due to personal bias, and I 
therefore regularly reflected on reflexivity throughout the project. 
 
The second limitation is that I worked with three translators. This was one of the most 
challenging elements of the research, and posed several problems such as the time 
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required to train the translator, filtering questions and answers through a third party, and 
errors in translation. For example, the term ‘Fairtrade’ had two translations in Swahili, 
and the original phrase ‘usawa wa biashara’ used by the translator was less common; as 
a result we switched to ‘soko la haki’ after several interviews. Personal bias, politics, 
emotional state, or lack of awareness on the part of translators may have served to filter 
the results (Patton, 2002).  In order to reduce errors in the producer questionnaire, I had 
the document back translated into English from Swahili (see Appendix 25). While there 
were some minor errors, I concluded that the translation of the questionnaire was quite 
accurate. As previously mentioned, I also had all translators sign a contract (see 
Appendix 17) as well as a confidentiality agreement (Appendix 18). 
 
Thirdly, I was constrained by a limited sample. Owing to issues of access and time 
limitations, I was unable to speak with non-members or local traders. For the same 
reasons I sampled a very small percentage of the population, and therefore the results 
may not be representative. Fourthly, documents and records have limitations (Patton, 
2002). They may be inaccurate or incomplete, and in some cases I had great detail while 
in others I had very little. 
 
In order to reduce the likelihood of these limitations, I aimed to ensure reliability and 
validity, both external and internal, throughout. Reliability is the degree to which a 
measure of a concept is stable (Bryman, 2001). It refers to the coherence and 
transparency of the analytical procedures (Eisenhardt, 1989a), and I aimed to do this 
here by providing detailed information on case selection, design, and fieldwork 
procedures in order to make the research replicable. External reliability is the degree to 
which the study can be replicated, and I therefore provide all relevant information here 
including interview questions, respondent details, and study locations. Internal 
reliability may refer to whether or not the research team agrees with what it sees and 
hears, and I addressed this by engaging in ongoing discussions with my translators 
about their interpretations of the interviews.  
 
Validity, in contrast, is concerned with the integrity of the conclusions generated from 
the research (Bryman, 2001). Internal validity is the match between the researcher’s 
observations and theoretical ideas they develop (Bryman, 2001). Eisenhardt (1989a, 
544) notes that “[a]n essential feature of theory building is comparison of the emergent 
concepts, theory, or hypotheses with the extant literature.” I aimed to ensure validity by 
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engaging with the data, analysis and literature on an ongoing basis. External validity 
complements this by referring to how the study’s findings may be generalized across 
social settings (Bryman, 2001). I sought to accomplish this by thoroughly reporting all 
research procedures. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
Over the two-year research period, I engaged in many interviews, observed many 
events, and read a great deal of documentation. I believe that this data triangulation 
allowed me to effectively capture the perspectives of multiple stakeholders in order to 
tell the story of collaborative governance at these organizations and to learn more about 
how individuals participate in Fairtrade decision-making. There are limitations to the 
study, as outlined above, and it was key to consider reflexivity as a means of 
understanding my role as a researcher.  
 
It is clear from the overview of the multiple case study that the three cases share some 
commonalities but also differed quite strongly. In this chapter I have highlighted these 
variances in supply chains, leadership and management, and assets. In the following 
section I move on to a discussion of the findings and pull in insights around these three 
themes.  
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PART II: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Chapter 5: A Partial Fit to EPG 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I outline my findings on decision-making at Tanzania’s coffee unions, in 
order to assess how Fairtrade might give producers a voice. I evaluate Fairtrade’s fit to 
the procedural elements of Fung & Wright’s (2003) Empowered Participatory 
Governance (EPG) model. This involves a critical assessment of how well Fairtrade 
facilitates participation, deliberation, devolution, and centralized co-ordination – 
elements that Fung and Wright define as key to collaborative governance. I then 
consider power relations, vital to Fung & Wright’s Enabling Conditions, at both the 
internal level of management and leadership, and the external level of the State.  
 
In Chapter 2 I noted that Fairtrade works through co-operative structures for small 
producer organizations, and identified a fit to Fung and Wright’s model in terms of the 
institutional structures that are in place. However, through fieldwork I identify 
challenges related to communications, decentralization, management, and leadership, 
which all have the potential to lead to an overall lack of individual producer 
participation in decision-making. I explore the deliberative process for Fairtrade 
premium usage, which I posit as one of the system’s most important elements, in order 
to learn more about this.  
 
Overall, I discover that producers are quite involved in decision-making processes at 
their primary societies, with the majority claiming to both attend and speak at meetings. 
However, communications and the level of decentralization vary across the unions and 
KNCU is noticeably weaker in its fit to EPG than are KCU and KDCU. I also find that 
there are barriers to substantive participation in decision-making, particularly for 
women. Finally, despite recent reforms and the apparent resilience of the model in 
Tanzania, I find that the country’s co-operative sector may not have evolved much from 
a previous era of high government intervention, and that managerial and leadership 
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deficiencies pose challenges to producer participation in decision-making. 
 
5.2 Using EPG for Fairtrade Research 
 
As outlined in Chapter 2, I adopted Fung and Wright’s (2003) EPG model (see Chapter 
2) in order to examine decision-making processes within Fairtrade. This model has been 
effectively employed to assess topics such as participatory budgeting in Brazil and 
decentralized planning in India, and overall I find it well suited to this study on 
Fairtrade in Tanzania. I used EPG to develop my methodology and questionnaire, and 
adopt it here to structure the findings from my research. The use of EPG establishes a 
high benchmark for an analysis of Fairtrade and, as will be seen, some of the findings 
do not fit the model. As a result, I identify areas of weakness in Fairtrade’s fit to EPG. If 
EPG is taken as a good model of collaborative governance, this may be pertinent to 
FLO’s efforts to strengthen producer participation. 
 
I use only the procedural elements of EPG, which include the general principles, design 
properties, and power relations, to analyze and report this section’s findings. I do not 
assess institutional objectives here, and the reader will note that this section is missing 
from the final comparison table. Generally I find a consideration of the institutional 
objectives better suited to a longitudinal study. Had I instead visited the unions before 
they joined Fairtrade or before the breakaway groups departed, and returned later to 
learn about the evolution of the decision-making process of these groups, I might be in a 
position to comment on institutional change. The exception to this is a consideration of 
equity, which I explore further in Chapter 7. Overall, I feel that an assessment of EPG’s 
procedural elements allowed me to explore the decision-making processes at these 
unions in sufficient detail to determine the nature of decision-making and whether or 
not producers truly have a voice. 
 
5.3 General Principles 
 
5.3.1 Bottom-up Participation  
Various principles are fundamental to the EPG model, one of which is bottom-up 
participation, or the involvement of ordinary people. This does not imply that experts 
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should not be engaged, but rather that they should not have exclusive decision-making 
power (Fung and Wright, 2003). The FLO standards state that decisions must be made 
democratically, requiring organizations to maximize member participation and ensure 
that members all have voting rights, often through a system of elected delegates 
(Fairtrade International, 2011e). As outlined in Chapter 2, FLO has also taken strides 
towards increasing producer participation in governance in recent years. In order to 
assess bottom-up participation, I asked farmers how they participate in their primary 
societies (Producer Questionnaire Question 18 (Q18), Appendix 15). The answers, some 
of which stem from multiple responses, are outlined in Table 9. 
 
Table 9: Primary Society Participation 
 
Response Frequency10 
Frequently attend meetings at the primary society 56 
Vote for Board members 49 
Act/acted as Board member 30 
Act/acted as Secretary-Manager  3 
No participation – meetings are too far away from home 1 
 
The majority of producers at all three unions therefore claimed to attend meetings and 
vote for Board members, and I take this as a good sign of bottom-up participation.11 The 
quorum for meetings in Tanzania is 100 members or 50 per cent of membership (TFC & 
CDD, 2006), and at all primary societies it was reported that quorum was met at 
meetings (Producer Questionnaire Q20). However, when I observed an AGM in Old 
Moshi in August 2012, the meeting went ahead without quorum, despite the fact that 
union Board members were present and could have objected to this as a violation of co-
operative law (Author’s non-participant observation). The Chairman later told me that 
meetings get cancelled often because they do not meet quorum (Interview G3 R4).12 
This indicated to me that there may in fact be issues of meeting frequency and quorum 
which I did not learn about during other interviews and observations.  
 
As I was also interested in learning about which individuals participate in these 
discussions, I then asked farmers if they speak at meetings (Producer Questionnaire 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Frequency refers to the number of individuals who gave this response. The number 56 indicates that 56 
producers (out of a total of 68) said this. 
11 The number of Board members amongst respondents is quite high, which could be due to individual 
self-selection for interviews, as addressed in Chapter 4’s overview of the methodology and its limitations. 
12 This code refers to a respondent in Group 3, listed as respondent 4. All related non-confidential 
information can be found in Appendices 9 to 12. 
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Q21), to which 63 of the 68 responded that they did – another very positive finding. 
Some of the responses I received when I asked why they contribute are outlined in 
Table 10. 
 
Table 10: Contributing to Discussions 
 
Response Frequency 
Share views 7 
Ask questions or get clarification 6 
Strengthen the co-operative 4 
Address a problem 3 
 
With regards to the ‘Address a problem’ response that three producers gave, examples 
of potential problems that might incite them to speak included a desire to remove a 
Secretary-Manager or a Board member (Interviews G4 R23 & G4 R34). Overall, I was 
quite surprised by this high frequency of producer participation in primary society 
meetings, but it was confirmed when I observed the Old Moshi AGM and witnessed 
many of the producers speaking (Author’s non-participant observation).  
 
Based on these interviews and observations, it appears as though, according to the 
sample of individuals I interviewed, producers have the opportunity to speak and be 
listened to at meetings. This is, however, more of a reflection on the co-operative model 
than the Fairtrade system, and it is essential to disentangle the two in order to avoid 
false causality. Fairtrade at this level is neither necessary nor sufficient for democratic 
decision-making, as the primary societies I visited were all co-operatives before the 
unions joined the Fairtrade system. While Fairtrade participation may affect the topics 
that are discussed (as in the case of the Fairtrade premiums), the processes and practices 
for decision-making at this level existed long before Fairtrade did. 
 
In Chapter 2 I outlined barriers to producer participation in decision-making including 
producer skills, confidence, and knowledge, and these three elements also came through 
in interviews. As an example of how skills and confidence may play a role in affecting 
deliberation, the Board Chair of Kyengia, who is female, said that most women are 
afraid to speak in front of men (Interview G3 R1). I intentionally over-sampled women 
(as outlined in Chapter 4) and had the opportunity to ask many women questions about 
participation. During individual interviews, I did not observe a gender divide amongst 
men and women with regards to their claims about participation. However, the reality of 
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the situation could very well have differed from what they reported about their 
participation. For example, in an all-women focus group in Kibosho Central, women 
told me:  
 
“We are given the opportunity to speak so we do sometimes. But it is mostly men 
who speak. Mostly men attend meetings. Many women do not have an 
identification card so they can't go.” (Focus Group 2)  
 
This indicated to me that there is a potential issue with substantive participation 
amongst women. I had only one opportunity to observe an AGM, in Old Moshi, and 
noted that women seemed quite willing to voice their opinions and a few were quite 
outspoken (Author’s non-participant observation). However, I cannot generalize to 
comment on whether or not women at other primary societies speak as often as men do 
based on this one meeting. Overall, given that most producers I interviewed claimed to 
attend meetings and participate in the discussion, I find bottom-up participation to be 
quite high at the level of the primary society for all three unions. This does not 
necessarily mean that all producers participate, however, as one Fairtrade expert 
explained during a discussion of producer participation: 
 
“We can look at how active producers are. Did they have the opportunity to 
participate? If they did and chose not to, that’s democracy. Some producers will 
say they don’t want to participate. We do tend to get the voice of producers who 
are much more involved in the system in terms of their business operations and 
that’s inevitable.” (Interview G1 R1) 
 
5.3.2 Deliberation 
Despite the fact that I found bottom-up participation to be high, this does not imply that 
the decision-making process entails genuine deliberation – another of Fung and 
Wright’s (2003) general principles. Deliberation requires that producers come together 
to listen to each other, discuss alternatives, and choose the best option as a group. 
During exploratory research in 2011, I visited a tea co-operative in the Mbeya region 
(southern Tanzania) and had the opportunity to interview people there. The manager of 
a tea factory said to me: 
 
“In our country we have been very calm for a long time. If leaders tell us to do 
it, we will do it. Farmers should instead sit and decide together.” (Interview G1 
R17) 
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During interviews I asked producers who makes decisions at meetings of their primary 
societies (Producer Questionnaire Q23). Of the 68 farmers, 54 claimed that producers 
are responsible for making decisions, 12 stated that the Board makes decisions, and the 
remaining two said that they were unsure. Overall, producer awareness of co-operative 
decision-making procedures was high. Elaborations on this process included: 
 
“When there’s a matter to be decided, the Board sits first. Then they call a 
general meeting and tell the members. The members are the last to decide. The 
Board cannot pass a resolution without the farmers’ agreement.” (Interview G4 
R1)  
 
“We discuss together and decide together.” (Interview G4 R26)  
 
“The Chairperson controls meetings but we all have to agree.” (Interview G4 
R65)  
 
One slightly disconcerting finding was that, of the 12 farmers who thought that the 
Board was responsible for decision-making, five thought it was solely the Chairperson 
who had the power to make decisions. I triangulated by asking this question about who 
makes decisions in a Kibosho Central focus group of farmers and, more promisingly, 
everyone in the focus group stated that decisions are made by producers at the AGM 
(Focus Group 1).  
 
Despite these findings that producers are involved in discussions at meetings, there was 
some evidence of a lack of genuine deliberation in interview responses. A tour guide at 
KNCU stated:  
 
“We vote; argue through opinion. But sometimes the more powerful win. 
Producers get to ask questions but the meeting goes quickly; farmers are quiet 
because they are confused.” (Interview G2 R2) 
 
One academic at MUCCoBS also explained about KNCU:  
 
“There is a syndrome of waiting for the meeting to make decisions. The leaders 
tend to dominate the decisions because of how they prepare agendas. So they 
always come up with a certain kind of decision.” (Interview G2 R19) 
 
Knowledge is clearly essential to deliberation, as farmers must understand the issues in 
order to discuss them; however, it is not practical or sensible for every producer to have 
access to excessive amounts of information. So how much information do farmers really 
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need? I asked this question of the Director of Producer Partnerships at the Fairtrade 
Foundation, who noted that: 
 
“We’ve got to be careful not to overlay our Western values as, to an extent, we 
would want each farmer to be involved and to be participating. But actually 
what is important is that people can make informed decisions themselves. […] 
We want to see that individuals are able to play a greater role but we can’t 
ignore the fact that some individuals may choose not to do so.” (Interview G1 
R10) 
 
In order to assess how knowledge is shared or communicated at the primary society 
level, I asked farmers how they receive information from their primary societies 
(Producer Questionnaire Q22). While I had intended to learn about how information is 
shared at meetings or events, I instead learned about the mechanisms for alerting 
producers to meetings, which include notices, the sound of a trumpet, informal 
discussions with Board members, and text messages.  The fact that Kilimanjaro’s 
farmers tend to learn about meetings through their church or mosque, while Karagwe’s 
farmers hear about meetings on the radio is not in itself of interest here; however, at all 
unions it was clear that meetings are the means by which information is shared with 
farmers. The forums for farmer decision-making are, in fact, mandated by Tanzanian 
law: AGMs must be held once a year, two months before the financial end-of-year, and 
there must also be a mid-year meeting. According to Tanzania’s co-operative law, 
members must receive three weeks notice of the date, place, and time of the meetings 
(TFC & CDD, 2006), and this appeared to be happening. Overall, meetings are being 
held and are well attended by producers.  
 
What is of interest here is the fact that communications challenges may be occurring 
between the primary society and the union and in turn affecting deliberation. In her 
1990s research on KNCU, Tallontire (1999, 211) observes communication weaknesses 
that hinder participation in decision-making between the primary societies and the 
union, identifying a large vacuum between these two levels. Tallontire (1999) finds that 
the union provides a highly bureaucratic, uniform service while most farmers still have 
little to no understanding of the organization, identifying weaknesses in the mechanisms 
for participation and communication in place between the primary societies and the 
unions. Unfortunately, I found this to still be the case today at all three unions. In order 
to learn more about deliberative processes, I explored two situations that exemplify 
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communications between the primary and the union: (1) knowledge of Fairtrade and (2) 
a delayed payment in the Kagera region. 
 
5.3.2.1 Knowledge of Fairtrade 
Within their primary societies, farmers are tasked with determining how the Fairtrade 
premium should be used - a process that should, in theory, require deliberative decision-
making. However, in general, the farmers I interviewed had very little knowledge of 
Fairtrade. A tour guide I spoke with at KNCU claimed that few farmers at his primary 
society were aware that Fairtrade existed (Interview G2 R2). I asked producers how 
much they knew about Fairtrade (Producer Questionnaire Q37). Of the 68 farmers I 
interviewed, only 38 claimed to have even heard the term ‘Fairtrade’ before. I asked 
them to tell me more about Fairtrade and these answers are outlined in Table 11. 
 
Table 11: Knowledge of Fairtrade 
 
 
I triangulated these responses by asking farmers about their Fairtrade knowledge in 
focus groups. In a Kibosho Central, KNCU focus group of women, five of the six 
claimed to have never heard the term ‘Fairtrade’ before, and the remaining woman 
claimed only to have “heard the word in a meeting” but could not define it (Focus 
Group 2). In a Kasharu, KCU focus group several people had heard of Fairtrade but 
could not explain it in detail (Focus Group 5).  While I anticipated that Board members 
would have a higher level of Fairtrade knowledge given their role in overseeing 
premium allocation, this was not necessarily true. One farmer in Kagera had been on the 
Board for six years but had never heard of Fairtrade (Interview G4 R56) and I met 
another two Board members at KDCU who did not recognize the term (Interviews G4 
R62 & R63).  
 
Response Frequency 
Had heard the term but could not explain 14 
A higher price 12 
Premium projects (KCU & KDCU only) 3 
Sponsoring children (KNCU only) 3 
Both the price and premiums 2 
Human rights 2 
High quality 1 
Environmental standards 1 
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Fairtrade knowledge was therefore a problem at all three unions. While this is not in 
itself surprising, as in Chapter 2 I outlined how producers often have little access to 
information about Fairtrade, the General Managers at the three unions all had an 
inflated sense of the Fairtrade knowledge that their farmers possessed. The Acting 
General Manager of KNCU said that farmers were aware of Fairtrade (Interview G1 
R2), and according to the Marketing Manager at KCU: 
 
“Our farmers know a lot about Fairtrade. As Fairtrade beneficiaries we are 
strong. [The Fairtrade Co-ordinator] trains them, and we have many extension 
officers.” (Interview G2 R25)  
 
KDCU’s Fairtrade Coordinator provided a more nuanced description that appeared to be 
quite realistic at this union: 
 
“They (producers) know what the Fairtrade premium is even if they don’t know 
what Fairtrade is.” (Interview G2 R14) 
 
As I explained in Chapter 4, there were difficulties associated with asking producers 
about the premiums, due in part to the challenge of translating technical terms. 
Producers at KDCU did know about social projects, which were substantial in this 
region, and as such this manager’s response may prove quite accurate. However, 
overall, and given that all three unions claimed to provide farmers with information 
about Fairtrade through annual training sessions, there appears to be a lack of 
knowledge-sharing between the unions and the primaries.  
 
5.3.2.2 Payment delays in Kagera 
There was also a problem with delayed payments to farmers at the time of research, as 
many producers belonging to KCU and KDCU had not yet been paid for their coffee 
that season. KCU’s Marketing Manager explained that the Robusta auction started late 
in 2012 because there was not enough coffee in June (Interview G2 R25). KCU 
admitted that the problem was due to its own forecasting, and in September 2012 had 
still not paid one third of its farmers (Interview G2 R4).  
 
Based on conversations with farmers and field officers, the main problem did not seem 
to be the delay, but the lack of information that farmers had received about it. In 
general, farmers were confused about the late payment and had no idea why this was 
happening. I spoke with farmers, field officers, and a Secretary-Manager who all 
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complained about a shortage of information. A farmer in a Kasharu focus group said to 
me:  
 
“Before a new season of coffee the money should be present – why wasn't it?” 
(Focus Group 5)  
 
 
I discovered through interviews with two of KCU’s field officers at Izigo primary 
society that the union’s field officers were struggling to answer farmers’ questions in 
the villages where they were located, as they did not know how to respond (Interviews 
G3 R9 & G3 R10). One of these field officers expressed his frustration: 
 
“How can I as a field officer go to advise them when they're not getting money? 
What can I tell them?” (Interview G3 R9)  
 
Another field officer was clearly confused about the delayed funds and mistakenly 
attributed this to Fairtrade – evidence of the mixed messages that result from a lack of 
communications: 
 
“We tell villagers how to produce coffee, that coffee will be sold as Fairtrade. 
But Fairtrade is not giving us money on time.” (Interview G3 R10)  
 
The General Manager of KCU (Interview G2 R26) noted that many primary society 
Boards had not held meetings because they did not know how to explain the delayed 
payment to farmers. As the Secretary-Manager of Izigo summarized: 
 
“[T]he problem is that there is no perfect information from headquarters about 
why farmers are not being paid. We have nothing to tell our farmers except to be 
patient.” (Interview G3 R8)  
 
The delay in the Robusta auction also affected KDCU, as it did KCU’s farmers, and 
some farmers had not been paid at the time of research. The chairman of Nyakaayanja 
PCS said that, while the relationship with KDCU is usually good, in 2012 the 
relationship was strained due to late payment (Interview G3 R14). He noted: 
 
“There is no explanation from KDCU. I tried to call the KDCU Chairman but 
he just said there was no payment and did not tell me why.” (Interview G3 R14)  
 
I asked the Secretary Manager of the Nyakakika PCS why the payment was late, and he 
replied:  
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“I'm not really sure. But KDCU hasn't prepared for the competition. They 
should have borrowed money or made sure they could sell the coffee at the 
auction. This hasn't happened in past years.” (Interview G3 R15)  
 
Overall, there are clear communications issues between the primary society and the 
union that may affect genuine deliberation. This, of course, raises the initial question of 
how much information farmers require. In the case of Fairtrade knowledge, it is possible 
that farmers do not require a great deal of information about Fairtrade in order to vote 
on how the premiums will be used. The case of the delayed payment may be different, 
however, as it was clear that farmers felt that their questions were not being answered. 
Perhaps a balance is required that ensures that farmers have enough information to 
make informed decisions and play a greater role if they so wish, while acknowledging 
that some individuals may choose not to. It is difficult to comment here on what that 
balance should look like, but the fact that the unions think that producers know more 
than they do, in terms of both Fairtrade and the delayed payment, indicates that there is 
the possibility for this to affect genuine deliberation. If there are not good 
communications processes in place, farmers will not have the information that they 
require to effectively engage in decision-making. 
 
5.4 Design Properties: Devolution and Centralized Co-ordination 
 
Beyond these general principles of bottom-up participation and deliberation, Fung and 
Wright (2003) list design properties that are integral to advancing EPG’s general 
principles, two of which are devolution and centralized co-ordination. These authors 
highlight the importance of devolving power to local action units composed of 
individuals who are responsible for devising and implementing solutions, and who are 
held accountable for them. While these local units have considerable power and 
discretion, they are not autonomous; rather, there are linkages of accountability and 
communication (Fung and Wright, 2003). In this section I explore the delegate system 
and Fairtrade premium distribution in order to assess this.  
 
The Fairtrade Coordinator at KDCU explained the role of delegates during our 
interview (Interview G2 R14). At her union, each primary society elects two 
representatives who attend the union AGM with the Chairperson of the Board, for a 
total of 228 representatives. At the AGM they discuss union matters such as Fairtrade 
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premium usage, and the delegates decide how to distribute premiums among the 
primary societies. Prior to the union AGM, each primary society calls a meeting to 
discuss how they would like to spend the Fairtrade premium funds so that the delegates 
can represent the members at the union-level meeting (Interview G2 R14). The same 
goes for KCU, while at KNCU two representatives from each primary society, typically 
a Board Chair and an elected representative attend (Interview G2 R7). A Fairtrade key 
informant outlined the challenges of representation:  
 
“Our model is through the organization. Any representative system is imperfect. 
The system itself can be weak. There’s a lot that people who have a 
representative role have to take on the responsibility for, such as to hear 
people’s views and to relay them back.” (Interview G1 R1) 
 
Fairtrade premium allocation provides a useful means of assessing centralized 
coordination and devolution, as the three unions demonstrated variance with regards to 
the degree of decentralization between the union and the primary. Both the Fairtrade 
premiums and the Fairtrade Development Plan are voted on by the General Assembly of 
delegates at the union AGM. As a follow-up to my question about Fairtrade general 
knowledge, I asked farmers if they know what Fairtrade premiums are (Producer 
Questionnaire Q39). Of the 68 farmers, 17 replied yes. When I then asked them to 
describe the Fairtrade premiums, only 4 farmers mentioned social or business 
development projects. The others either confused the premium with the Fairtrade price 
(four respondents) or could not provide a description. During pilot interviews, I 
identified a potential error in translation, as there was confusion over the best way to 
describe Fairtrade premiums in Swahili. The answer to Question 39 on Fairtrade 
premiums is evidence of this. I therefore decided to reword Question 40 (originally 
“How are the Fairtrade premiums used within the co-operative?”) and ask farmers: 
“Do you know of any social projects within your co-operatives?” The challenge with 
this new wording is that they may have referred to non-Fairtrade projects, so I 
triangulated interview responses with union-level interviews as well as Fairtrade 
premium documents. 
 
Overall, farmers knew little about the Fairtrade premiums. The distribution process for 
these premiums demonstrates union-level variance with regards to devolution and 
centralization, indicating an overly centralized process with issues of trust in producers 
at KNCU. In contrast, KCU and KDCU’s models exhibit higher levels of 
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decentralization and are, as a result, better suited to the EPG model. I outline these three 
processes in the following sections. 
 
5.4.1 KNCU: Union-level Premiums 
Since joining the Fairtrade system in 1993, KNCU’s Fairtrade funds have been used to 
fund equipment purchases, schooling, quality improvement, tourism projects, a coffee 
tour of Kenyan coffee farms, and training for farmers (Interview G2 R7 & G2 R8). 
However, for the past four years KNCU’s premiums have primarily gone towards 
supporting disadvantaged students through a union-wide program, and the acting 
General Manager informed me that Fairtrade premium usage is decided at the union 
level (Interview G2 R1). This is in opposition to what I had expected to find, as FLO 
stipulates that the Fairtrade premiums should be democratically determined for the 
“realization of common goals.”(Fairtrade International, 2011e) While it is not, strictly 
speaking, a violation of the standards if this is voted on at the General Assembly, it does 
seem to contravene the spirit of the premium if decision-making about these funds does 
not move beyond the union level AGMs. 
 
For the 2010-2011 year, Fairtrade premiums totaled 151,832,792 TSh, and this money 
was used to fund the position of the Fairtrade Coordinator, cover fees in the foreign 
exchange account, attend events such as coffee exhibits, and invest in KNCU’s union-
wide orphans project (Interview G2 R7). In 2012, 410 students had received partial 
funding through the program (Interview G2 R31). Overall, the Fairtrade premium 
allocation at KNCU demonstrated a high degree of centralization. As the G32 General 
Manager noted about KNCU’s Fairtrade premium allocation:  
 
“This is suggested by KNCU headquarters; it is not the individual societies 
deciding.” (Interview G2 R17) 
 
An academic at MUCCoBS confirmed this, stating:  
 
“KNCU doesn’t give the members the choice to use premiums as they want to.” 
(Interview G2 R19)   
 
When I asked farmers about projects within their co-operative (Producer Questionnaire 
Q40), 13 of the 28 individuals I interviewed referred to the union’s secondary school 
project, which has seen all premiums overseen at the union level in recent years. 
Responses included: 
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“Orphans go to school.” (Interview G4 R4, G4 R22, G4 R24, G4 R25 & G4 
R27) 
 
“In the society we give names of kids who can’t pay their school fees.” 
(Interview G2 R2)  
 
“We send 2 kids from each village every year.” (Interview G4 R8)  
 
While very few farmers understood the term ‘Fairtrade premiums’, some responses 
during interviews from those who recognized the term included: 
 
“We don’t talk about it here; we get that information once the union has made a 
decision.” (Interview G4 R9)  
 
“We are told that the premiums remain at KNCU and we have to apply for 
orphans. We receive information from KNCU to write down the names of 
orphans so they can have a fund for schools fees.” (Interview G4 R1)  
 
A Board Chairwoman at one of KNCU’s primary societies said in a separate interview:  
 
“For four years [the Fairtrade premium] has gone to orphans. I don’t know 
why.” (Interview G4 R19)  
 
I went back and spoke to the Fairtrade Coordinator at KNCU about this finding. She 
acknowledged that they had shared the Fairtrade premiums with the primary societies in 
the past, but went on to say:  
 
“If we give them the option, they won't want projects. They just want the money 
for themselves.” (Interview G2 R7) 
 
This highlights a potential lack of distrust in democratic decision-making, a clear lack 
of devolution, and highly centralized co-ordination; overall, these findings on premium 
allocation at KNCU indicate a potential domination of union management and leaders 
over premium allocation. 
 
5.4.2 KCU: Premiums to the Primaries 
In contrast to the KNCU findings, seven of the 18 famers I interviewed at KCU primary 
societies mentioned society-specific projects included buildings for meetings, benches, 
schools, desks, coffee cleaning machines, electricity, hospitals, security, shops, and 
toilets. Within KCU, Fairtrade premiums are allocated equitably to primary societies. In 
recent years, these premiums have been used to invest in schools and improved health 
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facilities, to provide bonuses for organic production, to construct roads and bridges, to 
facilitate improved access to clean water, to rehabilitate coffee collection centres, to 
purchase coffee hullers for members, to increase ownership of the instant coffee factory, 
and to create an internal loan scheme for members (Interview G2 R21). According to 
one manager I interviewed, this is so that they can determine how to best meet their own 
community needs:  
 
“Each primary society has different needs, so they should decide how to use the 
premium.” (Interview G2 R4)  
 
KCU’s Fairtrade Coordinator, who is responsible for supervising how the premiums are 
spent, said that premium usage is determined at the primary society annual AGM 
(Interview G2 R21). He claimed that the premiums are distributed equally to all primary 
societies, rather than based on their volumes of coffee (Interview G2 R21). The primary 
society is given the money and decides how to spend it; once they bring their AGM 
minutes to headquarters, they receive the funds. The Secretary Manager at the Katoro 
primary society told me that Fairtrade premiums have been used to buy machines as 
well as to construct primary schools, a building for meetings, and shops that will be 
rented to business owners (the rent from which will go towards providing farmers with 
small loans) (Interview G3 R11). At KCU’s Izigo primary society, I saw a letter on the 
office door from the Fairtrade Coordinator and had it translated (see Appendix 26). This 
letter explains to the primary societies the value of their premiums, the democratic 
nature of selecting projects, and clearly allows them the freedom to choose projects to 
suit their own needs. It therefore provides evidence of potentially strong information 
flows between the union and KCU’s primary societies.  
 
The Fairtrade Coordinator claimed that the delegates often vote to spend some of the 
money at the union level, and at the time of research some Fairtrade premiums were 
being used to build a hotel and rehabilitate the coffee curing factory (Interview G2 
R21). In the past premiums have also been used to top up the price paid to farmers, and 
the Fairtrade Coordinator claimed that when they did this in 2008-2009 they visited 
every primary society to consult with them first (Interview G2 R21). Premiums have 
been used at the union in various other ways in recent years, including building a 
commercial complex, providing Fairtrade training, expanding the organic project, and 
rehabilitating of one of KCU’s hotels which is used as collateral for loans (Interviews 
G2 R4 & G2 R17). The premiums allocated to primary societies (of equal value at every 
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primary society) are outlined in Table 12.  
 
Table 12: KCU Premium Usage 2003 – 2012 
 
Year Premiums given to primary societies (per PCS) 
2003-2004 2 million TSh 
2004-2005 1.8 million TSh 
2005-2006 2.5 million TSh 
2006-2007 2 million TSh 
2007-2008 2.5 million TSh 
2009-2009 1.7 million TSh 
2009-2010 0 (price top-up only) 
2010-2011 5.77 million TSh 
2011-2012  8 million TSh 
 
Source: Interviews at KCU (G2 R4 & G2 R21), KCU financial documents 
 
 
5.4.3 KDCU: Productivity-related Premiums 
I observed the same decentralized premium decision-making at KDCU, although here 
the amount allocated to each primary society is based on coffee volumes, rather than 
distributed equitably as in the case of KCU (Interview G2 R14). A portion of the 
premium stays at the union and the remainder goes to the primary societies. The Export 
Manager stated that the premiums go to primary societies based on productivity, and 
typically to areas with new plots (Interview G2 R12). This differs from KCU and is 
quite interesting, as the areas that are already advantaged by higher productivity receive 
higher premiums. KDCU’s Fairtrade premium has been used to support various projects 
at the primary societies relating to education, training, store repairs, new rainwater 
collection tanks, a dispensary, warehouses, and the purchase and distribution of new 
coffee seedlings (Interview G2 R14). 
 
When I asked how KDCU had benefitted from Fairtrade, the Export Manager spoke 
mainly about the Fairtrade premium, stating that it ‘supports social life.’ (Interview G2 
R12) Total premiums for the past three seasons, which are then shared amongst primary 
societies, are outlined in Table 13. This does not include the amount that is used to fund 
union-level projects. For the 2012-2013 season, premiums totaled 787.5 million TSh 
and 240 million TSh was divided amongst the PCSs, with the remainder being used at 
the union level (Interview G2 R14) At the organizational level, KDCU has used 
premiums to buy its curing factory (which cost 100 million TSh in 2005), to invest in 
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Nyaishozi secondary school for children of KDCU members, Kibimba pine forest, 
water tanks at the factory (used for hand sanitation), watchmen offices, equipment such 
as dryers, and to send employees to school for a certificate or diploma (Interview G2 
R14). They are planning to buy a new car (as the union owns only one right now), a 
second grader at the factory, and a gravity table that will replace many jobs currently 
done by those who sort the coffee cherries (Interview G2 R14).  
 
Table 13: KDCU’s Fairtrade Premiums 2010 – 2013 
Year Total premiums given to primary societies 
2010-2011 66 million TSh 
2011-2012 141 million TSh 
2012-2013 240 million TSh 
 
Source: Interview G2 R14, KDCU financial documents 
 
KDCU’s Fairtrade Coordinator stated,  
 
“Premiums should be for a community purpose. They (producers) know what 
the Fairtrade premium is even if they don’t know what Fairtrade is. Because we 
teach them.” (Interview G2 R14)  
 
I visited one primary society that reported that they had not used their premiums. When 
I asked the Fairtrade Coordinator about this, she said that there was a non-conformity on 
the FLO inspection because of this group, and also mentioned that the Chairman of the 
same PCS had borrowed money that had yet to be repaid; overall KDCU has 20 non-
conformities during its last audit (Interview G2 R14). FLO-CERT oversees Fairtrade 
audits, and will typically explain non-conformities to primary societies, suggest ways to 
correct them, and monitor the work of the group in order to ensure that these problems 
are remedied (FLO-CERT, 2013). 
 
I visited the Kibimba Pine farm, which is a Fairtrade project funded by KDCU 
premiums. The farm has 100,000 trees that the union intends to use for carbon trading 
schemes or to sell as timber. I also visited the Nyaishozi Secondary School that has used 
Fairtrade premiums for projects such as dorms and building construction. Built in 
1990s, this school has 475 students and 47 per cent are female; students are mainly the 
sons and daughters of coffee growers. There are 18 teachers and 13 non-teaching staff. 
They were in the process of building a girl’s dorm at the time of my visit and, as the 
headmaster said: 
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“Because attitudes are changing and more girls are going to school, we need 
more room. 30 years ago you could hardly find a girl at secondary school in 
Tanzania. Now there are so many that we need to build a new dormitory. This 
dorm was built with Fairtrade premiums.” (Interview G2 R39)  
 
5.5 Enabling Conditions: Power Relations 
 
The third element of EPG, after general principles and design properties, refers to the 
background conditions that may help or hinder EPG. The largest obstacle identified 
within the EPG model is that of power relations. Although Fung and Wright (2003) note 
that absolute equality is not required, they state that there must be sufficient equality of 
power between participants for the purposes of deliberation. As introduced in Chapter 2, 
in this analysis I adopt the assumption that power is present in all interactions and has 
large implications for participation. Yet, as noted by Fung and Wright (2003), a certain 
degree of equality is required for the purposes of deliberation and democratic decision-
making, and as such it is essential for organizations to understand and manage power 
relations. 
 
The stories and quotes provided in the following section are anecdotal, and I do not aim 
to discern which union or primary society has the best power relations or the most 
effective management team. Instead, I highlight some of the characteristics of both a 
strong and a weak leader as a means of exploring how internal power may become an 
obstacle to collaborative governance.  
 
5.5.1 Internal Power I – Union Management 
While one might expect a co-operative to be more collaborative in nature, Spear (2004) 
argues that managers may be even more powerful at member-based organizations, such 
as co-operatives, than they are in commercial organizations. Co-operatives employ 
professional managers who may run organizations according to their own interests 
rather than doing what is in the best interests of members and the organization (Spear et 
al., 2009). I identified turnover, size, and trust to be problematic issues at the level of 
union management. The notion of trust is one that is absent in Fung and Wright’s 
(2003) EPG model, although it is closely linked to considerations of power relations. 
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Turnover was a major issue at KNCU, although it was not mentioned at the other two 
unions during interviews. I spoke with an ex-KNCU manager about recruitment, who 
stated that there is high turnover amongst management; he attributed this to a problem 
with recruitment and the fact that these managers are not farmers and as a result may 
not be committed to the organization (Interview G2 R17); another academic felt that 
there was high management turnover because managers have no contact with the 
primary societies (Interview G2 R19). During the course of this research I witnessed 
high turnover in the role of the General Manager at KNCU. When I first visited KNCU 
in August 2011, I met an acting General Manager and was informed that the union had 
not hired a General Manager since the last one left (Interview G2 R1). During my 
second trip in May 2012, I met a second acting General Manager (Interview G2 R6). 
Upon returning for a third trip in July 2012, I learned that the second acting Manager 
had left and the first had been reinstated again as acting General Manager, as there was 
still no permanent General Manager. I asked the Board Chairman about this in an 
interview, and he told me that the union has struggled to recruit a well-educated, 
efficient manager (Interview G2 R31). 
 
An interviewee at Fairtrade Africa claimed that KNCU could not be efficient because of 
its size, and cited problems of bureaucracy and inefficiency (Interview G1 R7). One 
trader I interviewed, who has visited and worked closely with Tanzania’s coffee co-
operatives, noted that these large unions often exhibit a distance between farmers and 
union management that makes it difficult to get anything done. He stated that, 
particularly in Africa, there is a great deal of hierarchy and management offices are 
often inaccessible to farmers, referring to the General Manager’s office as ‘a king’s lair’ 
(Interview G1 R12). One coffee tour guide, in speaking about management, told me 
that:  
 
“People at KNCU aren’t right. They do their own business with the money, 
things that small farmers wouldn’t do. This has been a problem for many 
years.” (Interview G2 R2)  
 
I interviewed an academic who had studied the impact of governance on coffee prices in 
the Bukoba region, where KCU is located (Interview G2 R19). During this study, his 
team identified several problems with KCU’s management: (1) a lack of close 
interaction between leaders and farmers leading to an absence of common goals, (2) a 
lack of consultation with the primary societies, who were viewed solely as labourers 
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supplying inputs, and (3) an increasing awareness on the part of the primary 
cooperatives that they could exist without KCU, which the interviewee attributed to 
liberalization and Fairtrade. However, he said that the General Manager of KCU was 
not interested in the results of the research because he “wanted the primary cooperatives 
to be submissive to the union.” (Interview G2 R19) One academic claimed that 
knowledge might be used to create power imbalances between managers and farmers. 
He stated:  
 
“There’s a kind of weakness amongst our people. Some are honest; some are 
not. Some of those who are not honest are knowledgeable, so they can make use 
of the weakness that is in the society to steal from them.” (Interview G2 R19)  
 
I was interested in learning more about issues of trust, and potential distrust, in 
management. As there were translation issues with the term ‘trust’, during interviews I 
asked producers if they had confidence in the management of the union (Producer 
Questionnaire Question 27).13 Of the 68 farmers I interviewed, 42 said yes, 13 said no, 
and 13 were unsure. Those who responded in the negative were primarily farmers from 
breakaway groups or KCU and KDCU farmers who were frustrated with the payment 
delay. Some of their comments referred to trust or confidence:  
 
“This year, because money is delayed, people are complaining about confidence 
in KCU.” (Interview G4 R50) 
 
“When there are money delays we can’t buy things like farming tools. We hire 
people to work in our farms, so when there are delays we can’t pay them. So I 
have no confidence in KCU.” (Interview G4 R52) 
 
“Formerly we could trust them but people are shying away because of the price, 
which is too low.” (Interview G4 R58) 
 
“One time they advertised a price of 1600 TSh on the radio, but when we came 
it was 1500. So we don’t have confidence.” (Interview G4 R65) 
 
KCU’s field officers expressed a tension between the field officers and management of 
the union, telling me that they had many questions but did not feel as though they could 
approach the Organic Coordinator and that he was difficult to meet with (Interviews G3 
R9 & G3 R10). One of these individuals stated: 
 
“We can't express our views. We have had no meetings to talk about the 
[delayed] money; he doesn't meet with us. (Interview G3 R9) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The original word ‘trust’ did not translate well in Swahili. Under the advice of my translator, we used 
the word ‘confidence’ instead.   
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At Mamsera, the results were quite different. As this primary society is not part of the 
union for transport and marketing purposes, the Secretary Manager takes on a much 
bigger role than the typically administrative one seen at primary societies belonging to 
KNCU. In contrast to the primary societies still marketing to the unions, where farmers 
had little to say about their Secretary Managers and this position is typically viewed as 
an administrative rather than a managerial position14, Mamsera’s success was attributed 
to its Secretary Manager (Interview G3 R2). A KNCU manager stated the following 
reason for Mamsera’s success, once again referring to trust: 
 
“They’ve been successful because they've trusted the woman in charge; she has 
autonomy to make decisions.” (Interview G2 R6) 
 
While interviewing the Secretary Manager at Mamsera, I asked her why she decided to 
apply for the position of Secretary Manager. She explained:   
 
“There was a problem with the society Secretary Manager then. We were losing 
money, and there was no effectiveness in service delivery so people left. When I 
joined it was not a good situation. We needed people to trust the society again, 
and now they trust us.” (Interview G3 R3) 
 
I did not find the same testimonials about management at the G32 societies, but inferred 
that this may be related to the fact that they still belong to an association (formerly 
known as a joint venture) and the primary society management may not take on a strong 
managerial role as in the case of Mamsera. Overall, I determine that trust/confidence is 
key to the relationships between union management and farmers, and is often lacking in 
these relationships due to issues of high turnover (observed at KNCU only) as well as 
size (observed at all three unions). 
 
5.5.2 Internal Power II – Board of Directors 
In order for Board members to be effective, they must possess the necessary skills and 
experience (Spear et al., 2009). As Spear et al. (2007, 55) assert, in the case of a 
dysfunctional Board: “where the board is formally accountable to membership, it could, 
in principle, be removed by the members.” One academic I interviewed explained: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14I originally asked producers about management of their primary society in pilot interviews, but found 
that producers responded with information about the union, presumably because the Secretary-Manager 
position is viewed as an administrative one at primary societies belonging to unions. This may have also 
been due to the fact that interviews were often held in close proximity to the primary society headquarters 
and producers may not have felt comfortable talking openly about the Secretary-Manager. 
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“At a lot of unions, including KNCU, there is a crisis. It is a crisis of the right 
leadership. The age of liberalization requires new leadership. It requires 
entrepreneurial leadership, but the history of leadership in the union has been 
more political.” (Interview G2 R20) 
 
Tenure for Board members has been an ongoing problem in Tanzania, and as a result 
the 2003 New Cooperative Societies Act limits Board tenure to three terms of three 
years each (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2003). The government claims that the 
country’s co-operatives of the past were poorly managed because leaders remained in 
their positions for overly long periods of time, and made decisions without involving 
everyone (TFC & CDD, 2006). According to the TFC and CDD, “Changing Board 
members regularly makes sure that no person or group can have too much power in the 
society.” (TFC & CDD, 2006, 16) The notion of power came up in interviews with 
General Managers at the unions. As the General Manager of KNCU noted: 
 
“The Board always needs consent from members. Members have the power; 
they can remove the Board.” (Interview G2 R21)  
 
However, KDCU’s General Manager stated that the Board may have too much power, 
as a result of the country’s Co-operative Law: 
 
“We are guided by the Cooperative Act. We want government to review the 
principles and policies. [We] need to reduce the power of the Board and vest 
this power to management team. For example, we can't change the price of 
coffee until the Board approves it. It takes so much time to make decisions.” 
(Interview G2 R28)  
 
I asked producers about both the primary society and union Boards. I began by asking 
them if they knew how Board members are chosen, in order to learn more about the 
selection process and representation (Producer Questionnaire Q25). Of the 68 farmers I 
interviewed, 54 farmers said that they knew how Board members were chosen, and 
mentioned either a vote, elections, or the AGM. One farmer outlined the process quite 
accurately in detail: 
 
“They announce elections. Those who want to compete take the forms and go to 
the coop. They need at least a primary education and must be able to read and 
write. Those who are fit can stand for elections, where members make a secret 
ballot.” (Interview G4 R1) 
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I then asked farmers if they have confidence in their primary society Board (Producer 
Questionnaire Q26), to which 52 producers responded yes, three said no, and 13 
declined to answer. These answers referred to diverse primary societies. Of those who 
said yes, responses mentioned trust through elections, auditors, transparency and 
information sharing. Some comments included:  
 
“Of course, how could I not have confidence in someone I elect?” (Interview G4 
R6) 
 
“We make sure we get people who are ethical; we know their parents.” 
(Interview G4 R8) 
  
“They have not stolen anything from me.” (Interview G4 R17) 
 
“We choose them so we trust them.” (Interview G4 R25) 
 
“They are transparent; they aren’t squandering money and there are no bad 
reports about them.” (Interview G4 R31) 
 
“We elect them every three years so we’ll fire them if it’s not good.” (Interview 
G4 R35)  
 
I went on to ask farmers if they have confidence in the union Board, referring to KNCU, 
KCU, and KDCU (Producer Questionnaire Q28). Of those asked, 48 said yes, six said 
no (two at each union, so there were no regional differences), and 14 were unsure. 
Interestingly, of those who said yes, not a single farmer elaborated on this response, 
except to say that there were no problems (Interviews G4 R3 & G4 R4).  One KNCU 
farmer who had stated no said:  
 
“They do not care much about the farmers. You can complain at the meeting 
and they come. But taking action on the complaints of farmers is rare.” 
(Interview G4 R1)  
 
Some interesting responses came from those who were unsure, and served as reminders 
of the distance between the farmers and the union Boards. These answers included: 
 
“I can’t say as it’s not for me to know.” (Interview G4 R12) 
 
“I’m not inside.” (Interview G4 R35) 
 
“I don’t know them.” (Interview G4 R49) 
 
As Board members are elected, rather than appointed as in the case of managers, I 
looked at the elections process. During the course of this research, I discovered that the 
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District Co-operative Officers (DCOs) are heavily involved in selecting eligible Board 
members at the primary society, while the Registrar fulfills the same role for the union. 
The Board is typically elected every three years, and all members have the right to 
apply for elections and to vote. There are rigorous procedures in place. Those interested 
in applying visit the office to complete a form, and the DCO then arranges a meeting 
with four “influential people”, who might include the DCO, a technical person in the 
municipal office, a security officer, and someone from the Office for Corruption or a 
similar Office (Interview G2 R23). Applicants are then graded according to the 
following criteria: the completion of Standard 7 education (indicating that they know 
how to read and write), work experience, no prior prosecutions, fully paid shares, 
meeting attendance, primary society participation, and a minimum of three years as an 
active member at the primary society. This process is also used for individuals applying 
to be representatives from the primary society to the union AGM. 
 
I asked the DCO why a Standard 7 education is important, given that this would 
discriminate against many people, especially women, who may wish to run for the 
Board or act as a representative but did not have the opportunity to attend school. He 
replied that women nowadays have a Standard 7 education (Interview G2 R23). 
However, this does not account for the fact that most female farmers, when they do 
have the opportunity to become co-operative members, are from an older generation. 
Rural women tend to have less education than men, and this is especially true in the 
case of older women (Smith, 2013). I held individual interviews with 68 producers, and 
the average age of these farmers was 55 years old. Of these 68 individuals, 53 had a 
minimum Standard 7 education, indicating that they can read and write according to 
Tanzania’s school system. Of the 15 individuals who did not have a sufficient education 
to run for the Board, 11 were female. When I asked these women why they had not 
continued in school, five of them responded that their parents had died and no one else 
could afford to send them (Interviews G4 R18, G4 R37, G4 R48, G4 R54 & G4 R59). 
Additional answers included:  
 
“My father wouldn’t pay anymore.” (Interview G4 R16) 
 
“Because I’m female.” (Interview G4 R34) 
 
“Because I was married at 14 and my father couldn’t pay for everyone.” 
(Interview G4 R51) 
 
 132	  
Clearly, not everyone, particularly women, has access to a Standard 7 education. There 
are various additional barriers confronting women when it comes to leadership 
positions, including land ownership, culture, confidence, and household responsibilities, 
as will be outlined in Chapter 7. Not everyone meets the minimum requirements to be a 
Board member or a representative to the AGM, and this lack of skills and experience 
represents another barrier to participation in decision-making. When I asked the DCO if 
this process results in a certain gender or class of farmer being put forward for elections, 
he responded that everybody has a right to be elected (Interview G2 R23). However, he 
also noted: 
 
“You can’t be a leader without Swahili or an education. A representative is a 
leader. They must be able to read and write.” (Interview G2 R23)  
 
A lack of communication may pose another problem for these processes. It was quite 
clear from producer interviews that some people had no idea how they might run for 
leadership. As one female farmer in Kilimanjaro stated, 
 
“I want to be on the Board. But I don’t know how forms are taken; we just see 
names on a board.” (Interview G4 R27)  
 
I further explore the possibility of gender inequity in Boards, and the potential for 
capacity building to change this, in Chapter 7. 
 
5.5.3 External Power – The State 
While studies on co-operatives in the global North often begin with the assumption that 
the government has not played an interventionist role, the same cannot be said of co-
operatives in the developing world (Shaw, 2006a). The experience of the latter has 
differed greatly, and Shaw (2006a) claims that a discussion of governance issues 
necessitates a consideration of the legitimacy of State control and intervention into the 
co-operative sector. This legacy, as seen at many of the African continent’s co-
operatives, stems from a colonial history of heavy government intervention, outlined 
earlier in Chapter 3. As noted by the International Labour Office (2001, 11), “The 
developing world experienced several decades of working with State-sponsored and 
State controlled co-operatives – which had been introduced by the colonial powers as 
development tools and subsequently used by governments of the independent states for 
similar purposes.” For example, during Nyerere’s villagization efforts, some of 
KNCU’s assets were expropriated by the State and never recovered in full. This 
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indicates a potential blurring of the lines between government and co-operatives. At 
KCU it was also clear that the State is still highly involved in the union’s operations 
today; as the General Manager explained: 
 
“Before we were separate from the State, we were independent, it was better. 
We were not relocated [during villagization] much in Bukoba but we lost our 
assets, and the nature of the coop changed. After it was never the same, still tied 
to government. Today we are still connected to the Commissioner (Regional and 
District) and the government.” (Interview G2 R26) 
 
Pollet (2009), in his research on nine African countries and their respective co-operative 
movements, notes that the continent’s governments have typically supported co-
operatives, which he claims is reflected in updated legislation and well-functioning 
cooperative departments. His following statement highlights this dichotomy: “The 
regulating policy may be felt as meddlesome by certain cooperative movements, while 
in other cases, the government is trying to restore the movement institutions. The line 
between supporting and controlling may remain a subject of controversy […].” (Pollet, 
2009, 27) This offers insight into some of my findings at Tanzanian co-operatives, as 
while some respondents were highly critical of the government’s involvement in the 
country’s coffee co-operatives, others spoke positively about the role of the Tanzanian 
government. One academic I interviewed noted: 
 
“We need a government that is talking progressively about co-ops. Co-ops are 
about power relations. They are about issues of voice and freedom. How far 
should we manage co-ops in this country and how free should they be?” 
(Interview G2 R20) 
 
Overall, I discovered heavy government intervention at Tanzanian co-ops - in stark 
contrast to the assertions seen in the government’s modern-day policy documents (TFC 
& CDD, 2006, The United Republic of Tanzania, 2005). While the Tanzanian 
government claims to be facilitating independence and autonomy for the country’s co-
operatives, in line with its ambitions to adhere to the ICA principles (TFC & CDD, 
2006, The United Republic of Tanzania, 2005), this is not the case in practice. The State 
remains heavily involved in the sector, in particular through the Registrar and the 
DCOs. One academic I interviewed stated that through his research he found that the 
Co-operative Act has 14 areas of contention that do not allow freedom for co-operatives 
(Interview G2 R20). As Chambo asserts (2006, 5), “[T]he government is talking about 
member empowerment without giving the members the ability and authority to control 
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themselves. The members do not have power to practise control of their own co-
operative economy.”  
 
This does not necessarily imply, however, that there is no role for the government to 
play. I spoke with two union managers who felt that government regulation was 
essential: 
 
“To me the laws and rules are good. They should be there in order to check.” 
(Interview G2 R14)  
 
“Co-ops can't run themselves without an eye from the government. If there's a 
problem with the co-ops, this can shake the State because of all the money and 
the people involved. The State has to be involved. People are not yet very 
competent at running things on their own. We need somebody to tell us how to 
do things; that's why we have co-operative laws. There's a policy that the 
government should distance itself from co-operatives, but practically it does 
not.” (Interview G2 R26) 
 
I had the opportunity to interview two DCOs, one in Moshi and one in Bukoba, as well 
as a DALDO and a DCSMS in Moshi. The Bukoba DCO told me that his position is 
longstanding, although the number of DCOs has been greatly reduced in recent years, 
indicating that there may be less support for this role (Interview G2 R23). The Moshi 
DCO explained that her job involves supervising all co-operative activities including 
registering new co-operatives, attending meetings, overseeing day-to-day activities, and 
auditing the financials, as well as educating members, the Board, and employees 
(Interview G2 R33). She also noted that DCO inspections should be quarterly at each 
primary society, but that at the time there were not enough field officers and financial 
resources were lacking; as a result, visits were taking place annually (Interview G2 
R33). When I asked her why she felt this level of government involvement, including 
her role in selecting Board applicants, was necessary she responded: 
 
“This is necessary because the primary co-operative society wouldn't operate 
properly without us. There is no wide education amongst members, the Board 
and employees in terms of how to run the co-operative. The members of co-
operative societies are just farmers; they don't have the capacity to run the co-
operative. Members need education. In the past employees might misuse funds 
or not be honest. The Board might also misuse funds. […] We're there to advise 
them to do everything according to the law because the farmers don't know the 
law.” (Interview G2 R33) 
 
There is clearly a distinct lack of trust in the primary co-operatives, on the part of the 
DCO - once again raising this theme of ‘trust’. Interestingly, despite, or perhaps because 
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of, this strong government role in leadership elections, there remains corruption. 
Political corruption typically refers to the use of public office for private gains, although 
empirical data on corruption can be limited and difficult to collect (Bardhan, 1997).  
As an example of corruption within the government, when I asked the Moshi DCO if 
their screening processes are working, she responded in the negative and stated that 
bribes are taken (Interview G2 R33). I also heard stories of corruption at the primary 
society level, which these DCOs would have been tasked with addressing. At Mwika 
North East PCS, one of KNCU’s primary societies, the Chairman was accused of 
squandering money and the Board was replaced in September 2012 (Interviews G2 R7 
& G2 R33), in accordance with Part IX of the Tanzanian Co-operative Law (The United 
Republic of Tanzania, 2003). A KNCU manager also told me that the union had 
recently sued an unnamed primary society for misusing the funds collected for coffee 
sales (Interview G2 R7). The Moshi DCO, who is responsible for dealing with these 
situations, provided various other examples of recent problems at KNCU primary 
societies: Mwika Kinyamvuo removed the Board and Secretary Manager for misusing 
funds, while Uru North Msuni, Uru North proper, and Old Moshi had recently fired the 
Secretary Manager for misuse of funds (Interview G2 R33). Although the role of the 
DCO may impede the co-operative principles of independence and autonomy, as I 
outlined earlier, this individual can also be instrumental in addressing issues of poor 
governance at the primary society level. As such, there may indeed be an important role 
for this individual to play as regulator. However, there is a large difference between 
regulation and intervention. While the DCO may play a useful role in addressing 
organizational disputes, this individual’s role in selecting Board members is a possible 
indication of paternalism and continued parastatalism.  
 
Table 14 outlines the major similarities and difference across the three unions, as 
described in the previous sections. Overall, KNCU may be considered the most 
problematic of the three unions, due to management turnover, a disconnect between the 
primary and secondary societies, the manner in which the Fairtrade premiums are 
distributed, and the scaling back of technical support for farmers. For this reason, the 
breakaway groups present an attractive alternative to farmers in Kilimanjaro who may 
benefit from independent primary societies that exist separately from the union. While I 
expected to discover a similar situation in the western region of Tanzania, the same 
cannot be said for KCU and KDCU. Although these unions have their own issues with 
poor governance, delayed payments, and competition, the primary societies at both 
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unions rely strongly on these unions for marketing and transport in their remote regions 
of dense competition, and might not have the same opportunities to succeed as 
independent entities as KNCU’s primary societies do. In addition, Fairtrade premiums 
are allocated to primary societies. This may therefore indicate improved opportunities 
for farmers to have a voice in decision-making and it appears as though KCU & 
KDCU’s farmers might benefit more from the union than they would without it. 
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Table 14: Findings on Fung & Wright’s Procedural Elements 
 
 
 
5.6 Regional and International Governance 
 
 
As Prevezer (2013) notes, a consideration of how FLO’s governance structures operate 
is a topic that must be included in any research framework on governance. In this 
EPG 
Model 
Element KNCU KCU KDCU 
General 
Principles 
Bottom-up 
Participation 
High High High 
Deliberation - Processes in 
place (meetings) 
- Lack of 
communication 
between primary 
and union 
- Low knowledge 
of Fairtrade  
- Low knowledge 
of premiums and 
social projects 
 
- Processes in 
place (meetings) 
- Lack of 
communication 
between primary 
and union 
- Moderate 
knowledge of 
Fairtrade (due to 
premium usage) 
- High 
knowledge of 
premiums and 
social projects 
 
- Processes in 
place (meetings) 
- Lack of 
communication 
between primary 
and union 
- Moderate 
knowledge of 
Fairtrade  (due 
to premium 
usage) 
- High 
knowledge of 
premiums and 
social projects 
Design 
Properties 
Devolution 
 
- Premiums 
centralized at 
union level 
- Premiums 
devolved to PCS 
- Premiums 
devolved to PCS 
Centralized 
Co-ordination 
- High - Somewhat 
decentralized 
- Somewhat 
decentralized 
Enabling 
Conditions 
– Power 
Relations 
 
Internal: 
Management 
(turnover, 
size, trust) 
- High turnover 
- Large size 
 
- Low trust 
- Large size 
- Low trust 
- Large size 
Internal: 
Board 
 
- High trust at 
primary level 
- Low trust 
between primary 
and union 
- High 
government 
involvement in 
elections 
- High trust at 
primary level 
- Low trust 
between primary 
and union 
- High 
government 
involvement in 
elections 
- High trust at 
primary level 
- Low trust 
between primary 
and union 
- High 
government 
involvement in 
elections 
External: 
State 
- Heavy 
government 
intervention 
- Heavy 
government 
intervention 
- Heavy 
government 
intervention 
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section I shift away from the producer organization level to explore governance at the 
international level of FLO and its regional networks. With regards to deliberation in 
Fairtrade, the system requires that individuals at various levels of Fairtrade’s formalized 
governance structures engage in democratic decision-making. This is seen in the regular 
events that FLO and Fairtrade Africa organize, such as annual meetings, regional 
meetings, and product network meetings (for coffee, cocoa, and tea) whereby 
representatives come together to address specific problems, vote, and develop solutions. 
An understanding of decision-making at a regional and international level is essential to 
this discussion of democratic member control, as this sheds light on how producers 
participate in decision-making at Fairtrade’s various levels. 
 
Decision-making at FLO tends to be around high-level strategy and policy issues, such 
as Fairtrade standards, new products, price increases, or the inclusion of hired labour 
and plantations. In the past there was a lack of democratic participation in FLO 
governance (VanderHoff Boersma, 2002) and today critics continue to question how 
truly democratic and inclusive the system is (Bacon, 2010, VanderHoff Boersma, 2009). 
As seen in Chapter 2, the institutional structures appear to be in place at FLO to 
facilitate participation, deliberation, devolution, and centralized co-ordination - 
elements that Fung and Wright (2003) define as key to collaborative governance, and 
there is reason to be optimistic about recent changes to governance. However, this does 
not rule out problems of substantive participation in high-level decision-making. As I 
outlined in Chapter 2, FLO has engaged in changes to its governance systems in recent 
years, including 50 per cent producer ownership on the General Assembly, more 
producers on the Board, regional producer networks, and field Liaison Officers (LOs). 
According to a Fairtrade key informant,  
 
“Producers knew they needed to sort out the governance problem first as they 
were not formally part of the decision-making process. […] There was a lot of 
dissatisfaction coming to a head.” (Interview G1 R1)  
 
However, formal governance changes may not result in shifts in terms of how decisions 
are made (Bennett, 2013). As an ex-member of the FLO Board stated:  
 
“Fairtrade needs to walk the walk on empowerment and not just talk the talk. 
[…] If you look at Fairtrade now, it still looks like something that people in the 
North do to people in the South. […] What we’re lacking is a real dialogue for 
all stakeholders in the system to be thinking about how we really engage 
producers.” (Interview G1 R1) 
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FLO defines its three producer networks in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the 
Caribbean as “associations which Fairtrade Certified Producer Organizations may join 
if they so wish and which are recognized by FLO as the representative body of farmers, 
workers and others belonging to Fairtrade Certified Producer Organizations.” (Fairtrade 
International, 2007, 6) According to the Fairtrade Foundation’s Director of Producer 
Partnerships: 
 
“Governance is about giving people options, and having people’s voices heard. 
This filters from the individual to the co-operative, from the co-operative to the 
country, and then regionally through producer networks. Then producer 
networks provide a very powerful mechanism through which they can engage 
with the co-operative sector.” (Interview G1 R10) 
 
According to the FLO constitution, the three producer networks must make themselves 
available to all certified producers (Interview G1 R1). One interesting question relates 
to who participates in meetings at the producer networks. I had the opportunity to attend 
the Fairtrade Africa meeting in Accra, Ghana in November 2011 as a non-participant 
(Author’s observations). I spoke with one female manager who told me she comes to 
these meetings to make contacts (Interview G2 R15), indicating that these opportunities 
are available only to those who are chosen to attend such events. She also commented 
on the lack of Africans on the panels, stating that it was necessary to hear more from 
Africans (Interview G2 R15). As an observer, I noted that meetings were indeed 
dominated by western delegates and the individuals I met at the conference tended to be 
high-level representatives (Author’s observations). A vanilla producer from Madagascar 
whom I interviewed confirmed this by stating:  
 
“The people here (at the conference) are technicians, not producers. Most 
organizations can only afford to send one person, so the leaders go. There’s a 
lot of nepotism.” (Interview G1 R8)  
 
I interviewed an ex-member of the FLO Board about the producer networks, who 
claimed:  
 
“These networks are about giving producers a voice – not just in governance 
but in other sorts of decision-making. Governance isn’t just a vote or a seat on 
the Board. There are many other processes as we can’t have everyone on the 
General Assembly.” (Interview G1 R1)  
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However, during interviews not everyone agreed that these networks are succeeding at 
giving producer a voice in decision-making. Several managers I interviewed at KNCU 
and KCU were quite critical of the evolution of Fairtrade Africa from the original 
African Fairtrade Network (AFN). An ex-General Manager of KNCU noted that 
Fairtrade Africa had changed since its days as the AFN prior to 2005, stating that 
members participated fully when the AFN first began, but that recent years had seen a 
lack of participation and information-sharing (Interview G2 R6). The General Manager 
of KCU similarly mentioned a change, claiming that there were problems with the 
group (Interview G2 R26). A key informant at Fairtrade Africa noted that the network 
had yet to engage in monitoring and evaluation of its work, stating: 
 
“We had no idea if we're really representing the voices of the producers and 
how effective the producer network is.” (Interview G1 R15)  
 
It may be that Fairtrade Africa has not evolved to adequately meet the needs of its 
members. I interviewed the Head of the African Producer Support and Relations Unit 
(PSR) and asked him why Fairtrade only works at the union level. He responded that it 
is because “this is where certification happens.” (Interview G1 R16) I asked him about 
the lack of a Liaison Officer (LO) in Tanzania, and he explained that the number of LOs 
is based on the number of organizations, rather than the number of producers (Interview 
G1 R16), which I identify as a potential problem given the number of producers in 
Tanzania. He also told me that the PSR is monitored by FLO to ensure that at least 60 
per cent of its activities relate to certification, meaning that the majority of its work is 
focused on certification rather than capacity building such as training (Interview G1 
R16).  
 
In July 2012, Fairtrade Africa began a process of merging with the PSR into what 
Fairtrade Africa refers to as a “strong, efficient producer-facing support unit.” (Fairtrade 
Africa, 2011a) I interviewed FTA’s Director of Programmes who explained that FTA 
and the PSR are working both strategically and operationally together, and that this 
initiative will be referred to as Team Africa (Interview G1 R13). According to him, they 
will share one budget and point of accountability, and joint deliverables will reduce the 
duplication of costs. He claimed that this would make them more accountable to the 
Fairtrade movement and facilitate increased information exchange, claiming that 
farmers want more homogeneous service delivery. He also noted that this would 
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facilitate “stronger voices by bringing everyone together.” (Interview G1 R13)  
 
From these discussions of Fairtrade at a regional and international level, it sounds as 
though there is an intention for Fairtrade to become further devolved. However, there 
are also obstacles that may serve to keep power and decision-making centralized within 
the upper echelons of these formalized structures. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have presented the findings as they fit Fung and Wright’s EPG 
framework. At the level of the primary society, I discover that bottom-up participation 
is high and that producers appear to have the opportunity to speak at meetings. Despite 
this, decision-making processes may not be akin to deliberation. Overall I identify 
challenges related to communications, inadequate knowledge, limited decentralization, 
and challenges of management and leadership, which all have the potential to lead to an 
overall lack of voice in decision-making. There is a strong possibility for power 
imbalances to exist, and in a discussion of power relations, I find that managers and 
leaders may take advantage of their positions. Also, despite recent reforms and the 
apparent resilience of the model in Tanzania, the country’s co-operative sector may not 
have evolved much from a previous era of high government intervention; there are 
policy-related challenges to producer participation in decision-making, such as high 
government involvement in Board selection. 
 
Overall, producers knew very little about Fairtrade, and therefore little about Fairtrade 
premiums. Fairtrade premium allocations demonstrate regional variation in decision-
making, and I conclude that there is more producer involvement at KCU and KDCU 
than KNCU, due to the fact that decision-making is highly centralized and less devolved 
at KNCU. I suggest that this is linked to lower barriers to participation at KCU and 
KDCU, such as better information sharing, more decentralization, and stronger 
management and leadership. Despite FLO’s assertions of producer participation and 
empowerment, through this examination of governance at the union, Fairtrade Africa 
and FLO, it is evident that there remain barriers to producer voice in decision-making.  
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Chapter 6 – Exit as an Alternative to Voice 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I explore the options that are available to individuals and their 
organizations when they perceive barriers to participation in decision-making, as 
outlined in Chapter 5, to be insurmountable. Should these obstacles, such as heavy State 
involvement or poor management, be present, individuals and groups may choose to 
seek alternatives to participation. The main option that is available to those who do not 
feel as though they have a voice is exit, and here I consider group both exit from the 
secondary co-operative union (as in the case of the breakaway groups) and individual 
exit from the primary society in the form of selling to private buyers. 
 
I begin with an introduction to Hirschman’s (1970) conceptualization of exit, voice, and 
loyalty, which is well suited to the co-operative model. I then consider the departure of 
the breakaway groups from KNCU, comprising both Mamsera and the G32 primary 
societies, as examples of exit and potential countervailing powers in the EPG model 
(Fung and Wright, 2003). The G32 exit from KNCU illustrates what can happen when 
individuals are taught to demand information from those in power. In this case, 
producers first sought a voice for their concerns, but eventually chose exit when they 
found that their voices were not being heard. In order to frame this discussion, I map 
Hirschman’s (1970) conceptualization of exit, voice, and loyalty onto the EPG 
framework employed in this research, and incorporate the findings. 
 
I move on to explore Tanzania’s post-liberalization environment, positing individual 
sales to buyers as a potential form of exit. As sales to private buyers often depend on the 
coffee payment to farmers (i.e. a farmer might have more of an incentive to exit if the 
co-operative pays a low price), it is also relevant here to question whether or not the 
Fairtrade price is financially benefitting farmers belonging to Tanzania’s coffee unions. 
Clearly, these unions stand to lose if producers have no incentive to stay on as members 
and choose to exit instead. 
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6.2 Group Exit: The Breakaway Groups as Countervailing Power  
 
In Chapter 2 I introduced the notion of countervailing power and framed Hirschman’s 
work on exit, voice, and loyalty as a means of understanding how underrepresented 
individuals may mobilize. Within the co-operative model both voice and exit are tools 
available to individuals who wish to express their dissatisfaction. While voice is aimed 
at reform from within, exit leads to withdrawal from the organization (Saltman and von 
Ofter, 1989). Up to this point I have focused on voice and how governance determines 
whether or not individuals have the opportunity to have a voice in decision-making. As 
was seen in Chapter 5, this may be occurring somewhat effectively (although not 
perfectly, as in the case of the delayed payment) at KCU and KDCU. In contrast, I 
observed dissatisfaction with regards to achieving this voice among many individuals 
belonging to KNCU, and I explore a decision by some of them to exit the union as a 
means of understanding what can happen when voice is not achieved. 
 
As previously mentioned in Chapter 2, Fung and Wright (2003, 260) claim that EPG is 
only possible with the presence of a countervailing power, which they define as “the 
too-simple concept that describes how powerful actors with privileged access to 
decision-making venues may be challenged and even defeated from time to time by the 
weak and less organized.” Hirschman (1970) raises a point that is relevant to this 
paper’s consideration of countervailing power, as he notes that achieving voice requires 
the use of creative new approaches. According to him, “[I]n the choice between voice 
and exit, voice will often lose out, not necessarily because it would be less effective 
than exit, but because its effectiveness depends on the discovery of new ways of 
exerting influence and pressure toward recovery.” (Hirschman, 1970, 80) Perhaps then, 
it is the presence of countervailing power through creative influence that strengthens the 
possibility of individuals choosing voice over exit.  
 
When individuals, such as KNCU’s farmers, perceive a decrease in quality or benefit, 
they may choose to leave their organizations. The greater the availability of exit to these 
individuals, the less likely it is that they will choose to use voice. There are, however, 
reasons why individuals may not choose to exit in the end. Firstly, the threat of exit can 
strengthen the effectiveness of voice, as a great deal depends on whether or not these 
voices are listened to. The facilitation of voice via collaborative governance may be one 
reason why they instead stay. In Figure 2, I mapped Hirschman’s notions onto the EPG 
 144	  
model, indicating that if collaborative governance is facilitated by EPG, producers may 
have a higher likelihood of choosing voice. In contrast, if EPG is not met, I anticipate a 
higher chance that these individuals will choose to exit. Secondly, loyalty, 
conceptualized here as a commitment to stay with the organization whether or not it 
changes (Saltman and von Ofter, 1989, Stryjan, 1987), can also prevent exit. Members 
might choose to stay with the organization even if it does not deliver the expected 
results, particularly in terms of economic benefits (Jussila et al., 2012). 
 
During the field research I discovered that 32 primary societies, known as the G32, 
exited KNCU in 2003 as a result of their frustration with the union. I was fortunate to 
have a flexible methodological approach and the time to pursue new areas of interest 
during the fieldwork; I conducted interviews with individuals at four primary societies 
that departed from KNCU in 2003 and met with the General Manager of the G32 on 
multiple occasions. The G32, introduced in Chapter 4, exists today as a joint venture of 
primary societies who all left KNCU together. This group provides an example of both 
voice and exit; the members of this group first sought a voice but chose exit when 
management did not listen. This demonstrates how voice alone is not enough; members 
must perceive that they have changed something through the use of voice (Simmons and 
Birchall, 2004). This is in accordance with Hirschman’s assertion that “the decision 
whether to exit will often be taken in the light of the prospects for the effective use of 
voice.” (Hirschman, 1970, 37) In contrast to Hirschman’s predictions, it does not appear 
as though the G32’s credible threat of exit improved the effectiveness of its voice, as 
management refused to listen and the group eventually departed KNCU. It is unclear 
whether or not loyalty played a role in the G32’s decision to leave, although one can 
imagine that these primary societies may have left years ago were it not for a feeling of 
loyalty towards the union. Loyalty may have therefore raised the barrier to exit, as 
envisioned by Hirschman (1970).  
 
I conducted interviews to learn more about this exit process and found that the G32 does 
indeed appear to be a countervailing power to KNCU and creates competition for the 
union. Of interest is also the fact that a second countervailing power emerged within the 
G32: Mamsera. This group left KNCU with the G32 in 2003, but one year later chose to 
exit from the G32, becoming an independent primary society. I outline both stories and 
related findings here.  
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6.2.1 The G32: Countervailing Power to KNCU 
The story of the G32 goes back to the 1990s and the establishment of the membership 
empowerment initiative known as MEMCOOP, earlier described in Chapter 3. Through 
its capacity building efforts, MEMCOOP taught individual producers their rights as co-
operative members, including how to ask important questions of the union, such as 
those relating to KNCU’s operational costs, the budget, transport, and access to credit 
(Interview G2 R20). For example, the MEMCOOP program encouraged KNCU’s 
farmers to cost out the price of coffee transport and these producers discovered that they 
could save money using private transporters, which KNCU would not allow (Interview 
G2 R20). Primary societies also began to access loans on their own, whereas prior to 
this the union asked the bank for loans on behalf of the primaries and individual primary 
societies were not allowed to access new loans. Through MEMCOOP the farmers 
learned that this could change. The General Manager of the G32, who had previously 
worked as KNCU’s Export Manager for ten years and coordinated the G32 exit, 
explained to me that the purpose of exiting was to offer farmers an alternative. He 
noted: 
 
“One of the reasons for forming the G32 was to change things. When I was at 
KNCU I wanted a change in the system. My thinking was that the primary 
societies now have manpower and don’t need the union. For example, transport. 
I said, ‘You don’t need to send a lorry to the society; let the society bring their 
coffee so that they minimize the cost of transport.’” (Interview G2 R17) 
 
Over time, and armed with this new knowledge, these primary societies became highly 
frustrated with the union. Mmari (2012) outlines that the impetus for the G32 departure 
included KNCU’s failure to provide advance payments for coffee crop procurement, 
high union coordination costs, and widespread maladministration. Eventually, a tipping 
point was reached. At a 2003 union AGM, several primary societies expressed 
dissatisfaction with the budget that was shared and called for the union Board of 
Directors to create a new one (Interview G2 R20). KNCU’s Board agreed to rework the 
budget in response to producer demands, but postponed for three months before moving 
ahead with a budget that had not been approved by membership. It was at this point that 
the G32 decided to separate, clearly frustrated that their voices had not been heard. I 
interviewed an academic who was present in this meeting and described his reaction to 
this: 
 
“Inside I was clapping my hands. When they did exit, they were called rebels. 
When the G32 left the union used threats. ‘If you go, you are not going to get 
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this and that.’ But actually, the primaries that remained with the union were the 
weak ones in relative terms. […] One argument that has been coming up is: 
‘G32 is a process of killing the cooperative movement.’ But for me cooperation 
comes from the members and not from the structure. (Interview G2 R20) 
 
When these primary societies left the union to join the G32, they maintained their co-
operative structures. The General Manager explained that co-operative structures have 
endured in the Kilimanjaro region because of the country’s history, describing how 
people typically group themselves together in his culture, whether it is to grow coffee, 
build schools, or dig irrigation tunnels (Interview G2 R17). It is important to note here 
that, while the G32 primary societies no longer belong to KNCU for coffee marketing 
purposes, they are still members of the union, attend meetings, and can vote. However, 
they do not utilize KNCU for marketing and transport services and sell their coffee 
independently at the auction (Interview G2 R19). Initially there was resistance to the 
G32 despite, or perhaps because of, the fact that this group has the potential to be a 
strong countervailing power. This is seen in the following quote from an academic, 
referencing the potential for the union to learn from the G32: 
 
“At the beginning [the G32 members] were not respected. I told the manager of 
KNCU: ‘If I were you I would visit them and learn from them. Because maybe 
that would bring some kind of evolution and new thinking on how the union 
should be operating.’ But they didn’t do it; doing that would be insubordination 
and they wouldn’t like to do that with small people. […] The union considers 
itself the boss and treats primaries as branches. But they forget that they were 
formed by primaries.” (Interview G2 R20) 
 
This quote’s reference to ‘small people’, insubordination, and the union as the boss 
provides further evidence of some of the governance challenges I discover. In Chapter 5 
I outlined problems of internal and external governance, finding that poor management 
and leadership can be highly detrimental to achieving a voice in decision-making. In the 
scenario depicted above it is clear that the G32 members did not feel as though their 
voices were being heard at the union level. While the producers first chose voice, they 
did not find that they were listened to when they expressed themselves. Clearly, 
therefore, a great deal depends on how management and the Board respond when 
individuals assert their voice.  
 
So have things improved for the G32 since its departure? The G32 claims that farmers 
now receive a better price for their coffee than they would through the union 
(Interviews G2 R17 & G3 R7). A Board member at primary society Lukani/Losaa told 
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me that many farmers were about to quit ten years ago but stayed because the price 
improved with the G32 (Interview G3 R6). Other changes within the G32 primary 
societies since leaving KNCU relate to access to credit and processing. According to the 
G32 General Manager, should primary societies need to borrow money to pay farmers, 
farmers borrow through the bank and become responsible for the administration of that 
money, rather than relying on the union (Interview G2 R17). The G32 General Manager 
claimed that farmers have been trained on how to prepare and approach the bank and 
are all considered credit-worthy (Interview G2 R17). He also emphasized quality 
improvement, explaining that once a primary society attains a high standard it appears 
in the auction under its own name rather than the G32’s (Interview G2 R17). In 
addition, I discovered an ongoing commitment to capacity building, through training 
and technical assistance, for G32 producers. The General Manager of the G32 
explained: 
 
“We just provide technical advice, not take power. We need to train them for 
transparency, so at the grassroots level they can ask and answer questions. They 
don’t need us to answer on their behalf.” (Interview G2 R17) 
 
The role of central pulping units (CPUs) in ensuring high quality came up during 
interviews as an example of capacity building. The G32 has installed CPUs in three of 
its primary societies, including Lukani/Losaa, one of the primary societies that I visited. 
A Board member at the Lukani/Losaa primary society stated that the CPU is better 
because it minimizes the work required to process coffee (Interview G3 R6). At the time 
of research, the G32 was starting a health insurance project modeled after KNCU’s and 
had recently worked with NGOs including Café Africa, Hivos, and EnviroCare to 
provide capacity building support as well as programs for women and children. Overall, 
the General Manager claimed that the group’s success could be attributed to training, 
such as this example of value chain knowledge: 
 
“We calculate that the system is working because now we have trained all our 
members to know how to trace their coffee from the society up to the auction 
level. They know the documentation and documents from Coffee Board and can 
trace when and where their coffee was sold.”  (Interview G2 R17) 
 
I do not intend to imply that the G32 primary societies are free of problems. Overall, 
producer responses did not differ greatly from those of KNCU members, aside from the 
mention of a slightly higher price for coffee within the G32, and G32 farmers face many 
of the same challenges relating to inputs, prices they deem too low, and problems with 
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pests attacking coffee plants. Members of management at Mamsera draw parallels 
between KNCU and the G32 with regards to the issues that both umbrella groups face 
(Interviews G3 R2 & G3 R3). There were also stories of poor governance at one of the 
two G32 primary societies that I visited: the Secretary Manager of the Keryo primary 
society told me that the person in the post prior to him stole money, so they chose him 
to be Secretary even though he is over-qualified as an agronomist (Interview G3 R5). 
Also, one of the Board members I spoke with had been on the Board for over nine 
years, which exceeds the amount of time allowed under the Tanzanian Co-operative 
Law. When I asked about this, I was told that they would soon have elections (Interview 
G3 R5). Separating from the union does not necessarily lead to perfect primary 
societies, but it does appear to allow for a process of change to begin. 
 
I also discovered some support for the G32 at KNCU, which could make the G32 more 
effective as a countervailing power. One manager stated during an interview that the 
independence of primary societies could make sense, with some caveats. He felt that it 
was good for some societies to be independent if they were strong, referencing 
Mamsera, while it might be more challenging for others (Interview G2 R9). While this 
comment hints at skepticism over the breakaway groups, it also posits this type of 
resistance as a potential positive force. This discussion raises the question of how the 
G32 may act as a countervailing power for KNCU’s remaining primary societies, as the 
G32 groups are technically still members of the union. These breakaway groups could 
therefore provide a countervailing power that may encourage other primary societies to 
seek a voice. The Secretary-Manager of the Keryo primary society, for example, 
claimed that his co-operative had become a big challenge to KNCU (Interview G3 R5). 
One academic felt that the G32 had opened a Pandora’s box (Interview G2 R20), while 
another academic described the G32 in a manner that positions it as a potential 
countervailing power to KNCU: 
 
“If the G32 is stronger than KNCU, they may shift into the KNCU and change 
the whole thing. It could be a revolution. […] People are informed at the G32, 
they’ll talk to you. But if you go into KNCU you won’t learn anything.” 
(Interview G2 R19) 
 
The General Manager of the G32 felt that the exit of the G32 may have had positive 
consequences for the primary societies that stayed with KNCU. He explained: 
 
“Some KNCU members are happy for the G32 because it creates a challenge; if 
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you don’t offer good services they will go to G32; if G32 is not good they will go 
to KNCU; if KNCU is not good they will go to a private buyer. So we’ve given 3 
windows or 3 alternative markets: private buyer, KNCU, or G32.” (Interview 
G2 R17) 
 
At KNCU’s primary societies that do not belong to the G32, I found that these groups 
had no plans to leave and, in general, expressed loyalty towards the union. As I outlined 
in Chapter 5, the majority of farmers (42 farmers of 68 interviews) stated that they had 
confidence in the union management (Producer Questionnaire Q27), while 48 farmers 
of 68 interviewed claimed that they had confidence in their union’s Board (Producer 
Questionnaire Q28). Beyond feelings of loyalty, this resistance to change could also be 
due to a lack of capacity building for these producers, as KNCU’s primary societies do 
not provide much in the way of training and capacity building (which I further address 
in Chapter 7). In contrast, MEMCOOP’s capacity building efforts clearly played a large 
role in the original G32 departure. This may also be one explanation for the lack of 
breakaway groups at KCU and KDCU. These primary societies were not part of the 
MEMCOOP program, and have had limited access to capacity building opportunities.  
 
6.2.2 Mamsera 
Mamsera Rural Primary Co-operative Society is the second breakaway group that I 
explore. Mamsera originally exited KNCU as a member of the G32, but one year later 
separated to become completely independent. I asked members of a Mamsera producer 
focus group about the departure from KNCU and was told that they separated with the 
G32 because KNCU was unfair and sold assets, including buildings and cattle, without 
their permission (Focus Group 4). According to the Deputy Secretary Manager of 
Mamsera, KNCU's operational expenses were very high and the farmers were paid little 
for their coffee (Interview G3 R2). He felt strongly, however, that KNCU had missed an 
opportunity to learn from the departure of these breakaway groups, and made strong 
claims about the union’s reaction: 
 
“KNCU made a very big mistake because when we stepped aside they did not 
want to find out why. Instead they declared war with Mamsera. They told the 
government that we were getting money from illegal sources. Auditors came and 
we proved we're doing business legally. Now we're doing better than KNCU and 
everyone asks them why they're not more like us. […] Slowly KNCU is moving 
towards its grave.” (Interview G3 R2) 
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Interestingly, Mamsera then separated from the G32 a year after leaving KNCU. The 
Secretary Manager of Mamsera explained this departure in an interview: 
 
“We stayed in the G32 for a year, but then we realized it was no different from 
KNCU. We knew we could go to the auction ourselves, so why use a 
middleman? There were problems with [the G32] delaying information and the 
operational costs were high. These were different problems than KNCU, but it is 
better to be independent.” (Interview G3 R3) 
  
Mamsera’s Secretary-Manager explained to me what happened when this group became 
completely independent: 
 
“In 2004 we started marketing our own coffee. KNCU went to the Registrar of 
Cooperative Societies and complained about us. They told them lies. The 
Registrar said to them: ‘This is the era of the free market. You can't hold people 
down.’” (Interview G3 R3) 
 
Mamsera is located in Rombo, a region that suffers from water shortages. Despite this, 
this primary society is doing better than any of the others belonging to the large union – 
an achievement that one academic attributed to good governance (Interview G2 R11). 
As outlined in Chapter 4, Danda and Bamanyisa (2011) find that Mamsera is a vibrant 
primary society that has seen an increase in membership, high membership participation 
in annual general meetings, higher prices paid to farmers, and an increase in the volume 
and quality of marketed coffee. This was reflected in my findings, as outlined in Table 
15. Unlike most primary societies, Mamsera also pays dividends and had paid a 
dividend of 200 per cent in 2012.15   
 
Table 15: Mamsera After the KNCU Departure 
 
Year Members Share Capital Coffee Collection (kg) 
2004-2005 1000 5,872,960 TSh 128,650 kg 
2011-2012 1800  16,000,000 TSh 308,033 kg 
 
Source: Author’s own, Interview G3 R2 
 
 
I was interested in learning more about why Mamsera has been so successful, especially 
when I learned that the Secretary Manager is a woman. While some of KNCU’s other 
primary societies have female leaders, this remains rare in Tanzania given some of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 A co-operative dividend is a sum paid on the share capital invested in a society (The United Republic 
of Tanzania, 2003). 
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attitudes towards women and the fact that coffee is viewed as a crop for men (which I 
further explore in Chapter 7). In Mamsera’s case, this female leader is credited with the 
co-operative’s success. The Deputy Secretary Manager referred to the Secretary 
Manager of Mamsera as a ‘businesswoman’ who has connections with many banks, 
stating that she is able to negotiate good rates (Interview G3 R2).  In addition, a KNCU 
manager attributed the primary society’s achievements to the fact that the Secretary 
Manager of Mamsera is a strong leader. He claimed:  
 
“They’ve been successful because they’ve trusted the woman in charge; she has 
autonomy to make decisions.” (Interview G2 R6)  
 
Along with other G32 primary societies, Mamsera was part of the MEMCOOP pilot 
project; as such, the primary society adopted strong governance structures through these 
participatory membership empowerment initiatives. One manager claimed that this 
assisted them in making the decision to market their own coffee and that the members 
learned about how they could improve their cooperative society (Interview G3 R2). The 
Secretary Manager also felt that members had learned about the importance of paying 
shares to the primary society and not selling to private buyers, thereby helping them to 
maintain loyalty (Interview G3 R3).  
 
Mamsera focus group members reported that approximately 50 per cent of the primary 
society’s members attend meetings, which they claim is many more than when the 
primary society was part of KNCU, and that topics include the development of the 
society, farmer inputs, the provision of benefits to farmers, budget and expenditure, and 
decisions regarding how to use the dividend (Focus Group 4). I asked focus group 
members to describe the benefits of belonging to Mamsera. They responded that more 
children attend school, profits are higher, and their living standard has improved (Focus 
Group 4). Individuals in this group also claimed that more women participate, 
attributing this to training on equal rights that is leading to a reduction in male 
dominance. Mamsera supports farmers with credit when necessary, such as during the 
December/January period when there is no harvest but a great deal of family 
commitments. Similarly to the G32 primary societies, Mamsera takes its own loans 
from banks rather than relying on the union. According to the Secretary Manager:  
 
“After the training from MEMCOOP, we learned that we could take loans 
outside of KNCU. So we did this and focused on coffee quality, while teaching 
the farmers.” (Interview G3 R3)  
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Mamsera provides interest-free loans to members and one manager explained how this 
differed from the union: 
 
“We borrow only when necessary, not like KNCU. KNCU is not business-
oriented because they borrow from banks and keep it for a long time, and then 
the interest rate is high. If Mamsera has to borrow we do it when crops are out 
so we don’t have to keep the money for too long. In two to three years we will be 
self-sufficient with no loans. KNCU relies completely on loans; we only rely on 
loans for 10 to 20 per cent.” (Interview G3 R2)  
 
One KNCU manager said that Mamsera’s producers collect high volumes of coffee, and 
that the organization received a great deal of support from a private exporting company 
named Taylor Winch (Interview G2 R6). Another key to Mamsera’s success is coffee 
quality. The Deputy Secretary Manager explained in an interview that Mamsera’s 
coffee attracts higher prices than KNCU’s in the auction: 
 
“People fight for Mamsera coffee because it’s better quality. KNCU collects 
from 50 societies and sells under one name. But because our coffee is sold under 
Mamsera we have to ensure very good quality.” (Interview G3 R2)  
 
Once again, there are still challenges for this primary society, as independence is not a 
panacea. While Mamsera’s price was indeed higher than KNCU’s at the time of 
research, 5900 TSh/kilo as opposed to 5000 TSh/kilo, the farmers I spoke with in a 
focus group still felt that the price needed to be higher to cover production and the cost 
of fertilizers, with one member stating that it needs to be at least 10,000 TSh/kilo (Focus 
Group 4).  
 
6.2.3 Leaving Fairtrade 
The G32 primary societies and Mamsera all left the Fairtrade system when they 
departed from KNCU. The Deputy Secretary of Mamsera said that they left because 
they did not benefit much from Fairtrade, and now pay their farmers a higher price than 
Fairtrade does (Interview G3 R2). The Secretary Manager of Mamsera echoed this and 
said that they did not benefit from Fairtrade when they were with KNCU (Interview G3 
R3). These comments raise the issue of whether or not the primary societies were 
actually benefitting from Fairtrade while with the union. Could it be that these primary 
co-operatives do not stand to gain from belonging to the Fairtrade system?  
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Despite the fact that they are not part of the Fairtrade system, there were strong 
examples of social projects and high payments at the breakaway groups. As one 
academic explained, the breakaway groups are bringing back programs, related to 
schools and roads, that were lost during the disbandment of co-operatives in Tanzania 
(Interview G2 R19). Despite no longer belonging to the Fairtrade system, it is possible 
that these breakaway groups could in fact espouse the Fairtrade standards more than the 
primary societies belonging to KNCU. According to the Export Manager at KCU:  
 
“The G32 and Mamsera...these groups are more Fairtrade than other groups 
that are part of Fairtrade. They don't need the Fairtrade system.” (Interview G2 
R5)  
 
Interestingly, the G32 expressed an interest in returning to Fairtrade one day. The 
General Manager said: 
 
“The cost was high so we left the system. But I think we will go back.” 
(Interview G2 R17)  
 
He claimed that they would have more funding to cover Fairtrade fees due to their 
success since departing from KNCU (Interview G2 R17). A G32 Board member 
explained that his primary society, Lukani/Losaa, was no longer part of Fairtrade 
because of the high costs; however, he thought that they would return to Fairtrade in the 
future (Interview G3 R7). 
 
In Table 16, I outline some of the similarities and differences between KNCU, the G32 
and Mamsera. 
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Table 16: Comparing KNCU, the G32 and Mamsera 
 
Characteristic KNCU  G32  Mamsera 
Type of 
organization 
Union Joint venture Primary society 
Members 70,000 20,000  1800  
Number of 
Primary societies 
67 22 1 
Coffee Price 2012 5000 TSh/kilo 
(parchment) 
5200-5700 TSh/kilo 
(parchment) 
5900 TSh/kilo 
(parchment) 
Fairtrade Yes No No 
Organic 11 primaries 3 primaries No 
Board  5 members (0 
women) 
5 members (1 
woman) 
9 members (2 
women) 
Number of female 
members 
4200 (6% of 
female members) 
Unknown 230 (12.7% of 
members) 
Competition (may 
depend on organic) 
Moderate Moderate Low (farmers all sell 
to Mamsera, even 
those from other 
primary societies) 
Loans Union level Primary society level Primary society 
level;  
Mamsera also 
provides interest-free 
loans to farmers 
Transport Provided by 
union 
Local transport Local transport 
Source: Author’s own 
 
Although further research is required, these findings seem to imply that for multiple 
reasons, potentially including high coffee quality, decentralization, a departure from 
Fairtrade, more female members, and local-level access to transport and loans, the G32 
and Mamsera may be viewed as better and more inclusive organizations without the 
union as they pay farmers a higher price, have more social projects, and demonstrate 
higher gender equality. But just what is a ‘better’ organization? Here I am interested in 
voice in decision-making and claim that a stronger organization is one where members 
have a voice. From these stories it is clear that the G32 members achieved more of a 
voice when they left KNCU, and that the Mamsera members achieved more of a voice 
when they left the G32. This seems to indicate that the primary society may be a more 
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effective model in some cases and indicates that, at least in the case of KNCU, there 
may no longer be an essential role for the union to play. I explore this further in the 
following section. 
 
6.2.4 The Future of the Primaries 
Given this history of breakaway groups in Kilimanjaro, in this section I consider the 
future of the primary societies and the challenge that they might pose to the union. I 
interviewed one academic who highlighted trends in the co-operative movement, 
indicating a potential shift towards the primary co-operative society: 
 
“The existence of unions will very much depend on 2 things: (1) if they are run 
at minimum costs and (2) if they are offering relevant services to the primaries. 
But at most co-operative unions this is not the case. […] The primary is 
becoming the co-operative institution because it is directly responsive to 
members and it is a forum whereby members can contribute, can discuss, and 
can also participate in decision-making.” (Interview G2 R20) 
 
Another MUCCoBS academic explained how he feels the co-operative model should 
evolve to focus on the primary: 
 
“The primary society needs to be the future. Primaries should be left to sell 
anywhere, and [the union] should only coordinate the process. If there’s more 
action and more democracy at the primary level, it will reflect itself at the union 
and therefore the union will definitely change.” (Interview G2 R20) 
 
When the 1991 Cooperative Societies Act was first introduced, which made co-
operatives autonomous from government, it aimed to make co-operatives member-
based institutions. Chambo (2009, 11) asserts that member-driven agricultural co-
operatives are the “ultimate goal of co-operative development in Africa.” As one 
academic I interviewed stated:  
 
“Co-operatives lost orientation because of government intervention. We found 
that co-ops had to be member-based to succeed.” (Interview G2 R19)  
 
But just what is a member-based organization and how might one be achieved? This 
academic, who is also an expert in the Tanzanian co-operative sector, outlined his 
criteria for a member-based organization during an interview (Interview G2 R19): 
members apply and get accepted; members buy shares and pay fees; members 
participate in income generation; members are responsible for leading the organization; 
and members participate in management, meetings, and decision-making. On paper, 
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these are all elements of the co-operative model. However, this fifth and final point is of 
particular interest to this consideration of collaborative governance and addresses my 
primary research question: to what extent do members truly participate in meetings, 
decision-making, and, potentially, management? And could it be that this is happening 
at the primary but not the secondary level? 
 
Bibby (2006, 10) states: “Good corporate governance goes hand-in-hand with effective 
member empowerment and healthy internal democracy. Moves to strengthen members’ 
role in their own cooperatives also [strengthen] the coop’s leadership and management.” 
I interviewed an academic member of a government-led team working to strengthen and 
rejuvenate co-operatives, who stated the following in an explanation of why he felt the 
co-operative model had survived in Tanzania:  
 
“People want co-operatives. Co-operative organizations can die but the co-
operative spirit still exists among the people.” (Interview G2 R19)  
 
This was echoed in producer interviews. When I asked farmers why they joined the co-
operative (Producer Questionnaire Q16), answers that referred to this co-operative spirit 
included:  
 
“If we come together, we can solve all the problems of the members.” (Interview 
G4 R3) 
 
“The society is protecting the farmers. It is giving one voice to the farmers.” 
(Interview G4 R22) 
 
“Coops take care of us, like a loan to send our children to school.” (Interview 
G4 R68) 
 
“When there’s a problem the society can help out.” (Interview G4 R24) 
 
It is interesting to observe that none of these answers refer to the union. It is also 
important to note here that, as outlined in Table 17, many farmers said they were 
members of the co-operative for specific reasons that were not at all related to this 
notion of co-operative spirit (Producer Questionnaire Q16). 
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Table 17: Incentives for Joining Primary Society 
 
Response Frequency 
Father/husband gave me land and membership after dying 18 
It’s the only way to sell coffee 13 
Co-operative values, like “coming together” 11 
A good/stable price 8 
To get free inputs 3 
Social projects 2 
To get health insurance  1 
 
 
Chambo (2009, 11) recognizes that it might take time to cultivate truly member-based 
co-operatives, observing: “Africa’s agricultural co-operatives are still at the drawing 
board. More design work needs to be done with the participation of members to arrive 
at an appropriate size of agricultural co-operatives which can respond to the needs of 
members.” He asserts that this requires (1) an effort on the part of government to adapt 
the policy agenda and reduce its involvement in co-operatives, (2) member education 
for empowerment and entrepreneurship, and (3) a new generation of co-operatives 
attracting new leadership and management (Chambo, 2009). 
 
Overall, it is difficult to make blanket statements about whether the unions facilitate or 
impede the emergence of member-based co-operatives. However, it is clear from the 
story of the G32 that independent primaries can successfully foster participation and 
deliberation, and may in fact be more effective in the Kilimanjaro region. This example 
is, of course, restricted to KNCU’s farmers and I did not find examples of other 
breakaway groups. While KDCU separated from KCU in 1990, this cannot be 
considered a breakaway in the same sense that the G32 might be. As discussed in an 
interview with the organization’s Export Manager, KDCU left with an aim to better 
service its members and it was an amicable split referred to as a ‘gentleman’s 
agreement’ (Interview G2 R20). While there may have been tensions related to the two 
regions and tribal differences, this separation from KCU was considered friendly by the 
individuals I interviewed (Interviews G2 R12, G2 R14, G2 R19 & G2 R20). Therefore, 
to the best of my knowledge, there is no comparable case at KCU or KDCU to that of 
KNCU’s breakaway groups. As such, the G32 and Mamsera may be isolated cases 
found only in the Kilimanjaro region. 
 
 158	  
I spoke with KCU’s General Manager about these breakaway groups and he asserted 
that MUCCoBS had always advocated the breakup of the unions (Interview G2 R26). 
He felt that independent primary societies might work well when the price is high, as in 
the case of Arabica, but that this was not the case for his region’s Robusta coffee and 
could not work at KCU. Another manager at KCU felt that members needed the union: 
 
“People want to join the union because members feel proud within their 
community that they can own something. This is different than the primary 
society level because communities come together. The union is better for the 
farmer because the union has a system linked to the market. Producers couldn't 
get by just selling to buyers that show up randomly.” (Interview G2 R4) 
 
With regards to KDCU, an academic who had conducted research on Mamsera noted 
that KDCU was similar to the G32 because of its size, and represented a ‘better way’ 
than KNCU and KCU (Interview G2 R11). Another academic said that the divide 
between the union and the primary society was smaller at KDCU because everyone is 
housed in one district; according to him this made the social and geographic distance 
much smaller (Interview G2 R20). While these examples of KCU and KDCU do not 
answer the question of whether the primaries are more effective structures than the 
unions in these two regions, they do illustrate the complexity of making claims about 
whether the primary or union is a ‘better’ model. As one academic explained: 
 
“When they call the union the cooperative movement I don’t agree. The distance 
between primary and secondary is sometimes so big that nobody knows what is 
happening. This is different from KCU and KDCU, but in all cases the union 
wants to control the primary.” (Interview G2 R20) 
 
There are also implications for Fairtrade, of course. One academic discussed why it is 
important to look at the impact of Fairtrade at the primary society level, and provided an 
example of how Fairtrade could lose its impact at the union level: 
 
“The anchor for Fairtrade should be the primary society. For me, the primary 
society is the future of the cooperative movement because decisions to build a 
different kind of structure will come from them. […] These funds should trickle 
to the members. Fairtrade funding should be discussed at the level of the 
primary society.” (Interview G2 R20) 
 
This raises the questions of whether or not there remains a role for Fairtrade at the union 
level, and if Fairtrade might one day be able to work directly with the primary societies 
in Tanzania. 
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Overall, the three coffee unions that I explore in this multiple case study all face 
challenges in the post-liberalization environment. From under-capacity factories to 
breakaway groups, much has changed since KNCU and KCU were first created during 
the colonial era. In order to remain relevant to farmers, these unions must be able to 
provide essential services that members could not otherwise access at the primary 
society level. This may indeed be the case at KCU and KDCU, where farmers are 
located in more remote areas, grow low-priced Robusta, and benefit from the marketing 
and transport services of these unions. These primary societies receive Fairtrade 
premiums, and the findings from Chapter 5 indicate that producers may indeed have a 
voice in decision-making. Organic farmers in these regions, in particular, stand to 
benefit from strong capacity building support from union field officers. While they are 
not without their challenges, these unions may be essential to the survival of the primary 
societies in these more remote regions, and there are clear benefits of Fairtrade filtering 
down to the primary societies, in particular through the use of the Fairtrade premium. 
 
KNCU, in contrast, does not seem to provide an attractive alternative to independent 
primary societies located in the Kilimanjaro region. This is clear in the case of the 
primary societies belonging to the G32 and Mamsera, who have all been more 
successful without the union, and who have created competition for the union in 
Tanzania’s competitive coffee market. With regards to Fairtrade, KNCU’s primary 
societies are not currently gaining directly from Fairtrade membership at the village 
level, as the premiums are being used solely at the union level. In fact, it may be that 
Mamsera and the G32 present alternatives are more ‘Fairtrade’ in nature, despite the 
fact that these primary societies no longer belong to the Fairtrade system.  
 
In Figure 8, I map this onto a modified version of Figure 2’s conceptualization of EPG 
(Fung and Wright 2003) and Hirschman’s (1970) exit, voice, and loyalty. This figure is 
a generalization and hence is oversimplified. However, it shows that when EPG is 
realized, there is a higher likelihood that producers will have a voice in decision-
making, as we see in the case of KCU and KDCU. There are two options for producers 
who are part of an organization with effective collaborative governance. They may 
either exercise their voice and serve to strengthen EPG, or they may choose to stay 
despite the fact that they do not have a voice, which they often do out of loyalty or 
simply because they do not wish to be active participants. In the latter scenario, EPG is 
not strengthened.  
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In contrast, at KNCU there is a lower likelihood that producers will have a voice in 
decision-making. Should producers not have a voice in decision-making, as seen in the 
case of some (although not all) groups at KNCU, they also have two options: remain 
with the organization regardless or exit. In both cases, EPG at the union level is not 
strengthened; however, at the primary society level exit may lead to strengthened EPG 
for those primary societies that leave the union. As evidenced in this research, there are 
of course cases where KNCU farmers exercise their voices effectively, especially when 
groups have access to capacity development (outlined in Chapter 7). However, the 
findings demonstrate that this is less likely at KNCU than it is at KCU or KDCU. 
 
Figure 8: Findings on EPG, Voice, and Exit 
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Source: Author’s own based on Fung and Wright (2003) and Hirschman (1970) 
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6.3 Individual Exit: The Impact of Competition 
 
I now shift from a consideration of group exit, as seen in the case of the G32, to explore 
the possibility of individual exit from the co-operative. While exit and voice are options 
available to individuals, either when there is no competition or as a complement to it, 
competition is also a major “mechanism of recuperation.” (Hirschman, 1970, 3) 
Hirschman (1970) claims that in the traditional competitive economy model, recovery 
from what he deems a “repairable lapse” at firms is not essential, as other firms will 
simply take over when they detect an opportunity.  This is precisely what happened in 
Tanzania following liberalization, and in this section I explore how competition 
following liberalization in Tanzania may have created opportunities for voice and exit. 
 
When competition increases, individual farmers generally have three options: (1) 
remain members out of loyalty or satisfaction with the organization, (2) exit from the 
organization, perhaps after trying to change its policies (Ollila et al., 2012), or (3) 
remain members while selling to private buyers. In their study on Finnish farmers’ 
motivation as cooperative members, Ollila et al. (2012) find that loyalty may shrink as 
cooperatives and farmers experience intensified competitive pressure. Loyal members 
may accept a lower price for a period of time, but potentially consider exiting if the 
price stays too low. They also note that, while some members may be loyal, others sell 
to the co-operative for purely business-related reasons (Ollila et al., 2012). 
 
6.3.1 Coffee Competition  
Until the 1990s, Tanzania’s smallholders could only sell their coffee through co-
operatives and this marketing channel was vital for their crops. This changed with 
liberalization, however, as farmers gained the ability to sell to either co-operatives or 
private buyers. As a result, these private traders, both local and foreign, eroded the 
dominance of co-operatives in the marketing of agricultural products in Tanzania. At 
the same time, co-operatives continued to depend on their members for survival, as they 
are not allowed to purchase from non-members. KCU, as one example, lost its Fairtrade 
certification for two weeks at one point due to a nonconformity that involved 
purchasing from non-members (Interview G2 R21). A key informant noted the 
challenges of retaining members who sell only to the co-operative: 
 
“There are some limits as to how co-operatives are able to engage each and 
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every member of the co-op. It’s a fine balance and when you get that balance 
wrong private buyers come in to make offer.” (Interview G1 R10) 
 
As Birchall and Simmons (2009, 478-479) describe, “In Tanzania, the impact of 
liberalization was disastrous. Cooperatives were in a weak position at the start of the 
trade reform process, and had no breathing space to adjust, and so private traders took 
over much of their business.” Strict State supervision came to an end, and co-operatives 
lost the regulatory mechanism that the State had previously provided (although in 
Chapter 5 I argued that there remains heavy State government intervention regardless). 
Overall, liberalization created both opportunities and threats for Tanzania’s coffee 
unions. While it allowed the union to develop its export capacity and independently sell 
its members’ coffee, at the same time increasing numbers of buyers began competing 
for this coffee (Tallontire, 2000). While many co-operatives struggled and were not 
successful in this newly competitive environment (TFC & CDD, 2006), others, 
including the unions I explore herein, survived the initial years of liberalization and 
demonstrated their resilience. The General Manager of KDCU noted that his union 
shifted its approach to address this threat of competition:  
 
“Historically co-ops were the only buyers, but today the philosophy of business 
is different. Now we operate as a business entity, like a private buyer.” 
(Interview G2 R28) 
 
This reference to the co-operative as a ‘business entity’ is interesting. Following 
liberalization, co-ops had to compete with other players and could only stay in business 
if they were able to sell agricultural produce. At the same time, co-operatives became 
free from the State to “enjoy autonomy and operate like business ventures responding to 
market demands”. (Wanyama, Undated, 1) Their success in making this transition had 
major implications for both (i) individual farmers, who now had the option to exit the 
primary society, and (ii) primary societies, who now had the option to exit the union. 
Whereas members joined co-operatives in the past in order to access the only marketing 
channel available to them, they could now sell to private buyers instead, in turn 
reducing co-operative membership. And while primary societies in the past needed the 
union in order to sell their produce, this was no longer a requirement – especially if the 
union was mismanaged or malfunctioning (Wanyama Undated).  The exit of the G32 
and Mamsera, as previously outlined in Section 6.2, provides evidence of precisely this 
type of exit that was made available by liberalization.  
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In the era of competition, a major challenge for co-operatives is the coffee payment. 
Private traders typically offer farmers the entire payment in cash up-front, and for this 
reason many farmers opt to sell to them instead, even though the total price from the co-
operative - comprising at least two payments, if not more - may be higher overall. This 
is especially tempting, of course, when market prices are high as private traders have 
the flexibility to pay a different price every day (whereas the union sets a price that does 
not fluctuate often). According to a manager at KCU, the private buyers wait until the 
unions fix their prices and then top up their prices in order to make them higher than the 
union’s (Interview G2 R21). This can have potentially disastrous consequences for the 
co-operative. A senior official at the Tanzania Coffee Board explained the risk that the 
co-operatives could collapse if they are unable to compete with higher prices from 
private buyers (Interview G2 R10): 
 
“If you’re a farmer and someone offers you money today the temptation is there. 
The co-operative then runs a risk of defaulting and collapsing, and then the 
value it can offer to the co-op is reduced; the next time the private buyer will 
offer 10% less. We need to ensure that farmers understand the long-term value 
of belonging to a co-operative.” (Interview G1 R10) 
 
As a respondent from the TCB outlined:  
 
“Most people sell to private buyers only when they need to. Otherwise the co-
ops could collapse and then these buyers would come back with low prices. 
[Raising awareness] is most essential in terms of making sure that coops are 
sustainable.” (Interview G2 R10)  
 
Some of the farmers I spoke with understood the risk that selling to private buyers can 
present to the co-operative, including the likelihood of a lower future price should 
selling to private traders lead to a collapse of the co-operative. During a focus group in 
Kibosho Central, Kilimanjaro, one farmer clearly described the challenge that 
competition poses to the union:  
 
“[The private companies] spoil the price, wait until KNCU can’t pay it, and 
then lower the price.” (Focus Group 1)  
 
Along with the coffee payment, there may also be implications related to coffee quality. 
In a Mamsera focus group, members noted that private companies contribute to low 
quality coffee (Focus Group 4), and KCU’s Marketing Manager stated that private 
buyers drive down quality standards by purchasing poor quality coffee (Interview G2 
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R25). The Executive Secretary of the TCA further described coffee quality as one of the 
main challenges of liberalization in an interview: 
 
“With liberalization the monitoring of coffee quality is not easy. You cannot tell 
the farmer he should bring a certain quality, because you say no and another 
person says yes. So the quality cannot improve because few players in the field 
are having similar standards.” (Interview G2 R18) 
 
KDCU’s General Manager also felt that the advent of competition has had an impact on 
quality:  
 
“When we were main players, our members were keen to offer good quality. 
Now because of the competition they don't even dry it properly.” (Interview G2 
R28)  
 
The strongest competition within the coffee industry is found in the Karagwe region, 
where KDCU’s farmers are located. The Fairtrade Co-ordinator at KDCU attributed this 
to the fact that the region produces a large quantity of high-quality Robusta coffee 
(Interview G2 R14). Driving through the small town of Kayanga (where KDCU’s office 
is located), I saw factories and offices belonging to private traders Olam, Karagwe 
Estate, Asu, Kadris, and Danier, and was told that there are over 15 companies 
operating in the region (Interview G2 R14; Author’s non-participant observation). 
These private companies approach farmers with a full payment in cash, which is of 
course tempting to farmers. However, while these private buyers may present attractive 
alternatives to farmers in the short run, they pose many challenges for the future of the 
primary societies and the union. The Chair of KDCU’s Mabira primary society was 
nervous about this and stated: 
 
“Stiff competition is going to end the coop; the primary society will collapse. We 
don’t get the coffee because private buyers pay a better price. Five years ago we 
had same number of farmers. It's just that now they don't sell here anymore.” 
(Interview G3 R13) 
 
While strict State supervision came to an end with liberalization, the country’s coffee 
auction, outlined in Chapter 3, may offer one means of adapting to this newly 
liberalized market. An Export Manager at KCU explained the importance of the auction 
to them: 
 
“We produce more than we can buy and we need other buyers. We don't think 
we can sell this coffee without going to the auction. In the auction, mind you, 
there are many factors that determine the price. In the auction we get a higher 
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price because of these factors.” (Interview G2 R4) 
 
The KDCU General Manager spoke of the importance of strengthening the auction, 
while minimizing and restricting direct exports, as a means of addressing the impact of 
competition:  
 
“When we have the auction we have transparency and competition. We go to 
auction and improve weaknesses and bottlenecks to make the auction more 
efficient and on time. At the auction there's monitoring from TCB, but there isn't 
for direct export. Without co-ops, farmers will suffer. Without the auction, 
farmers will suffer.” (Interview G2 R28) 
 
6.3.2 Selling to Private Traders 
Most of the farmers I met had either been members of their primary society for decades, 
or had received the farm from a late family member. Of the 68 producers I spoke with, 
35 claimed to have joined their primary society before the 1990s (Producer 
Questionnaire Q15). The majority of the remainder had received the farm from a late 
husband or parent, as land is passed down through the family in Tanzania. A great deal 
has changed since these families first began coffee farming; today many producers are 
both members of the co-operative and sell to private buyers. Selling to the competition 
does not imply exit from the co-operative; once farmers have paid their shares they will 
always continue to be co-operative members. Of the 68 individuals farmers I 
interviewed, 11 reported selling to both the primary society and private buyers while the 
remainder claimed that they only sell to the primary society; there were, however, no 
regional trends within the sample (Producer Questionnaire Q11). Reflecting on my role 
as an outsider and the implications of the interview location as outlined in Chapter 4, I 
question whether some farmers might have felt uncomfortable telling me the truth about 
selling to others, fearing that I would share this knowledge with the co-operative or that 
a neighbour might overhear. If so, these numbers may be higher in reality.  
 
I asked farmers who sold to private buyers why they did this. Some said that they 
needed the money quickly due to sickness or their children’s school fees (Interviews G4 
R19, G4 R24 & G4 R54), while others said that they sold to them because the price 
from the primary society was low (Interviews G4 R29, G4 R58 & G4 R64). At a focus 
group in Kasharu (a KCU primary society), one member explained that: 
 
“The primary society must be strong to compete with private buyers. Some 
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farmers here will sell to private buyers if they have problems like needing to 
send their children to school.” (Focus Group 5) 
 
Some farmers stated that they had sold to private buyers in the past but no longer did. In 
a Mamsera focus group, members told me that there were no longer private buyers 
coming to Mamsera because the farmers had stopped selling to them as soon as they 
saw that there was no second payment (Focus Group 4). This was echoed by a KNCU 
producer who said that farmers sold to a private buyer in the beginning, but switched 
back to the co-operative when there was no profit (Interview G4 R23). One farmer 
explained that he used to sell to a private buyer but no longer does:  
 
“I sold to [a private company] in the past with the introduction of the free 
market. But I stopped because there was no second payment. If the world market 
price went up, I didn’t get anything.” (Interview G4 R32) 
 
KDCU’s General Manager referred to loyalty when speaking about competition, stating:  
 
“Some members are not loyal and they sell to others. We do not punish them.” 
(Interview G2 R28)  
 
During interviews, many of KCU’s farmers reported strong competition from private 
buyers, particularly in the Muleba region, including Olam, Dormans, Taylor Winch, and 
Sherif (Group 4 interviews). In focus groups farmers said that people sell to private 
buyers if they have problems like needing to send their children to school; one 
individual explained:  
 
“We need to sell to Olam [a private company] if there's no money from KCU.” 
(Focus Group 5)  
 
One farmer stated: 
 
“I love being part of the co-operative. I only sell to other companies because the 
price is better.” (Interview G4 R58)  
 
Another expressed his anger towards these private companies, referring to these buyers 
as ‘thieves’:  
 
“The [private companies] are thieves. I have never sold to them and I never 
will. There’s one company here but I don’t sell to them. Others are scared to 
come here.” (Interview G4 R35)  
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A farmer at a KCU primary society mentioned selling to smugglers because he did not 
have a large enough quantity of coffee to sell to the co-operative (Interview G4 R45). 
As a key informant explained, Ugandan smugglers travel across the border in western 
Tanzania to sell their coffee to private buyers (Interview G2 R36). A KDCU farmer 
claimed: 
 
“I joined the co-op to sell coffee here rather than to smugglers from Uganda. 
They try to buy from me but then realize I’m loyal.” (Interview G4 R64)  
 
Six of the farmers I interviewed from KNCU mentioned selling to Dormans (Producer 
Questionnaire Q11), a private trader, and I was therefore interested in learning more 
about this company. I interviewed individuals from two private companies, one of 
which was Dormans. Originally from Kenya, the Dormans representative told me that 
they are currently expanding throughout Tanzania. Dormans buys green (unroasted) 
coffee from Tanzania, brings it to Kenya for roasting, and then either exports it from 
Nairobi or brings it back to Moshi to sell (Interview G2 R15). As a result, substantial 
value is lost along the chain. The chairwoman of the Kyengia primary society told me 
that, in the past, farmers sold to Dormans because KNCU was paying less. However, 
she explained that there is now resistance against the private company, including at the 
governmental level:  
 
“Dormans is not here right now, but is trying to get a license to come back in 
August. We had a zonal meeting with the DCO a little while ago, and he told us 
to tell them if Dormans comes back because he doesn't want them here.” 
(Interview G3 R1) 
 
It is interesting that the DCO might attempt to dictate which buyers are allowed to be 
there and threaten those who are not part of the co-operative. I did not hear about this 
from others, but this does indicate that the government likely plays a more prominent 
role than that outlined in the Co-operative Law, as I noted in my Chapter 5 findings on 
the role of the State. 
 
Most farmers stated that they only sold to the primary society they belonged to, 
although three mentioned selling to another primary society nearby (Interviews G4 R55, 
G4 R60 & G4 R61), depending on which one paid first. The Deputy Secretary at 
Mamsera also claimed that some farmers from nearby KNCU primary societies had sold 
their coffee to Mamsera in recent years – demonstrating the potential for this breakaway 
group to create competition for the union (Interview G3 R2). He claimed that this was 
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because Mamsera had offered farmers a higher price than KNCU for the past eight 
years.  
 
Producers who sold only to their own primary societies gave various reasons for selling 
to the co-operative: the principle of selling to a co-operative (Interview G4 R35 & G4 
R37), better incomes over the long run (Interview G4 R65) and a good Board of 
Directors (Interview G4 R55). One KDCU farmer stated that he only sells to his 
primary society because his coffee is organic and he therefore receives a high price for 
it (Interview G4 R66). This is an important point, as farmers whose crops are certified 
organic receive more money for their coffee than those who are not organic, and these 
farmers might be less tempted to sell to other buyers. 
 
It may not be true in all cases that private buyers will eventually lower the price. While 
staying at Kahawa Shamba, KNCU’s rural Fairtrade tourism project in Uru North, I 
learned about a private buyer from Sweden. The buyer runs an independent CPU for a 
small group of approximately 30 farmers.  These farmers all belong to KNCU and she 
has hand-selected the ones with the highest-quality Arabica coffee. Mild Arabica coffee 
is, as previously outlined in Chapter 3, highly desired on the world market. The owner 
of this CPU pays farmers a better price than KNCU and guarantees certain purchasing 
volumes. This offers farmers with high quality coffee an attractive alternative to the 
PCS, as it was reported that she pays 7800 TSh/kg in contrast to KNCU’s 5000 TSh/kg 
(Interview G2 R2). She has an export license for the auction, after which point she 
exports directly (Interview G2 R2). There was no evidence that she was lowering the 
price paid to farmers in this case, as she aimed to ensure the highest possible coffee 
quality. However, this is quite a different case from private buyers who buy on a one-
time basis in order to meet their demand needs. 
 
The entry of private buyers has also had an impact on coffee processing. KNCU’s 
factory initially produced 500 tons of coffee per year, which increased to 10,000 tons in 
1935 and 50,000 tons in 1997; today, however, it is operating at below 10 per cent 
capacity (Interview G2 R13). It has a Board of Directors and 54 permanent employees, 
down from 600 employees at its peak production time (Interview G2 R13). The reason 
for this decline in production is the entry of private curing companies with the era of 
liberalization; as these companies were established in the second half of the 1990s, co-
operative unions lost a great deal of their coffee curing market share (Ponte, 2002). The 
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Executive Secretary of the Tanzania Coffee Association described the factory as a 
“white elephant with over capacity” (Interview G2 R18) and, according to the Deputy 
Secretary Manager at Mamsera:  
 
“KNCU's financial position is very poor. Their big asset is the coffee curing 
plant that is barely manageable. The electricity bill alone is 11 million 
TSh/month. That factory is almost valueless because of new technology. It will 
be obsolete soon.”(Interview G3 R2) 
 
This is not, necessarily, a negative impact of competition. This part State-owned, part 
KNCU-owned factory is old and may not have the new machinery required to supply 
the world’s coffee demand. Competition can lead to necessary upgrades or replacements 
in this case. However, KNCU is tied to this State apparatus as it currently owns 29 per 
cent of the factory (Interview G2 R13).  
 
Overall, it is clear that private buyers are creating challenges for the co-operative model, 
which the primary societies and unions must be able to respond to. While farmers 
understand the risks of selling to buyers, and the potential long-term consequences such 
as the conceivable collapse of co-operatives, at times they feel as though they have no 
other choice. If a farmer cannot afford to send his child to school because the payment 
is delayed or too low, this individual may indeed feel as though private buyers offer an 
attractive alternative. 
 
6.4 The Fairtrade Price  
 
If the three unions in this study all pay farmers a Fairtrade price, should this not be 
enough to dissuade producers from selling to the competition? The answer is not a 
simple one. It is important to remember here that the Fairtrade price is paid to the union, 
rather than the primary society or individual producers, and that KNCU, KCU, and 
KDCU all sell between 15 and 50 per cent of their coffee as Fairtrade, depending on 
what the market demands (see Table 6). As a manager at KCU explained, if the union 
sells more Fairtrade coffee on the market, the farmers will receive a higher payment 
(Interview G2 R4). It is therefore difficult to determine how much of the Fairtrade price 
goes to farmers, although it is clear from interviews that the Fairtrade price alone is not 
enough of an incentive for farmers to sell solely to the primary society.  
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This is further complicated by fluctuating world market prices, and it is important to 
consider the coffee payment within the context of international prices. At the time of the 
field research with producers, in summer 2012, international coffee prices were 
moderately higher than the annual averages of the past decade (International Coffee 
Organization, 2013). They were, however, slightly lower than the spike in coffee prices 
in 2011 that saw the New York price of coffee double. Overall, while co-operatives may 
have been beginning to experience a decline in the price they received for non-Fairtrade 
coffee, world market prices remained at a higher point in the cycle. 
 
When coffee prices are high, one can imagine that the Fairtrade price takes on less 
significance. While the Fairtrade price always increases to match the world market 
price, during times of higher coffee prices producers will have stronger alternative 
options, strictly price-wise, should they wish to sell to private buyers. In contrast, it is 
when coffee prices are low that the Fairtrade guaranteed minimum price takes on more 
prominence. This is because the alternatives that private buyers offer are likely weaker 
during this time.  
 
As my interviews took place during a period of relatively high coffee prices, it is 
possible that producers were experiencing less financial benefits from Fairtrade at this 
time. As a result, they may have been more tempted to sell directly to private buyers. 
However, counterintuitively this does not seem to have been the case within the sample, 
as most individuals denied selling to private buyers at the time of interviews. As I 
outlined in Chapter Two, this could be due to the fact that the Fairtrade price is not the 
most important aspect of the system. It is therefore essential to consider additional 
benefits, such as the Fairtrade premiums or access to capacity building, when evaluating 
the impact of Fairtrade during times of fluctuating coffee prices. 
 
As I learned in Group 3 and Group 4 interviews, in 2012 the price paid to farmers 
selling to KNCU was 5000 TSh per kg of Arabica conventional pulped coffee 
(including both payments), while the price for independent primary societies such as 
Mamsera was higher, between 5200 and 5900 TSh/kg – despite the fact that these latter 
societies do not belong to the Fairtrade system. The price for Robusta conventional 
coffee during the same period at KCU was 3650 TSh/kg, while KDCU farmers reported 
being paid between 1100 and 1500 TSh/kg for Robusta cherry, as the price had changed 
throughout the season. The price of Robusta differs between KCU and KDCU, as 
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farmers at KCU receive a payment for clean coffee that has gone through the CPU, 
while those at KDCU sell coffee cherry - the weight of which is, of course, higher. 
Despite this, the price that farmers receive for their coffee is shockingly low in 
comparison to what Westerners pay for a cup of coffee at Starbucks: one farmer at 
KDCU stated that he must sell a kilogram of coffee, which yields approximately forty 
cups of coffee (Barista Exchange, 2013), in order to buy a can of soda (Interview G4 
R60). KCU adjusts its price throughout the year according to the world market; as such, 
farmers often get differing prices (Interview G2 R25). Producers in Kasharu claimed 
that the price was good at the start of the season, but had gone down during the season 
(Focus Group 5). Prices are higher for organic coffee in all cases. However, these 
numbers do not tell us much about the Fairtrade price, as it is difficult to discern how 
this oft-overemphasized element of the system may trickle down to individual farmers 
(Sutton, 2013a). 
 
Overall, the price of coffee is a major concern for farmers. When I asked producers 
about the challenges they face (Producer Questionnaire Q40), 37 mentioned price as 
their primary concern. Six farmers reported that the cost of production is often higher 
than the price (Interviews G4 R1, G4 R8, G4 R10, G4 R11, G4 R21 & G4 R63). A 
member of a focus group in Kyengia, a KNCU primary society, mentioned that the time 
between payments is a problem, as farmers often do not know when the payment will 
come and it often does not come at the right time (Focus Group 3). Another individual 
in this focus group summarized:  
 
“The problem is the fluctuation of price. The price is low now, and the cost of 
production is too high. Buyers don't tell us the price.” (Focus Group 3)  
 
Other responses to my question about the biggest challenge to farmers referenced the 
price. Some examples included: 
 
“Price fluctuations are a big problem. Sometimes it is 4000 TSh, and then it 
drops to 3000 TSh. This is very hard for farmers.” (Interview G4 R5) 
 
“If KNCU wants all coops to be members it needs to make sure the coffee price 
is stable.” (Interview G4 R32) 
 
“The price of coffee is pulling us down. We bring our coffee [to the primary 
society] but it doesn’t get enough money.” (Interview G4 R34) 
 
“My biggest challenge is to bring the coffee to the primary society when the 
price is low, and not sell to private buyers.” (Interview G4 R62) 
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I asked the 38 farmers who were familiar with Fairtrade whether or not Fairtrade had 
increased their standard of living (Producer Questionnaire Question 38), encouraging 
them to elaborate on their yes/no answer. Of these 38 farmers, 21 said no or were 
unsure. Comments included: 
 
“I don’t feel it.” (Interview G4 R1) 
 
“In the past but not now.” (Interview G4 R20 & G4 R22) 
 
Of the 17 farmers who said yes, 8 referred to the price increase as improving their 
standard of living. Additional responses included: 
 
“We have a big amount of money now and get free knowledge from them.” 
(Interview G4 R2) 
 
“It has made a big difference.” (Interview G4 R19) 
 
“Now I can take my children to school.” (Interviews G4 R47 & R53) 
 
Optimistically, the Secretary-Manager of the Izigo primary society told me that his 
primary society was paying farmers higher prices as a result of Fairtrade (Interview G3 
R8). Farmers in this Kyengia focus group also told me that Fairtrade helps to cover the 
price when it is low; however, they also said that the price was not good and was lower 
than it had been three years ago (Focus Group 3).  Overall, the Fairtrade price does not 
appear to act as a deterrent from selling to private buyers and does not act as a barrier to 
individual exit for farmers.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
Exit is clearly an option that is available to producers when they do not feel as though 
they are achieving a voice in decision-making. This alternative may be available to 
groups, as seen in the case of the G32, or individuals, as described in the section on 
post-liberalization coffee competition. While voice can serve to strengthen collaborative 
governance, exit simply reduces participation. As loyalty may play a mitigating role by 
postponing exit, even when voice is not realized, Hirschman’s (1970) predictions to this 
effect hold true.  
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The G32 can be viewed as one type of the countervailing power that Fung and Wright 
(2003) deem essential to EPG. In this Kilimanjaro region, this oppositional force today 
exists as a challenge to KNCU and an alternative that is available to the union’s 
members. While I did not find evidence of a similar group in the other two research 
zones, Kagera and Karagwe, one can imagine that a similar situation could arise if 
farmers became unhappy with their involvement in the union. Individual sales to buyers 
are also a potential form of exit, and these sales typically depend on the coffee payment 
to farmers – whether it be higher or simply cash in hand.  
 
Finally, it does not appear as though the Fairtrade price is having a strong impact on the 
farmers belonging to Tanzania’s Fairtrade coffee unions. Unfortunately, the Fairtrade 
payment does not necessarily provide farmers with an attractive alternative to private 
buyers, mainly due to the fact the unions are unable to sell the bulk of their coffee as 
Fairtrade. 
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Chapter 7: Capacity Building as Countervailing Power 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
In this chapter I investigate the potential of capacity building, which emerged as a 
highly relevant theme during interviews, to foster countervailing power. I begin by 
exploring the capacity building that is available to individuals as both (1) farmers and 
(2) members – a dual role that is unique to the co-operative model. As farmers, access 
to training and technical assistance about coffee can lead to quality improvements 
resulting in increased yields or better prices. This is clearly important to individuals 
who depend on farming for their livelihoods. Individual capacity building may also be 
conceived of as a means of arming people with the skills and knowledge they need to 
engage more fully as members.  As seen in the case of the Kilimanjaro breakaway 
groups, this can lead to the development of a countervailing power, as required in Fung 
and Wright’s (2003) model. Along with enhanced farming skills, I explore how capacity 
building may serve to both (a) strengthen voice and retain farmers as active participants 
in collaborative governance and (b) foster exit as outlined in Chapter 6. 
 
I then move on to a consideration of capacity building for women, as producers 
frequently referenced the importance of education and training during discussions of 
female participation. Capacity building therefore emerged from interviews as essential 
to the development of female members and leaders within these co-operatives. I do not 
attempt to assess the gender impact of Fairtrade, but instead to highlight some of the 
challenges for women that capacity building might serve to address. I begin by outlining 
barriers to female participation including land ownership and cultural norms, before 
exploring the opportunities that are available to women as both members and leaders.  
  
7.2 Capacity Building for Farmers and Members 
 
In this section I explore the training or technical assistance that is provided to farmers, 
which I group under the umbrella of ‘capacity building’. Capacity building activities 
often include technical assistance, training programs, conferences, and study tours, and 
technical assistance is the most common form of capacity building (Lusthaus and 
Neilson, 2005). In the case of Tanzania’s coffee farmers, capacity building primarily 
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comprises the training and technical assistance that is provided by the union, the 
Tanzanian government, the Fairtrade system, and external organizations. These services 
may be provided to members, Board members, or managers, and I argue here that 
training for members can lead to both (1) enhanced success as farmers and (2) increased 
involvement as members. While access to training and technical assistance about coffee 
is important to individuals as farmers, as quality improvements may result in increased 
yields or better prices, it is also a means of providing people with the skills and 
knowledge they require to engage more fully as members. In this latter case, capacity 
building may be conceived of as a type of countervailing power. Countervailing power 
is about challenging those who are typically privileged in decision-making venues 
(Fung and Wright, 2003), and therefore capacity building may serve to strengthen voice 
and retain farmers as active participants in collaborative governance.  
 
At Tanzanian coffee co-operatives, the members are the owners of the business.  
Therefore, any meaningful change will require education and training at the 
membership level (Chambo, 2009). The G32’s primary societies, including Mamsera, 
provide examples of how this might happen and how access to capacity building can 
eventually lead to exit. These groups had access to capacity development through 
MEMCOOP, as outlined in Chapter 6, and as a result eventually became a 
countervailing force to the union. Prior to MEMCOOP, many initiatives had engaged in 
training and capacity building solely at the leadership level; MEMCOOP instead 
committed to shifting the focus to the members. As seen in Chapter 6, MEMCOOP 
trained the G32 members and taught them their rights as producers. As a MUCCOBS 
lecturer who was involved in this program describes:  
 
“MEMCOOP came about as a capacity building venture. The project provided 
training to members so they could realize what they want in the co-operatives 
and go about making changes.” (Interview G2 R19) 
 
The General Manager of the G32 explained that capacity building is about arming 
people with the skills and knowledge they need to meaningfully engage in their 
organizations: 
 
“We need to train [farmers] for transparency, so at the grassroots level they can 
ask and answer questions. They don’t need us to answer on their behalf. […] We 
just provide technical advice, not take power.” (Interview G2 R17) 
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While I had not originally planned to focus on capacity building as a major theme, it 
emerged as an important area of research while I was conducting Group 4 interviews 
with producers. During interviews I asked farmers about the training and technical 
assistance that they have access to in order to learn about how they might benefit from 
capacity building16 (Producer Questionnaire Q32). Of the 68 farmers I interviewed, 51 
stated that they receive training. Although unprompted, some of these farmers noted 
learning from specific individuals, including union field officers, government extension 
officers, the Board, the DCO, TACRI, and Envirocare, a local non-governmental 
organization. It should be noted, however, that farmers were often unclear about who 
these individuals providing training or technical assistance were and there were few 
clear statements about ongoing visits. The one exception to this stemmed from 
conversations with organic farmers, who receive regular visits from union extension 
officers and appear to be privileged in the delivery of training. I asked those 51 farmers 
who claimed to receive training to elaborate on the assistance that they receive, and 
these answers are provided in Table 18. 
 
Table 18: Training and Technical Assistance 
 
Response Frequency 
How to grow and tend coffee 28 
Organic methods 6 
Training as a Board member or Secretary Manager 3 
Seminars on Fairtrade 1 
Health insurance 1 
Coffee diseases 1 
 
 
Farmers also voiced concerns when I asked them to elaborate about the training that 
they receive. Some farmers stated that there is not enough training and that visits are not 
frequent enough, while others claimed that they were not learning about the right topics. 
Of particular interest is the fact that 17 farmers of the 68 interviewed (equivalent to one 
quarter of the sample) claimed that they do not receive any training whatsoever. Some 
of these individuals stated: 
 
“Seminars and training are mostly for leaders.” (Interview G4 R37)  
 
“Nobody comes to train us; this is a big problem.” (Interview G4 R55) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 I did not use the term ‘capacity building’ in farmer interviews, as the phrase is problematic and open to 
interpretation; instead I used ‘training and technical assistance’ as stated in the definition of capacity 
building that I adopt here. See Lusthaus & Neilson (2005). 
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“Not even experts come here.” (Interview G4 R58) 
 
“Leaders get training about their responsibilities but there is not much technical 
advice about coffee.” (Interview G4 R19) 
  
Five farmers mentioned that extension officers used to visit often but no longer do. A 
few responses from these individuals included: 
 
“Extension officers rarely come and when they do they visit few farms. Before 
independence every village had 1 extension officer. Now there’s 1 extension 
officer for 9 villages.” (Interview G4 R9) 
 
“Extension officers are few and can’t visit each area. At one time there were 
many; now there are few.” (Interview G4 R10) 
 
“We used to have a lot of assistance but not now.” (Interview G4 R20) 
 
When I asked farmers about the biggest challenge they face as coffee farmers (Producer 
Questionnaire Q40), nine individuals mentioned a lack of knowledge about how to grow 
quality coffee, with a few explaining: 
 
“We need more training on how to grow coffee.” (Interview G4 R26) 
 
“We need to learn more about how to dry coffee.” (Interview G4 R43) 
  
“There’s a problem with wilting disease ruining coffee trees. We don’t know 
how to cure it.” (Interview G4 R51) 
 
“Government doesn’t support us to improve agriculture.” (Interview G4 R58) 
 
It could be that farmers are also not learning about topics that they deem necessary to 
their personal development; as Chambo (2009, 11) notes, “[…] traditional member 
education and training has not given the members the right skills and knowledge of 
bringing about qualitative change in their lives through their co-operatives.” I asked 
farmers what they would like to learn (Producer Questionnaire Q32b), and their 
answers, which primarily related to improving coffee quality, are listed in Table 19 
below. 
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Table 19: Learning Interests  
 
Response Frequency 
How to grow high quality coffee/increase the price 13 
How to plant coffee seedlings 3 
How to apply herbicides and pesticides 3 
Knowledge of how to run the union 1 
Training on how to be a Board member 2 
About diseases/pests that affect coffee  1 
English language skills in order to speak to the visitors who 
come here 
1 
Animal husbandry 1 
 
I also asked farmers if there are more informal ways, such as through discussions with a 
neighbor or a friend, in which they learn (Producer Questionnaire Q33). Of the 68 
farmers I interviewed, 52 said that they learn from others, with most mentioning 
neighbours. The reasons they gave included ‘to get advice from those who are more 
successful’, ‘to share amongst ourselves’, and ‘to learn from elders’. One farmer 
explained why he thought it was common for people to learn from neighbours: 
 
“Your neighbor has the same problems. We lack access to experts.” (Interview 
G4 R58) 
 
I now move on to explore the primary stakeholders who provide capacity building 
support at the three unions. 
 
7.2.1 The Unions  
Overall I discovered that the three unions provide limited capacity building support to 
farmers. Where there is access to capacity building, it is happening primarily at the 
leadership level. An academic I interviewed felt that there should be a training fund for 
both staff and members, as this support had traditionally been confined to staff rather 
than members (Interview G2 R19). The exception to this is organic primary societies at 
all three unions, where the farmers stand to benefit from strong capacity building 
support from union field officers. As required by the organic standards of the Institute 
for Marketecology (IMO), which provides the organic certification at the three unions, 
there must be one field officer designated to every 500 organic farmers (Interview G2 
R21 & G2 R27). There is, in contrast, no similar requirement under the Fairtrade 
certification system. Producers with organic farms therefore receive more field officer 
support through the union than their non-organic counterparts do. 
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Because of this, I was curious to learn more about how unions select primary societies 
to become organic. During an interview, KNCU’s acting Agricultural Farming 
Technical Services Officer told me that they look at production levels, historical 
background, and the magnitude of chemical usage in the areas (Interview G2 R8). If 
they are satisfied that the criteria have been met, they meet with the Board of the 
primary society to introduce the idea of converting to organic, and if they agree they 
discuss with all the producers, who then vote. Once they have passed the registration 
stage, these primary societies receive one designated field officer for every 500 farmers. 
The Organic Co-ordinator at KDCU told me that they select organic primary societies 
based on high productivity (Interview G2 R27). This begs the question of whether the 
strong might be getting stronger if only the best societies are chosen for organic 
conversion. For KCU and KDCU, the conversion to organic is quite straightforward as 
the farmers use manure and compost in the Kagera region, rather than chemicals, 
already (Interview G2 R27). The barrier to going organic at all primary societies within 
these unions is the cost of certification, including the additional field officers who must 
be employed. 
 
7.2.1.1 KNCU 
During interviews with KNCU managerial staff, I was told that the union conducts 
training for members at primary societies. Key informants referenced training on 
leadership, Fairtrade standards, and gender sensitization (Interviews G2 R6, G2 R7 & 
G2 R9).  The union’s Fairtrade Liaison and Export Marketing Officer told me that they 
provide a Fairtrade seminar every year.  
 
KNCU’s Agricultural Farming Technical Services Officer is responsible for extension 
work. He explained that field officers train farmers on issues related to quality coffee, 
such as fertilizer and pruning (Interview G2 R8). At the time of research, KNCU 
employed 18 extension officers, of which 12 were assigned to the union’s 11 organic 
co-operatives. The remaining six were each responsible for between five and ten 
primary societies, and most did not have access to transport such as motorcycles. I 
interviewed KNCU’s Field Officer Supervisor on two separate occasions (Interview G2 
R35). When I first interviewed him in July 2012, he told me that KNCU was planning 
on hiring additional field officers at every primary society and expanding its capacity 
building activities. However, in a second September 2012 interview he informed me 
 180	  
that KNCU had instead decided to reduce this program in order to cut down on 
expenses; as a result, only the 11 organic primary co-operatives will continue to benefit 
from field officer visits. He expressed his disappointment at this decision, noting: 
 
“I think conventional [coffee] will die.” (Interview G2 R35)  
 
This represents a clear lack of support for and investment in capacity building on the 
part of KNCU, aside from that provided to organic farmers. 
 
7.2.1.2 KCU 
A KCU manager I interviewed cited a commitment to capacity building and policies on 
developing the careers of its staff; he provided examples related to training primary 
society leaders about accounting and supporting people in their studies in Dar es Salaam 
(Interview G2 R4). This support, however, applies to the union’s employees rather than 
farmers. At the time of research KCU had 100 extension officers, all of whom were 
entirely dedicated to organic producers; of the union’s 126 primary societies, 21 were 
organic. I asked the General Manager and Fairtrade Coordinator why there were no 
field officers for non-organic producers, to which both replied that it is too expensive to 
employ more individuals (Interviews G2 R21 & G2 R26).  
 
I had the opportunity to interview and observe the work of two field officers at KCU’s 
Izigo primary society, which is organic. These individuals were not farmers or co-
operative members, and had been hired independently by KCU. Their main job is to 
register people as organic farmers and to conduct organic inspections. This particular 
primary society comprised three villages with a total of 584 farmers and therefore two 
extension officers were required, as there must be one field officer for every 500 
farmers according to IMO standards. These officers told me that production typically 
goes up with organic conversion (Interviews G3 R9 & G3 R10), as these farmers learn 
about how to grow high-quality organic coffee. This is clearly an advantage to being 
organic. I observed these field officers for a day as they visited farms by foot (Author’s 
observations). At each farm they would begin with introductions and ask to see the 
farmer’s organic contract. One farmer was taught how to use manure, while another 
learned about how to prune with a technique known as the single branch method. 
Overall it was clear that organic farmers receive a great deal of one-on-one attention 
that their conventional counterparts are not privy to. However, this is not to say that the 
 181	  
capacity building provided to organic farmers is optimal. These field officers mentioned 
problems related to limited resources, such as a lack of motorcycles and an expectation 
that they would walk up to 50 km a day as some of the farms are located 25 km from 
their office (Interviews G3 R9 & G3 R10). One said: 
 
“The Fairtrade standards say farmers should have training, but KCU doesn't 
provide money for training. Fairtrade sends money to KCU but they don't give 
us money on time. Farmers don't get the money, so what is going on? Maybe 
then send money to buy free transport for field offices but we don't get it.” 
(Interview G3 R10) 
 
7.2.1.3 KDCU 
At KDCU, the Fairtrade and Organic Coordinator told me that the union aims to train 
every primary society and all members (Interview G2 R14). She claimed that they had 
attempted ‘train the trainer’ exercises in the past, but that these had been unsuccessful; 
as such, they hoped provide capacity building to every individual. She stated that 
training is provided to all members and primarily relates to coffee quality, Fairtrade, 
marketing, and agricultural practices. The Board also receives one training session a 
year. The General Manager told me that KDCU’s Board and management organize a 
workshop every year to teach farmers about issues such as co-op leadership, marketing, 
and Fairtrade (Interview G2 R28). He explained: 
 
“We invite all members to these meetings at the primary societies. We used to 
select representatives to take part but there was no bigger impact because they 
didn't share the information. Just a few people got the knowledge and didn't 
share it. So now we go to every primary society every year, tirelessly.” 
(Interview G2 R28) 
 
KDCU has had organic primary societies since 2010 and claims that, as in the case of 
KCU, it was easy to receive organic certification as the farmers use manure and 
compost rather than chemicals to begin. The union currently has eight primary societies 
registered as organic. As is the case at KCU, KDCU’s field officers, of whom there are 
20, deal solely with the organic primary societies (Interview G2 R14). The Organic 
Coordinator told me that the job of the field officer is to train farmers on organic 
standards, and to conduct inspections before the IMO audit (Interview G2 R27). These 
field officers visit every farm to train farmers on organic standards and conduct pre-
IMO organic audits. He noted that this could be challenging, as field officers might 
need to visit eight farms in one day on foot. However, once again the field officers were 
dedicated only to organic farmers. 
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7.2.2 Government 
Tanzania’s Coffee Industry Development Strategy aims to increase coffee production 
through enhanced productivity, including replacing old trees with improved varieties, 
applying good agricultural practices, and expanding production to new areas (TCB & 
TCA, 2012). It notes the importance of extension support in the field, claiming that this 
will be achieved through training to facilitate technology transfer (TCB & TCA, 2012).  
Under the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives, the government 
employs agronomists who work as agricultural extension officers, also known as field 
officers. These individuals are all tasked with providing technical assistance and 
training to farmers. They are meant to visit farms to provide advisory and technical 
services, such as information on the plowing and planting season, or which seed 
varieties to use to deal with coffee diseases. However, I discovered that there is a real 
lack of capacity building in practice. Overall, there appears to be a lack of clarity 
regarding exactly which State institution should take on this responsibility.  
 
While one might expect the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives to 
be highly engaged in capacity building support, this was not the case. While a KNCU 
tour guide said that extension officers visit two to three times a year (Interview G2 R2), 
others raised complaints about the lack of visits they receive from government 
extension officers. Instead, I found that most of the capacity building efforts were left to 
the Tanzanian Coffee Research Institute (TaCRI), previously introduced in Chapter 3. 
TaCRI primarily exists to breed disease-resistant coffee varieties and the organization 
sells these seedlings to coffee farmers, sets up demonstration farms on productivity and 
quality improvement, and provides training to coffee farmers. In an interview with a 
TaCRI manager, I learned that productivity has decreased overall in Tanzania 
(Interview G2 R32). However, TaCRI believes that they have solved this problem as 
they now have 15 improved Arabica varieties that are resistant to Coffee Berry Disease 
(CBD) and Coffee Leaf Rust (CLR), as well as four Robusta varieties resistant to 
Coffee Wilt Disease (CWD). TaCRI works through farmer groups and claims to have 
trained over 300,000 farmers since 2001, of an estimated total of 500,000 coffee 
farming families in Tanzania (Interview G2 R32). In Old Moshi I was told that TACRI 
provides education for better crops, nurseries, and new seedlings, coming out to visit the 
nurseries and producers’ farms (Interview G3 R4). The General Manager of KCU was 
the Chairman of TaCRI at the time of research and stated in an interview: 
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“TaCRI does a lot of work that other government departments, such as the 
Ministry [of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives] and the DCO, should 
be doing.” (Interview G2 R26) 
 
I was interested in learning more about why the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security 
and Cooperatives, was not fulfilling this capacity building role. While in Moshi, I had 
the opportunity to interview the DCO, DALDO, and DCSMS, who are housed within 
the Ministry, as outlined in Chapter 3, and who are responsible for the Ministry’s 
extension officers. The DALDO oversees all agricultural activities including the 
government’s agricultural extension officers, also known as field officers (Interview G2 
R34). For his district of Moshi, there are 162 field officers, 112 specializing in 
agricultural crops and 50 who deal with livestock. The DCOs visit primary societies to 
share information about co-operative law. During an interview the DCO explained some 
of the challenges that he faces: there are not enough field officers to visit farmers at the 
primary societies, financial resources are lacking, and fuel and transport are a problem 
(Interview G2 R33). The Tanzania Coffee Board (TCB) provided coffee extension 
services until the early 1980s, but this is now the responsibility of the local government 
authorities (TCB & TCA, 2012). This is considered problematic, however, as the 
quality of these services varies across areas, they are often under-staffed, and may lack 
coffee husbandry expertise (TCB & TCA, 2012). 
 
Overall it appears as though TaCRI may be, in its limited capacity, filling an important 
gap that the government’s extension officers are unable to contribute to despite their 
stated aims. The DCSMS I interviewed explained that they work closely with TaCRI, 
operating through TaCRI’s coffee farmer groups and coffee nurseries (Interview G2 
R37). A TaCRI manager also said this is because there are not enough government 
extension officers due to a lack of money for motorcycles and fuel (Interview G2 R32). 
The Fairtrade Coordinator at KCU (Interview G2 R21) stated: 
 
“The government should have field officers but they don't really here.” 
 
7.2.3 Fairtrade 
Capacity building efforts are required by the Fairtrade system and should therefore be 
an essential feature at every union. The Fairtrade standards for small producers require 
training on coffee production (related to handling pesticides, pest management, and 
more) as well as co-operative membership. According to standard 4.2.1.1 (Fairtrade 
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International, 2011e), by their third year of certification organizations “must provide 
training to your members on internal mechanisms to facilitate their control over your 
administration” and the accompanying guidance notes claims that this “will increase 
members’ understanding and awareness of operations enabling them to participate more 
actively in your administration.”  
 
FLO uses Liaison Officers (LOs) for the purpose of capacity building. It employed 52 
LOs globally in 2012 through its Producer Services and Relations Unit (PSR) (Fairtrade 
International, 2012a), with six LOs in East Africa, three of whom were located in 
Kenya. While I expected to hear a great deal about capacity building efforts, I was 
instead surprised to learn that efforts are concentrated primarily at the organizational 
level. During the course of this research I discovered that there is no LO in Tanzania, 
despite the fact that Tanzania is the largest nation of Fairtrade producers in the world 
(FLO 2012 M&E). Instead, the Kenya representative is charged with visiting Tanzania’s 
producers. I was curious to learn more about why FLO had not allocated LOs in 
Tanzania, and interviewed the Head of the African PSR (Interview G1 R16). He 
explained that LOs are allocated according to organizations, rather than individuals. The 
rationale for this is that FLO works at the organizational level, and therefore must 
allocate its resources according to the number of Fairtrade Certified organizations in a 
given country. He explained: 
 
“This is because the core focus is certification, which happens at the 
organizational level.” (Interview G1 R16) 
 
However, a focus on certification and passing Fairtrade audits does not necessarily 
equate to capacity building. While meeting Fairtrade standards is clearly essential to 
ensuring that producer organizations remain members of the system, this is not so much 
about capacity building as it is about meeting the audit criteria. FLO could be doing 
more to support farmers with the training and technical assistance that they clearly 
desire. Unfortunately, the umbrella body may be moving in the opposite direction. In 
2012-2013, the PSR was in the process of downsizing, according to the Head of the 
African PSR when I interviewed him in late 2012 (Interview G1 R16).  He stated: 
 
“The structure and mandate of the LOs has changed. Currently, FLO provides 
free follow-up services post-audit and is the only ethical label that does. But 
because of financial realities it is now questioning these free services. FLO's 
policies are being affected right now.” (Interview G1 R16) 
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A few individuals I spoke with mentioned LO visits. While various union managers and 
leader spoke highly of their LO (Interviews G2 R5, G2 R7 & G2 R14), a KCU manager 
queried why there was not an LO in Tanzania (Interview G2 R5). Similarly, while the 
KDCU Fairtrade Manager told me that the LO from Kenya comes to visit frequently 
(Interview G2 R14), which I had not anticipated given their remote location, the union’s 
General Manager said: 
 
“We need our own Liaison Officer here in Tanzania.” (Interview G2 R12) 
 
Producer organizations may decide to use their Fairtrade premiums for capacity 
building efforts, as found in previous research with Fairtrade Peruvian cocoa farmers 
(Sutton, 2010). It is up to producer organizations to determine how the premium can 
best be used to meet their needs; therefore, producers may elect to spend this money on 
activities related to capacity building such as training and technical assistance. As 
outlined in Chapter 5, farmers at KCU and KDCU democratically determine how to use 
their premiums funds and projects linked to capacity building have included extension 
support, quality improvement, diplomas, and equipment purchases. At the time of 
research, however, there was no similar evidence at KNCU as all premiums were being 
used at the union level. 
 
7.2.4 Other External Organizations 
ATOs and other organizations occasionally visit these unions and provide capacity 
building support. World Vision was present at many of KCU and KDCU’s primary 
societies (Author’s observations) and Oxfam Belgium was working with some primary 
societies in Bukoba (Interview G2 R24). The Export Manager at KCU told me that 
buyers used to visit KCU often to meet with producers but rarely do anymore (Interview 
G2 R5). He said that he was keen to figure out why this had changed and alluded to 
buyers only being interested in purchasing coffee, rather than developing relationships 
as they did when KCU first joined Fairtrade. An individual at KCU claimed: 
 
“[External organizations] visit us. Next week there's a German group coming. 
TechnoServe comes to look at coffee quality and markets, transparency. But they 
don't run any projects here.” (Interview G2 R25) 
 
Another KCU manager stated: 
  
“People don’t really come to visit anymore.” (Interview G2 R21) 
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I heard about visits from one organization in particular, Twin Trading, while at all three 
unions (Interview G2 R21 & G2 R27). Twin Trading has been involved with all three 
groups, and at KCU I learned about training that Twin Trading organized for farmers at 
20 primary societies in past years. I had the opportunity to interview two key informants 
from Cafédirect, a UK-based ATO that used to be part of Twin Trading, in their London 
office (Interviews G1 R10 and R11). Cafédirect has purchased from KNCU, KCU and 
KDCU since the 1990s. One of these key informants referred to the unions as “partners, 
not just suppliers.” (Interview G1 R11) Cafédirect has set us a Producer Partnership 
Program that provides capacity building for producers. One respondent explained:  
 
“[I]n order to really have a more sustainable business model, we need to build 
capacity and capabilities of these organizations and their members so that they 
themselves become more independent businesses in their own right.’ This feeds 
back as a win-win to Cafédirect because they become more reliable partners 
and produce better quality, on time.” (Interview G1 R11) 
 
The TCB works with some external agencies to improve the coffee sector in Tanzania, 
through capacity building in many cases, and Café Africa, a Swiss non-profit 
organization, is one such example. I interviewed Café Africa’s Country Manager, who 
told me that a private consortium called the Coffee Partnership for Tanzania, with major 
funding, would soon be underway (Interview G2 R36). She noted that this group would 
aim to address some of the issues unearthed by a large-scale stakeholder analysis 
conducted by Café Africa, such as farmers’ complaints that all the coffee institutions are 
in Moshi and do not engage in adequate consultation with the farmers, as well as a lack 
of access to training and technical assistance (Interview G2 R36). She also stated that 
Robusta farmers, in particular, tend to get forgotten in these discussions that typically 
center on Arabica coffee. She highlighted the challenge of adding new institutions and 
programs without first addressing some of these problems.  
 
While there were no examples of external organizations at Mamsera, G32 groups had 
benefitted from partnership with the NGO EnviroCare, who provided skills 
development on economics and administration at several primary societies as well as 
training through the Tanzanian NGO Umati, funded by its Japanese buyer Zensho. 
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7.3 Capacity Building and Female Participation 
 
I raise the link between capacity building and female participation here, as producers 
frequently referred to education and training in response to my questions about women 
in co-operatives. Training for women, who might not otherwise have the opportunity to 
actively participate in their co-operatives, might be conceived of as a type of 
countervailing power if they have more of a voice in co-operative governance as a 
result. While I did not find any examples in this research, the women’s committees that 
Marjurin (2012) encounters in her study on East African co-operatives provide strong 
examples of countervailing power.  
 
Recent research on co-operatives in the global South has identified how the benefits of 
co-operative membership for women can be both monetary and non-monetary. 
Ferguson and Kepe (2011) find that women in Uganda report improved levels of 
confidence and negotiating skills, and preliminary findings in Hannan’s (2013) research 
on Kenyan dairy farmers emphasize the important role of co-operatives in providing 
access to training and agricultural expertise for women. A comprehensive ILO 
publication on women and co-operatives in East Africa, including a focus on Tanzania, 
outlines how joining a cooperative “offers a means of exercising voice and accessing 
leadership roles that would otherwise not be open to women.” (Marjurin, 2012, i) In 
Latin America and Asia, there are also examples of women’s organizations within co-
operatives, which exist to promote female participation and development in member 
organizations (Rawlings and Shaw, 2013).  
 
In the EPG model, Fung and Wright (2003) primarily view equity as an institutional 
objective, or as a means to an end - with the end being stronger institutions. For this 
purpose, they highlight the importance of including disadvantaged individuals who are 
typically left out of deliberative group decision-making. They assert that this establishes 
new channels of voice for issues that concern participants, and that the quality of this 
participation may in turn be higher. Gender equity is one such example, and in this 
section I assess female participation. A key informant at FLO explained Fairtrade’s role 
and objectives in facilitating female participation, referencing voice:  
 
“We’ve got to recognize that co-operatives operate within the social norms of 
their countries, and we know many of those norms are male-dominated. We’re 
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not going to change that, but we can make sure that we get the female voice 
through. We also know through international development best practices that 
investing in women has an impact on poverty alleviation, which is what 
Fairtrade is about. Whilst on the one hand we know we’re not going to change 
social norms, what we have to try and do through our standards is make sure 
that we’re encouraging transparency and democracy, and make it clear that we 
expect female representation.” (Interview G1 R10) 
 
One challenge for co-operatives is that they differ from other businesses and face a dual 
challenge in terms of gender. They need to achieve gender equity as both (i) enterprises 
with management structures (ii) member-based organizations (Rawlings and Shaw, 
2013). The unions in this study are also part of the Fairtrade system. As Fairtrade 
organizations, the FLO standards include basic criteria on non-discrimination that 
address gender, as per the ILO standards (Fairtrade International, 2011e). In 2013, FLO 
was also in the process of developing a gender strategy – clearly much-needed as a 2013 
meta-analysis of the Fairtrade literature identifies a “lack of explicit gender strategies 
and implementation policies among Fairtrade institutions and producer and worker 
organizations.” (Smith, 2013, 103) This review identified a clear need for research on 
Fairtrade and gender, developing a conceptual framework for future work on the 
gendered effects of Fairtrade (Smith, 2013).  
 
7.3.1 Barriers to Participation for Women 
There are inequalities between women and men in most societies, related to their 
household roles, responsibilities, and decision-making opportunities (Smith, 2013). This 
is particularly true in the case of agricultural assets, which tend to be male-owned. 
Despite the ICA’s first principle on gender equity, gender is a governance challenge at 
many of the co-operatives studied; levels of female participation are low and co-
operatives tend to be male-dominated. Women face many barriers to co-operative 
membership in Tanzania, and the barriers raised by respondents related primarily to 
land, culture, and household responsibilities.  
 
Land ownership is not technically a requirement for co-operative membership in 
Tanzania, although members must own coffee trees; women can therefore, in theory, 
grow coffee on land leased from their husbands (Interview G2 R7). However, it is 
common for men to have privileged access to land in rural areas in the global South and 
Fairtrade may therefore be biased towards men to begin with (Smith, 2013). While 
women could not own land in Tanzania until nearly the twenty-first century, the 
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country’s 1999 Land Act and Village Land Act17 permitted them equal access to land 
(Sundet, 2005). Gender activists lobbied for the inclusion of equality in this Act and one 
of this law’s fundamental principles (Section 3 (2)) is “the right of every woman to 
acquire, hold, use, and deal with, land shall to the same extent and subject to the same 
restrictions be treated as a right of any man.” (The United Republic of Tanzania, 1999) 
Despite this, for the most part there does not seem to have been a change in attitudes or 
practices. Men remain the typical landowners in Tanzania, and as coffee co-operative 
membership is limited to those who own the coffee plants, co-operative members tend 
to be men. As such, co-operative decisions are primarily taken by men, and women are 
often not eligible to participate in decision-making processes (Nippierd, 2001). This is 
despite the fact that women are predominantly responsible for coffee growing and care. 
Unfortunately, this is not unusual in the Fairtrade system as its focus on export crops 
can be biased towards men (Smith, 2013). Various interview and focus group 
respondents explained the challenge of land access for women in Tanzania: 
 
“Women who own land are widows. It is not practised for women and men in 
the same house to own land.” (Focus Group 1) 
 
“There are not many women because women don't own farms. The husband can 
give his wife land but few do.” (Focus Group 3) 
 
“A husband needs to be dead for a woman to have an identification card.” 
 (Interview G2 R7) 
 
One academic explained that land in Tanzanian is typically passed down to sons rather 
than daughters, due to patrilineal customs: 
 
“This is an ethnic/customary issue. It’s based on tradition. Land goes to the son. 
If it is given to the daughter land will shift to the other family and there will be 
conflict between her and the cousins or brothers.” (Interview G2 R19) 
 
In recent years there have been some union-led initiatives aimed at encouraging men to 
give their wives some of their land for coffee growing. This could allow women to get 
their own identification numbers and become members of the co-operative.  
Respondents explained: 
 
“Women have different identification numbers if they divide land with their 
husband, but this is rare.” (Focus Group 1)  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 For a detailed overview of the 1999 Land Act, see Sundet (2005). 
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“Some men won't give them part of the land so they can become members. They 
don't understand that this is important; only a few do. Land belongs to men. 
Even if they give it to women it still belongs to men.” (Interview G3 R1) 
 
 “It is not possible to give land to women, according to tradition. So we are 
campaigning. Just give your wife 2 to 3 bags [of coffee] so she can become a 
member and have a right to vote.” (Interview G2 R14) 
 
Culture, including gender-based norms and practices, also plays a strong role in 
determining coffee ownership and therefore co-operative membership. A meta-review 
of gender in the Fairtrade literature finds that gender norms can reinforce inequalities 
and create barriers to participation in organizations for women (Smith, 2013). I found 
this to be true in the case of Tanzania, despite the fact that women are primarily 
responsible for tending to coffee. Interview responses to my question about female 
membership that referred to the role of culture and gender norms included: 
 
“Any Tanzanian can own land, but tribal and cultural factors limit women. We 
are trying to attract more women.” (Interview G2 R12) 
 
 “No there are few [women]. This is because of the culture and traditions of this 
area.” (Focus Group 1) 
  
“Men are barriers, because there are so many of them.” (Interview G3 R13) 
 
“Women can't have [a membership card] and a husband at the same time.” 
(Focus Group 3) 
 
“If you take coffee to the primary society, it's under the husband's name and he 
gets to vote. Even though the women take care of the farms, family and 
everything. A husband needs to be dead for a woman to have [a membership] 
card.” (Interview G2 R7) 
 
It is not uncommon for women to perform the majority of the work at Fairtrade coffee 
co-operatives; research in Latin America on Mexican and Guatemalan co-operatives has 
similarly shown that women often perform much more coffee labour than men (Lyon et 
al., 2010). The Chairman of the KNCU Board explained that women do 75 per cent of 
the coffee-related work: tilling the farm, putting manure down, picking coffee, and 
washing coffee - everything except pruning, which is considered a ‘man’s job’ 
(Interview G2 R31). Another key informant explained that women process and harvest 
the coffee, while men get the money (Interview G2 R6). A KNCU manager described 
the gender divide in the Kilimanjaro region: 
 
“It's the background of Chagga men. Women take care of the farm. But the 
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husband is the owner of the coffee when it's time to sell.” (Interview G2 R7) 
 
Another academic explained: 
 
“The co-operative business is the man's business in Tanzania. They are the 
owners of the home. It takes time to change this. Coffee is sensitive. You're 
talking about man's work. Women have a big input so they should own it too. 
Both women and men participate from the beginning. But when it comes to 
reaping, it belongs to men. For men, this is 'my property'.” (Interview G2 R11) 
 
The DCO stated that men also tend to dominate the meetings:  
 
“Any meeting in our communities, men are many. Maybe because of tradition. 
Men take care of coffee. Inheritance is for men, not for women. Coffee means 
cash. Cash is only for men. But women do a lot of work. (Interview G2 R23) 
 
I asked members of an all-female focus group (Focus Group 2) why it is good for 
women to be members of co-operatives. Their responses included: 
 
“Women are more responsible for the family and take care of the coffee. We do 
all the work.”  
 
“All the work is done by women. We prune and pick.”  
 
“It is the woman who runs the farm.”  
 
“Women take care of everything that has to do with coffee. I have to stay at 
home to take care of the children and the coffee.”  
 
“Men are not at home all day. They have other business. My husband is in Dar 
es Salaam right now. He is always moving around doing business.”  
 
Women in Tanzanian have many household responsibilities including child rearing, 
food preparation, and water collection, which may challenge their ability to participate 
as active co-operative members. This is not uncommon, as women in many societies are 
responsible for reproductive activities including food preparation and childrearing 
(Smith, 2013). Fairtrade certification requirements may even intensify this workload, 
adding to women’s work burden (Smith, 2013). As respondents explained:  
 
“Women must stay at home to take care of the house.” (Focus Group 3)  
 
“We need time for children, time to go to the farm. When the load becomes too 
heavy, I need assistance.” (Focus Group 2) 
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“I’m told when a woman is given land to farm she must be able to do it all 
herself. Also take care of the house and take the children to school, but how can 
she do it all? Some of them are not interested.” (Interview G2 R19) 
 
Traditionally, women in Tanzania have taken care of banana crops, while men have 
been predominantly responsible for coffee (Interview G2 R7). However, in recent years 
the price of bananas has increased and men have become more involved in the crop. As 
respondents explained: 
 
“Bananas were always for women, but now the price of a banana is increasing 
and the men say 'Today that banana is mine because the price is higher.'” 
(Interview G2 R7) 
 
“There is an unwritten regulation among the Chaggas that land and coffee 
belong to men. Banana plantations and other products grown there have always 
been for women. But now banana as a business is changing peoples’ lives, 
because the price is so good. Now men also demand part of the banana 
proceeds.” (Interview G2 R19) 
 
7.3.2 Female Members 
Within global Fairtrade, approximately 73 per cent of the members in SPOs are male 
(Fairtrade International, 2011d). In most African countries women represent less than 
30 per cent of members and account for a very low share of managers and elected 
leaders, and in the Kilimanjaro region, where KNCU is located, this drops to 9.4 per 
cent (Marjurin, 2012).  In their research on a KNCU primary society, Donge and 
Mbeiyererwa (2011) found that female membership was low and attributed this to 
socio-economic factors including gender norms. In her paper on the gender impact of 
Fairtrade, Smith (2013) asserts that it is essential to attract more female members within 
organizations and to provide them with improved access to services, training, and 
markets as well as an enhanced voice in decision-making within their organizations. 
However, she identifies a vicious circle whereby “the male bias of SPOs and 
concomitant lack of gender-aware policies and services itself acts as a disincentive to 
women to participate, as they do not see the organisation acting in their interests.” 
(Smith, 2013, 110) 
 
During interviews, I asked an open-ended question about whether there are many 
female members in the co-operative, as well as why or why not (Producer Questionnaire 
Q29). Of the 68 producers I interviewed, 36 said that there were many women. Most of 
these affirmative responses were at KCU and KDCU, whereas only four of 28 
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respondents at KNCU said yes. While some respondents said that more and more 
women are joining (Interview G4 R1, G4 R60 & G4 R62), others claimed that the only 
female members are widows who receive the farms from their late husbands (Interview 
G3 R37). Some respondents noted how essential training might be to this: 
 
“Educated men will sometimes give women land, but there is not much 
training.” (Interview G4 R25) 
 
 “I got the coffee from my husband but he died and I don’t know how to plant.” 
(Interview G4 R62) 
 
During an all-women focus group with female members of a KNCU primary society I 
had the opportunity to ask women if they contribute to the discussion in meetings. They 
all responded that they do at times, which supports the findings on bottom-up 
participation outlined in Chapter 6. However, they elaborated: 
 
“We are given the opportunity to speak so we do sometimes. But it is mostly men 
who speak. Mostly men attend [the meetings].” (Focus Group 2) 
 
“We should be given training. We were not given training. Maybe KNCU can 
give us training.” (Focus Group 2) 
 
In my interviews with co-operative managers and leaders, a few referenced the need to 
ensure capacity building for women and mentioned a lack of confidence among women. 
The General Manager of KCU highlighted the importance of teaching women skills, 
such as public speaking, so that they might gain the confidence to participate in 
discussions: 
 
“We are thinking of starting a project to empower women. We want to teach 
them how to talk in public, as they're currently very shy. We have 375 delegates 
at the KCU AGM, so for a woman to speak up is difficult.” (Interview G2 R26) 
 
The Export and Fairtrade Liaison Officer at KNCU conducts seminars every year at the 
primary society level and claims that she includes topics on gender sensitization and 
‘the importance of having female members’ (Interview G2 R7). She explained that in 
the past men did not like to have female leaders, which may have acted as a barrier to 
female membership, and that it is therefore important to educate both men and women. 
She stated: 
 
“We need to encourage women so that they can have the courage. We need 
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training for women to become members. Right now many of them don't have the 
courage to become members.” (Interview G2 R7) 
 
The male General Manager at KDCU claimed that there had been a very big 
improvement in gender equity in the region in recent years. He attributed this to a series 
of workshops in 2005 on organizational strengthening. He also added that every job 
advert states that women are highly encouraged to apply (Interview G2 R28). The 
union’s Export Manager outlined gender equity sensitization projects, asserting that 
KDCU is trying to attract more women as members and leaders (Interview G2 R12). 
KDCU had recently recruited 11 Field Officers, five of whom are women (Interview G2 
R28). KDCU’s General Manager stated:  
 
“So there's an improvement. When you go to members there's a cultural issue 
(just like Bukoba). The man is the spokesman of the family. So he owns 
everything, including coffee. The wife and children are represented through a 
man's membership. Now we do sensitization to get men to give women coffee 
and now women are more involved. It's still lower than we'd like, but better than 
in the past.” (Interview G2 R28) 
 
There is clearly optimism among both key informants and members that capacity 
building may serve to attract new female members, as well as to provide current female 
members with the skills they require to participate effectively. 
 
7.3.3 Women as Leaders and Managers 
The ILO Promotion of Cooperatives, 2002 (No. 193) states that “special consideration 
should be given to increasing women’s participation in the cooperative movement at all 
levels, particularly at management and leadership levels.” (Marjurin, 2012) In a meta-
review of the literature on gender and co-operative leadership, Rawlings and Shaw 
(2013) identify a consensus in the literature on the developed world that there are 
benefits to having gender equity and diverse Boards. As an example, in their study on 
co-operative Boards in Norway, Matsa and Miller (2010) found that having equal 
numbers of men and women on the Board meant that decisions were more balanced. 
Depite this, women often still tend to be generally underrepresented in leadership 
positions, as a 2012 study of trade unions in the UK and US illustrated (Kirton and 
Healy, 2012). This study identified barriers for women including the gendered division 
of domestic work, the nature of trade union work, and the masculine culture that exists 
at many unions. Studies in Ireland and Italy also recognized time commitments at home 
as the main barrier to active participation for women (Rawlings and Shaw, 2013) and 
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Rawlings (2007) found that women in the UK co-operative movement reported that 
home responsibilities often kept them from advancing up the career ladder. Aside from 
these few studies, there is a disappointing lack of academic research on gender and 
leadership in co-operatives. However, Marjurin’s (2012) recent work in East Africa 
outlines how Ugandan efforts to promote women’s participation at the Board level are 
having an impact. In Malawi there have also been policies aimed at encouraging women 
to join Boards, and the success of these female leaders appears to be encouraging 
further participation from female members (Vicari and Borda-Rodriguez, 2013). 
 
I asked women in an all-female Kilimanjaro focus group if it was good for women to be 
leaders (Focus Group 2). They all said that it was, and replied with:  
 
“Women are more responsible for the family and take care of the coffee; we do 
all the work.” (Interview G2 R13) 
 
“It's important to have women in leadership positions because we are 
trustworthy and hard workers. Men are barriers, because there are so many of 
them. But they support us when they see us do well.” (Interview G3 R13)  
 
A female leader, who was the chairperson in Kyengia, KNCU, said: 
 
“When women are promoted it is felt by the whole family. We need seminars and 
training for women leaders. It is difficult to become the female chairperson. 
More training will help us. If I get more training I can do better.” (Interview G3 
R1) 
 
Similarly, A KNCU manager stated: 
 
"We are trying to sensitize them to tell them that when they have an election they 
need to encourage women. We have 4 women who are chairs of primary 
societies but it's still few. But KNCU has improved and are also improving the 
number of women on the primary society Boards. However, there's still no 
woman on the KNCU Board, and there never has been.” (Interview G2 R7) 
 
Within Fairtrade, women are much less likely to act as leaders and managers than their 
male counterparts are (Le Mare, 2008, Lyon et al., 2010, Nelson and Pound, 2009, 
Nelson and Smith, 2011, Ronchi, 2002, Smith, 2010a, Smith, 2010b, Smith, 2013). 
Given the previously outlined barriers to female membership, it is not surprising that 
there are few female leaders and managers at Tanzanian co-operatives. Any woman 
interested in running for the Board requires her own membership identification number, 
which is clearly a problem for many women. In order to act as a leader or manager, 
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individuals must also be able to read and write. As I outlined in Chapter 5, this can limit 
many women who might otherwise be interested in leadership opportunities. A few 
respondents explained: 
 
“You must at least be educated to be a leader. Capacity is a problem. You need 
at least Standard 7. There are no customs that limit us, we just need education.” 
(Interview G4 R18) 
 
“Most of [the women] are not educated so they don’t see the importance. Even 
at meetings only a few will raise their hands.” (Interview G4 R35) 
 
“I’m not educated so I wouldn’t do it. Maybe my children.” (Interview G4 R34) 
 
“Women should be given training and education. Women should not stay at the 
back behind men. After that education we will have more women as leaders.” 
(Interview G4 R14, female) 
 
I would like more education to become a leader.” (Interview G4 G13)  
 
Some members claimed that women simply do not aspire to these positions, or 
referenced household responsibilities as a barrier. Additional reasons, although they did 
not come up during interviews, could include lower confidence levels or cultural 
attitudes towards women’s leadership abilities (Marjurin, 2012). I spoke with members 
of an all-female focus group about women in leadership. When asked to elaborate about 
whether or not there were women in leadership positions, they provided answers related 
to motivation, availability, and education: 
 
“They are not motivated. They do not aspire to these positions. Also they are 
busy in the house. This might be one of the reasons.” (Focus Group 1, male) 
 
“Sometimes when it's time to take the election I am at home working.” 
(Interview G4 R14, female) 
 
Despite this, I discovered a clear interest in accessing capacity building that might lead 
to opportunities for leadership. In response to a focus group question about what they 
would most like to learn, one woman responded:  
 
“More education to become a leader and about the importance of being 
leaders.” (Focus Group 2) 
 
Also, in response to my interview question about why they joined the co-operative, 
(Producer Questionnaire Q16) one woman said: 
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“Other women encouraged me. I want to be on the Board.” (Interview G4 R27) 
 
Given the importance of culture and tradition, I asked women in a focus group (Focus 
Group 2) if their husbands would encourage them to be leaders. Of these six women, 
four said no. I asked them to elaborate and responses included: 
 
“My husband wants me to stay home and take care of the family.” (Interview G4 
R16) 
 
“My husband wants me to feed the animals at home.” (Interview G4 R17) 
 
The women who said yes explained: 
 
“Before the husbands said the women should stay home, but not now.” 
(Interview G4 R15) 
 
 “My husband supported me to run, but when I looked at the schedule I had no 
time.” (Interview G4 R18) 
 
Quota systems, which allocate a minimum number of seats for female Board members, 
have been implemented in several European countries in recent years, although the 
evidence to date is mixed (Rawlings and Shaw, 2013). More relevant to this research on 
Tanzania is the fact that Kenya imposed a new State constitution in 2012 that requires 
women to make up one third of all elected bodies; this resulted in over 15,000 women 
joining co-operative Boards for the first time (Rawlings and Shaw, 2013). 
Unfortunately, this is not accompanied by widespread training and there are fears that 
women will not have the skills, knowledge, and confidence to act as Board members 
and may be unable to fulfill the requirements (Rawlings and Shaw, 2013). Similar 
measures within the co-operative movement, as opposed to through legal requirements, 
have been undertaken in Uganda, with more encouraging results (Rawlings and Shaw, 
2013). However, Smith (2013) warns that measures such as these can result in trivial 
changes, such as the inclusion of women on Boards, without any transformations in 
their influence or status. For this reason, Marjurin (2012) notes that quotas must be 
accompanied by efforts to build the capacity of potential female leaders. 
 
KCU had a quota system in place within its union Board, and claimed to ‘recommend’ 
to primary societies that they should also have one female Board member in place. 
According to one manager:  
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“Things have changed in Tanzania; we have female [Members of Parliament] 
now. But it takes time. A woman can do the same job as a man. In Tanzania we 
have a lot of women who are managers. In the past, women couldn't even read.” 
(Interview G2 R4) 
 
At the G32, the joint initiative of primary societies that separated from KNCU in 2003, 
there was still a lack of female participation. I was told: 
 
“The problem is that education is low. A number of women are not ready to be 
challenged by the public, even if they have education. We need more training 
and encouragement for [women] to participate in leadership. It’s to give them 
more encouragement to face the challenges.” (Interview G2 R17) 
 
7.3.4 Signs of Change 
While there are clearly many barriers for women in Tanzania, primarily related to land, 
culture, and household responsibilities, there are, optimistically, signs of change. This 
was particularly true at KCU and KDCU, where members seemed more knowledgeable 
about land ownership opportunities for women, and the importance of including women 
as members and leaders. There were also female Board members at the union level in 
these two cases, while KNCU had never had a female Board member. Some 
respondents at these unions referred to the impact of education on gender and land 
ownership issues, including: 
 
“At the beginning because of male dominance [women] couldn’t own property. 
Now because of education men are starting to know that women can own land. 
Also the law has changed.” (Interview G4 R31) 
 
“Not as many women as men, but there are more now because people are more 
educated. The Board chair educated people.” (Interview G4 R33) 
 
“There are more because members were educated about gender issues. In 
previous years men were alone. But now because of education women are 
coming.” (Interview G4 R64) 
 
“Female membership has increased since men are getting educated on the 
importance of giving their wives coffee trees. They learn from KDCU. Now they 
give women coffee.” (Interview G3 R14) 
 
I interviewed a female chairwoman at KDCU who had recently been elected to KDCU’s 
Board. She stated:  
 
“I was chosen and elected. I competed with men. They chose me because I'm 
trustworthy, and this is why they re-elect me. It's important to have women in 
 199	  
leadership positions because we are trustworthy and hard workers.” (Interview 
G3 R13) 
 
In a Kasharu focus group in KCU, respondents told me that there were many women in 
their primary society. I asked if this was a good thing, and received the following 
responses (Focus Group 5): 
 
“The founders were men but we've been motivated that, to be a good 
cooperative, men and women should share property (land). Not half-half yet but 
we are getting there. We are motivated.”  
 
“It started with a female Board member and a Secretary-Manager and we saw 
that it was good. So now we want equality.”  
 
Although not as obvious, there were some signs of increased female participation in 
KNCU as well. A manager at KNCU said: 
 
"We have been doing some sensitization for the women to become members. In 
our area the custom is that the land is for the man so the coffee tree is for the 
man. It is a really hard job to sensitize the man to allow the woman to become a 
member of the society. But we are doing our best.” (Interview G2 R9) 
 
As a Kibosho Central focus group member explained when I asked if there were many 
female members: 
 
“At the beginning, coffee was only for men. Now that we have education about 
gender equality, women begin to turn up.” (Focus Group 1) 
 
Some women in Kilimanjaro stated that their husbands had agreed to share land with 
them. As a member of a Kibosho Central focus group with women stated: 
 
“I talked to my husband and he agreed to share his land. Some men agree, 
others don’t. If only men have land there won’t be gender equity.” (Focus Group 
2) 
 
The best example I found, however, was at Mamsera – the primary society that left 
KNCU in 2003 and is completely independent today. Mamsera’s Secretary-Manager is 
a woman who is viewed as a strong leader. At this independent primary society, 
individuals claimed that male dominance is changing because people are being trained 
and learning that women have equal rights. Despite this, there are still issues that limit 
the opportunities available to women, and one of them was the role of the government. 
As one respondent explained: 
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“At last election we were supposed to have 50 per cent women on the Board, but 
many women didn't meet the criteria. You need to be a member and pay all 
shares. The District Cooperative Officer makes this decision.”  (Focus Group 4) 
 
This again indicates that government officials may be over-stepping their boundaries 
rather than ensuring independence and autonomy at these organizations. Without a shift 
away from the country’s parastatal history, any type of change will be slow to come. 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
 
From these findings, capacity building appears to be key to the development of 
individuals as farmers, members, and leaders. Access to training and technical 
assistance can lead to improved farming, deepened member engagement, and access to 
leadership opportunities for those who seek them out. Capacity building therefore may 
serve to give individuals a voice within decision-making - both in the case of members 
as well as, more specifically, women. Women face many challenges within their co-
operatives, and capacity building can serve to address some of these. Capacity building 
is therefore visibly a means for individuals to achieve more of a voice in decision-
making, and may be conceived of as a type of countervailing power.  
 
Unfortunately I discovered that very little capacity building is provided to individuals at 
these co-operatives. This is despite the fact that respondents expressed a clear interest in 
accessing opportunities for training in order to learn more about farming, become more 
involved as members, and, in some cases, become leaders. The unions provide limited 
capacity building support to farmers; where there is access to capacity building, it is 
happening primarily at the leadership level or with organic farmers. There is also a real 
lack of capacity building provided by the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and 
Cooperatives despite its stated aims – a gap which TaCRI is trying to address in its 
limited capacity. In terms of Fairtrade, FLO’s capacity building efforts are concentrated 
primarily at the organizational level, as LOs are allocated according to organization. 
The unions, the government, the Fairtrade system, and external organizations could 
therefore play a more active role in providing members with training and technical 
assistance. This could in turn lead to higher-quality coffee as well as an enhanced voice 
in decision-making for members.   
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Chapter 8: Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis has sought to contribute to the literature on Fairtrade co-operatives. The 
broad aim has been to explore individual participation in governance through a detailed 
exploration of Tanzanian unions. Above all, I have aimed to answer the main research 
question: How does Fairtrade give producers a voice in decision-making? This research 
question has allowed me to contribute to knowledge of Fairtrade’s impact on 
governance by unpacking what is meant by ‘voice’, while at the same disentangling the 
role of the co-operative model and the Fairtrade system in facilitating or impeding good 
governance. The previous three findings chapters have demonstrated the complexity of 
assessing genuine participation in decision-making at the level of the primary society 
and the union, and the research question has allowed me to explore some of the 
challenges of participatory governance as well as the role that Fairtrade might play in 
facilitating good governance through voice in decision-making. By framing the 
methodology according to existing literature on collaborative governance (Fung and 
Wright, 2003) and exit, voice, and loyalty (Hirschman, 1970), I have used a multiple 
case study to unearth interesting and novel findings grounded in prior research.  
 
This concluding chapter demonstrates how the objectives of the research have been met 
through a discussion of the combined findings from the paper’s three analysis chapters 
(Chapters 5, 6 and 7). In the first part of this chapter I summarize the findings, 
beginning with an overview of the contextual and literature review chapters. In the 
second part I list some of the limitations of this work while providing recommendations 
and ideas for future research. Overall, this dissertation makes an important contribution 
to academic fields concerning Fairtrade, co-operatives, governance, capacity building, 
and gender studies, and may be of interest to practitioners and policymakers engaged in 
work on Fairtrade, co-operatives, organizational governance, or agriculture in general. 
 
8.2 Context and Literature Summary 
 
Before discussing the findings, it is useful to provide a brief overview of the issues 
raised in the contextual and literature review chapters. Chapter 2 introduced Fairtrade 
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and co-operative governance, the theoretical framework of EPG (Fung and Wright, 
2003) as it relates to Fairtrade co-operatives, and Hirschman’s (1970) conceptualization 
of exit, voice, and loyalty as a means of exploring alternatives to participation. I 
demonstrated the suitability of EPG as a framework for unpacking the nature of 
producer participation and learning about collaborative governance at co-operatives. 
Through a review of the literature I found that, while FLO has demonstrated a 
commitment to improving producer participation and its structures appear to be 
evolving accordingly, much remains to be done in order to ensure that individual 
producers are genuinely engaged in governance.  
 
Chapter 3 described the country context of Tanzania, both historical and contemporary, 
as well as the coffee sector. Tanzania’s co-operatives have undergone many 
transformations throughout the past century, and the political landscape has played an 
enormous role in determining the evolution of the country’s co-operative movement. 
Tanzania’s co-operatives are part of the co-operative revival currently taking place on 
the African continent. However, while today’s structures aim to facilitate independence 
and autonomy, in reality the government continues to play a major role in the sector. It 
remains difficult to tell if Tanzanian co-operatives have evolved from their colonial and 
nationalistic roots, comprising previous eras of high government intervention, or if they 
continue to be employed as tools of the government. Truly member-based co-
operatives, while arguably the way forward, are not yet a reality in the country.  
 
Finally, Chapter 4 outlined the methodology and its theoretical foundations, providing 
an overview of the multiple case study and the field research. The cases employed share 
some important commonalities while differing in terms of supply chains, leadership and 
management, and assets. Over the two-year research period, I held 139 interviews and 
five focus groups, engaged in direct observation of farmers’ fields and homes, co-
operative meetings, weighing stations, the coffee auction, factories, conferences, and 
Fairtrade premium projects, and reviewed documents such as membership lists and 
financial data. This data triangulation allowed me to effectively capture the perspectives 
of multiple stakeholders in order to tell the story of collaborative governance at these 
organizations and to learn more about how individuals participate in decision-making.  
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8.3 Main Findings 
 
In this section I summarize the main findings from the research, which were provided in 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7. While in Tanzania I had the opportunity to present these results, 
either in whole or in part, to managers at all three unions, as well as academics and 
government officials, and the findings were therefore developed through dialogue with 
these individuals.  
 
As seen in the structure of the three Findings chapters in this dissertation, I have divided 
this section into three parts based on the connections that emerged among the themes. 
The first subsection addresses Fairtrade’s fit with EPG, the second explores 
opportunities for exit, and the third outlines how capacity building might strengthen 
EPG, enhance voice, or in some cases lead to exit. 
 
8.3.1 Fairtrade and EPG  
In Chapter 5, I mapped the field research findings onto the EPG framework in order to 
determine how well Fairtrade fits this theory of collaborative governance. I discovered 
that, overall, producers appear to be quite involved in decision-making processes at 
their primary societies. However, deliberation, devolution, and centralization vary 
across the unions and there are barriers to substantive participation in decision-making, 
particularly for women. There are communication challenges between the primary 
society and the union, as exemplified in the cases of (i) knowledge of Fairtrade and (ii) 
delayed payments. With regards to managers and leaders, high turnover, size, and 
trust/confidence all pose potential problems at the management level, and there are 
issues of trust in Board members at the union level (although not at the primary society 
level). Despite claims to independence and autonomy for Tanzania’s co-operatives, 
there also remains heavy State involvement. The selection of Board members 
demonstrates a surprisingly high level of government intervention as well as criteria that 
could discriminate against women. Based on all these findings, I conclude that 
Fairtrade, in practice, may not meet EPG.  
 
Given that EPG sets a high standard for Fairtrade, this is not entirely surprising. 
However, it is of interest because, as outlined in Chapter 2, FLO’s literature describes 
Fairtrade as an empowering system that gives producers a voice; in contrast, the 
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findings from this research suggest that this may not be true in all cases. The potential 
identification of areas of weakness in Fairtrade’s fit with EPG may therefore prove 
useful with regards to FLO’s ongoing efforts to strengthen producer participation – 
examples of which include the ongoing evolution of the Fairtrade networks and 
increased producer representation in formal governance structures. As I outlined in 
Chapter 2, FLO has made changes to its governance systems in recent years, including 
50 per cent producer ownership on the General Assembly, more producers on the 
Board, and enhanced support for regional producer networks and field Liaison Officers. 
Over time it will be interesting to see if these changes reflect more of the principles 
found in a collaborative governance model. 
 
It is difficult to pinpoint an exact cause behind the lack of EPG at the three Tanzanian 
unions. One challenge is that it can be very difficult to disentangle the effects of 
Fairtrade from the effects of the co-operative model. By saying that Fairtrade does not 
meet EPG, one is also saying that the co-operatives do not meet EPG; in many cases, 
this lack of fit actually has nothing to do with Fairtrade. For example, I identified trust 
in management and the Board as problematic at the unions, and I found high State 
intervention (leading to potentially unfair Board elections) to be a factor leading to 
distrust in these leaders. This is, in large part, due to the historical evolution of the co-
operative movement in Tanzania and the lack of fit with EPG is unrelated to Fairtrade 
membership. It would therefore be erroneous to claim that Fairtrade does not facilitate 
EPG without unpacking the complexity behind this. However, there are repercussions 
for the Fairtrade system, such as producer knowledge of Fairtrade or the methods for 
premium allocation, if the co-operative is not proving collaborative in nature.  
 
There are important implications for the Fairtrade system’s effectiveness should 
collaborative governance not be realized at these co-operatives. Overall, I found that 
Fairtrade is not having its desired impact in the case of Tanzania’s unions. With regards 
to price, it is difficult to determine how much of the Fairtrade price goes to farmers, as 
the price is paid to the union rather than the individual primary societies. However, it is 
clear from interviews and the literature that the Fairtrade price alone is not enough of an 
incentive for farmers to sell solely to the primary society and not stray to competitors. 
The Fairtrade payment does not necessarily provide farmers with an attractive 
alternative to private buyers, mainly due to the fact that the unions are unable to sell the 
bulk of their coffee as Fairtrade and often sell this coffee at a lower price to non-
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Fairtrade buyers - despite all of the union’s coffee being grown to to Fairtrade 
standards. Given the stringent standards imposed on co-operatives by the Fairtrade 
system (such as environmental sustainability, democracy, transparency, and the 
abolition of labour abuses), this raises the question of whether or not Tanzania’s farmers 
are truly benefitting from Fairtrade. If they are not, there could be a reduced incentive 
for them to participate in Fairtrade decisions, such as those related to Fairtrade premium 
usage. 
 
There are several reasons why I argue that farmers stand to benefit from Fairtrade, even 
when the co-operative’s price does not provide an attractive alternative to private 
buyers. Firstly, the Fairtrade price has a positive impact on farmers when world market 
prices are down. In this situation, although the union would still be challenged by its 
inability to sell all of its coffee as Fairtrade, the price differential from the proportion 
sold at Fairtrade’s minimum guaranteed price provide a healthy cushion to farmers. 
Secondly, contracts with Fairtrade buyers provide a guaranteed purchasing arrangement 
at the auction; companies agree to buy set amounts of Fairtrade coffee in advance from 
the union and either attend the auction or ask the union to purchase for them as per a 
pre-arranged contract. This can provide some stability when competition is fierce. 
Thirdly, and arguably most importantly, the Fairtrade premiums can contribute greatly 
to community development. This latter benefit does, of course, vary according to how 
the premiums are allocated at the unions. As farmers at KCU and KDCU receive 
Fairtrade premiums at the primary society level, there are clear benefits emanating from 
the Fairtrade premium usage. However, KNCU’s primary societies are not currently 
benefitting directly from Fairtrade membership at the village level, as the premiums are 
being used solely at the union level. While this is not necessarily a fault in the Fairtrade 
system, as KNCU employs a ‘democratic’ process in order to decide to use premiums at 
the union level, it should nonetheless be of interest to those engaged in Fairtrade. When 
the benefits of the Fairtrade system such as the Fairtrade premiums are felt, as in the 
case of KCU and KDCU, there may be more of an incentive for farmers to remain with 
the co-operative and engage in decision-making. The Fairtrade premium can therefore 
induce farmers to stay with the co-operative and participate in related decision-making. 
In Table 20, I briefly summarize premium distribution at the three unions. 
 
  
 206	  
Table 20: A Cross-Union Comparison of Fairtrade Premium Spending 
 
Source: Author’s own 
 
8.3.2 Voice and Exit 
Producers who do not feel that they can exercise voice in their co-operatives may 
choose to exit the organization, as discovered in the case of the G32. The G32 can be 
viewed as one type of the countervailing power that Fung and Wright (2003) deem 
Union Premium 
Distribution 
 Premium Spending Characterized by 
KNCU Union level -Union-level spending 
including the Fairtrade 
Coordinator position, fees for 
foreign exchange account, 
attendance at events such as 
coffee exhibits, and a union-
wide orphans project. 
- High centralization  
- Low farmer 
knowledge of premiums 
and premium spending  
- Low incentive to 
engage in decision-
making 
- Low potential to 
exercise voice 
KCU Primary 
society level 
(equitably) 
-Society-specific projects 
including buildings for 
meetings, schools, machines, 
electricity, hospitals, security, 
shops, toilets, improved health 
facilities, infrastructure, and 
clean water.  
-Union-level projects 
including increased ownership 
of the instant coffee factory 
and an internal loan scheme 
for members. 
- Low centralization 
- Moderate to high 
farmer knowledge of 
premiums and premium 
spending 
- High incentive to 
engage in decision-
making 
- High potential to 
exercise voice 
KDCU Primary 
society level 
(by coffee 
quantity 
harvested) 
-Society-specific projects 
related to education, training, 
store repairs, new rainwater 
collection tanks, a dispensary, 
warehouses, and the purchase 
and distribution of new coffee 
seedlings. 
- Union-level projects 
including the curing factory, a 
secondary school for children 
of KDCU members, a pine 
forest, water tanks at the 
factory, watchmen offices, 
equipment such as dryers, and 
sending employees to school 
for a certificate or diploma. 
- Low centralization 
- Moderate to high 
farmer knowledge of 
premiums and premium 
spending 
- High incentive to 
engage in decision-
making 
- High potential to 
exercise voice 
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essential to EPG. In the Kilimanjaro region, this oppositional force today exists as a 
challenge to KNCU and an alternative that is available to the union’s members. The 
findings imply that for multiple reasons, potentially including high coffee quality, 
decentralization, a departure from Fairtrade, more female members, and local-level 
access to transport and loans, the G32 and Mamsera may be better off without the 
union. This is primarily because they pay farmers a higher price, demonstrate more 
social projects (in the case of Mamsera), and in general offer producers better 
opportunities. From the findings it is clear that the G32 members achieved more of a 
voice when they left KNCU, and that the Mamsera members achieved more of a voice 
when they left the G32. Capacity building played a role in facilitating this exit process 
as these groups benefited from MEMCOOP’s capacity building efforts aimed at 
empowering members (as previously outlined in Chapter 3). Capacity building may 
therefore foster exit when EPG is not being realized and there are better alternatives 
available to individuals. There are, of course, implications for Fairtrade, as these groups 
also left the Fairtrade system when they parted from the union. However, this does not 
necessarily indicate that all farmers would be better off without Fairtrade. While the 
G32 presents an attractive alternative for primary societies in the Kilimanjaro region, a 
similar option for KCU and KDCU’s farmers does not exist. As I argued in Chapter 5, 
KCU and KDCU’s farmers may therefore stand to gain more from the union, and 
resultingly from Fairtrade, than they would as independent societies. 
 
In contrast, the primary society as an independent entity appears to be a more effective 
model in the case of KNCU. Overall KNCU is considered the most problematic of the 
three unions, due to problems with mismanagement and corruption at the primary and 
secondary level, a disconnect between the primary and secondary societies leading to a 
failure of collaborative governance between these two levels, the manner in which the 
Fairtrade premiums are distributed, and the recent scaling back of union field officer 
support for farmers. While there are cases where KNCU farmers exercise their voices 
effectively, especially when groups have access to capacity development, the findings 
demonstrate that this is less likely at KNCU than it is at KCU or KDCU. Although 
KCU and KDCU have their own issues with poor governance, delayed payments, and 
competition, their primary societies rely strongly on the unions for marketing and 
transport in their remote regions of dense competition. Therefore, for both KCU and 
KDCU, farmers appear to benefit more from the union than they would without it. In 
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this case, one could expect capacity building to strengthen producer voice rather than 
lead to exit as in the case of the G32. 
 
The external environment also challenges voice. Since the liberalization of the 1990s, 
private buyers in Tanzania have offered alternatives to the co-operative model. While 
farmers understand the risks of selling to buyers, and the potential long-term 
consequences such as the conceivable collapse of co-operatives, at times they feel as 
though they have no other choice. Competition is particularly fierce in the Karagwe 
region where KDCU’s farmers are located, although farmers at the three unions 
reported having been approached by private buyers. As previously mentioned, in all 
three regions the Fairtrade price does not appear to act as a deterrent to selling to private 
buyers and does not create a barrier to individual exit for farmers. Therefore, 
competition may impede the potential for EPG to be realized; should the unions 
collapse, especially those that are most-needed such as KCU and KDCU, the structures 
for collaborative governance will also disappear. Given this threat, a partially-realized 
EPG model could prove more beneficial than the dissolution of these unions altogether, 
as farmers recognize that private buyers will cease to offer competitive prices if the co-
operatives crumble. Farmers understand that their co-operatives will fail over time if 
they cease to sell to them, and therefore tend to ‘stick it out’ with the co-operative 
despite one-time higher offers from private buyers. Those who reported selling to 
competitors were often hesitant to mention this and typically explained that they 
desperately needed the cash for an essential item such as medicine. While competition 
has the potential to undermine collaborative governance, farmers tend to remain with 
the co-operative for a multitude of reasons related to co-operative spirit and history, a 
fear of co-operative dissolution, and the benefits of Fairtrade such as the premium. 
 
8.3.3 The Role of Capacity Building 
Overall, I discovered that more capacity building is needed and that capacity building 
can serve to both foster exit and enhance voice. In terms of the former, as previously 
outlined in the discussion of the G32, capacity building can provide individuals with the 
skills and knowledge they require to seek out better alternatives should they cease to 
benefit from the union. Alternatively, capacity building can benefit individuals as both 
farmers and members. Capacity building for farmers, such as access to training and 
technical assistance about coffee, can lead to quality improvements resulting in 
increased yields or better prices. This is clearly important to these individuals who 
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depend on farming for their livelihoods. Individual capacity building may provide a 
means of arming people with the skills and knowledge they need to engage more fully 
as members or access leadership opportunities. Capacity building is therefore visibly a 
means for individuals to achieve more of a voice in decision-making, and may be 
conceived of as a type of countervailing power.  
 
Farmers at the three unions receive training from various sources, including union field 
officers, the government, and the Fairtrade system; however, these groups tend to 
provide little support to individual producers. The unions provide limited capacity 
building support to farmers; where there is access to capacity building, it is happening 
primarily at the leadership level or with organic farmers. Organic farmers at KCU and 
KDCU, in particular, benefit from strong capacity building support from union field 
officers. They receive regular visits from union extension officers and appear to be 
privileged in the delivery of training. This is due to IMO standards that require one field 
officer for every 500 organic farmers – a requirement that one could imagine benefitting 
Fairtrade farmers if FLO had a similar standard. There is also a lack of capacity 
building provided by the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives 
despite its stated aims – a gap that TaCRI is trying to address in its limited capacity. In 
terms of Fairtrade, FLO’s capacity building efforts are concentrated primarily at the 
organizational level, as Liaison Officers (LOs) are allocated according to the number of 
organizations. One of the major problems I identified is that there is no LO in Tanzania, 
despite the fact that Tanzania is the largest nation of Fairtrade producers in the world 
(FLO 2012 M&E). While there is a high potential for Fairtrade to provide effective 
capacity building, this unfortunately proved weak at all three unions. 
 
I also find that capacity building can serve to reduce barriers for women. As seen in 
Chapter 7, women face many challenges within their co-operatives, primarily related to 
land ownership, cultural norms, and household duties. Education and training for both 
women and men can serve to address some of these barriers. Capacity building is 
particularly important for female co-operative members and emerged from interviews as 
essential to the development of women as members, managers, and leaders within co-
operatives. Training for women, who might not otherwise have the opportunity to 
actively participate in their co-operatives, can be conceived of as a type of 
countervailing power if they have more of a voice in co-operative governance as a 
result.  
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Based on these findings, I can generally conclude that Fairtrade gives producers a voice 
in decision-making when (1) governance structures are collaborative and (2) 
producers have substantial and equal access to capacity building. Only then might it 
be possible to say that individual producers genuinely participate in decision-making at 
Fairtrade co-operatives. Without collaborative governance structures in place, it is 
conceivable that Fairtrade may fail in its efforts to facilitate producer participation. This 
is certainly true in the case of Tanzania’s Fairtrade coffee farmers, and there are lessons 
here for other agricultural co-operatives in the country, such as those working outside of 
the Fairtrade system or with other commodities. While I do not attempt to claim that 
these findings hold true for all farmers around the world, one can imagine similar 
situations in neighbouring African countries with similar histories, colonial roots, and 
ever-evolving organizations in the current co-op renaissance on the continent. 
 
8.4 Policy Implications 
 
Based on these findings, there are implications for practice. Some general 
recommendations from this research, which may be of use to anyone engaged in work 
with Fairtrade or co-operatives, are listed below.  
 
Recommendation 1: Increase capacity building support 
Above all, these findings are relevant with regards to the capacity building efforts that 
FLO and other external organizations engage in. Individuals require support as both 
farmers and members, and capacity building can help to strengthen both roles. This is 
particularly true in the case of non-organic farmers, who receive less capacity building 
support than their organic counterparts, and women, who experience high barriers to 
participation in co-operatives. All of the organizations listed in Chapter 7 could be 
doing more to provide capacity building support. As tangible examples, the unions 
could hire more field officers for non-organic farmers, the Tanzanian government could 
fund more field officer positions, and the Fairtrade system could require one field 
officer for every 500 farmers, as seen in the IMO organic standards. Enhanced capacity 
building could also allow producers to improve the quality of their coffee, which is 
essential to their livelihoods, as well as to participate more fully as members and 
potential leaders in their organizations. 
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Recommendation 2: Target the primary co-operative 
This is of particular importance in countries such as Tanzania, where the unions can 
comprise over 70,000 farmers. As outlined in the findings, there is often a lack of 
communication between the union and the primary, and benefits provided at the union 
level do not necessarily filter down to producers. A good example of this is FLO’s LO 
program. By allocating LOs according to the number of organizations rather than 
individual members, the system may be missing out on an important opportunity to 
provide capacity support to producers. Instead of the current approach, which is based 
on the rationale that certification occurs at the union level, LOs could be assigned based 
on the number of producers in a given country. Tanzania, as the country with the 
highest number of Fairtrade producers in the world, would stand to clearly benefit from 
this.  It could also be mandatory for the unions to distribute premiums amongst the 
primaries (avoiding a situation such as the current one at KNCU where premiums have 
been used solely at the union level for the past four years). In addition, if the primaries 
had the capacity to sell their coffee directly at the auction (as seen in the case of 
Mamsera), they could experience the benefits of the Fairtrade payment first-hand; of 
course, this would not work in all cases as the primaries often rely on the unions for 
marketing and transport. While the union can have an important role to play, as seen in 
the case of KCU and KDCU, any efforts aimed at increasing producer involvement in 
governance must target the primaries. 
 
Recommendation 3: Understand and address group and individual exit 
Little research has been undertaken on the G32 and the groups that exited KNCU, and 
there remains a great deal to be learned from these cases. Further research and an 
enhanced understanding of the impetus for the departure, as well as the post-departure 
success, of the G32 and Mamsera could be beneficial to individuals belonging to these 
groups as well as those who still belong to the union. Similarly, individual exit through 
sales to private buyers arose as a major challenge to the union and the primary societies, 
and any groups working with these farmers, be they Fairtrade organizations, NGOs, or 
government organizations, could benefit from a deepened understanding of the current 
and potential threats posted by individual exit. 
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Recommendation 4: Consider heterogeneity and diversity 
While Fairtrade targets small-scale producers as a marginalized group, there are 
intersectional categories, such as women and non-organic farmers, for whom differing 
degrees of support may be required. Fairtrade should learn more about heterogeneity 
and diversity among producers in order to provide strong support to individuals and to 
address specific needs. This dissertation’s overview of access to opportunities for 
women, as well as the advantages available to organic farmers, provides clear evidence 
of this. Similarly to the approach taken here, future explorations or monitoring activities 
(such as those undertaken by Fairtrade International) could seek to learn more about 
gender equity in different cultural contexts by over-sampling women, using focus 
groups where appropriate and preferred by respondents, and considering the role of the 
environment, such as who is listening in nearby. As I outlined in Chapter 4, there are 
cases where a lack of privacy may affect responses and the cultural context is therefore 
an important consideration. 
 
Recommendation 5: Embrace countervailing power 
The G32 and Mamsera may be considered a form of countervailing power as they now 
create an oppositional force to KNCU. In addition, capacity building support may act as 
a type of countervailing power by arming individuals with the information they need to 
have a voice in decision-making, as seen in the case of MEMCOOP support for G32 
primary societies. Additional forms of countervailing power (such as women’s groups, 
for example) should be sought out and embraced, as these may also serve to strengthen 
the unions as anticipated in Fung & Wright’s (2003) EPG model. 
 
Recommendation 6: Continue to support independent research 
Further independent academic research is required in order to better understand the 
nature of governance at Fairtrade co-operatives. A larger scale investigation, involving a 
comparative case study of Fairtrade governance across various countries and 
commodities could serve to determine whether or not my findings hold true for co-
operatives outside of the three unions featured herein. As an alternative approach, 
randomized quantitative surveying of farmers, using a non-Fairtrade control group, 
could allow for a larger sample size and an increased breadth of responses. A 
longitudinal approach could also shed some light on the impact of Fairtrade and the 
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evolution of governance structures over time. Further research into additional aspects of 
Fairtrade, such as access to advanced credit, transparency and accountability, 
environmental sustainability, and gender equity, is also required. Finally, EPG provides 
a novel framework for assessing the nature of governance within Fairtrade, although it 
does have its limitations. This theoretical framework may be useful to others conducting 
similar research, or those involved in developing Fairtrade policies and standards. 
 
8.5 Limitations  
 
This study comprises some shortcomings and limitations, which further resources 
related to time and funding could have served to address. Firstly, while I interviewed 
139 individuals involved in Fairtrade co-operatives, this is a relatively small sample of 
the population and, as a result, these results may not be representative of the entire 
organization. A larger sample size could have been possible with additional resources 
and interviewing more producers, in other localities and organizations, could be be a 
highly beneficial means of testing the findings. Nevertheless, while the sample size in 
this qualitative research was relatively small, I anticipate that the richness and depth of 
these interviews offset this.  
 
Secondly, this research alone is not a sufficient means of determining causality and 
creating generalizations about these findings. Therefore I recognize that, while I can 
draw conclusions about Tanzanian coffee co-operatives, it is difficult to determine 
whether or not this holds true for other countries and commodities. As a further 
hindrance to this, this research was interpretive in nature: there was no control group 
such as a non-Fairtrade co-operative, and this study’s selection criteria prevented it from 
being randomized.  
 
Thirdly, I used only the procedural elements of EPG to analyze and report the findings, 
and did not assess institutional objectives here, aside from a consideration of gender 
equity. An exploration of the institutional objectives would have been better suited to a 
longitudinal study, which could be an option for future research. Had I instead visited 
the unions before they joined Fairtrade or before the breakaway groups departed, and 
returned later to learn about the evolution of the decision-making process of these 
groups, I would be in a position to comment on institutional change. However, this 
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research is based on a ‘snapshot in time’ and does not allow me to assess EPG at this 
level.  
 
Finally, there are limitations to any research project such as only being able to interview 
those who give consent, those who are accessible, and those who have the time to be 
interviewed – not to mention my role as an outsider. As such, it is possible that I missed 
other problems within the unions I studied. Chapter 4 further outlined some of the 
methodological limitations. 
 
8.6 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, Fung and Wright’s EPG model provides a framework for unpacking the 
nature of individual producer participation and allows for a better understanding of 
collaborative governance. Based on the findings outlined herein, I can generally 
conclude that Fairtrade gives producers a voice in decision-making when governance 
structures are collaborative and producers have substantial and equal access to capacity 
building. Only then might it be possible to say that individual producers genuinely 
participate in decision-making at Fairtrade co-operatives. However, when individuals do 
not feel as though they have a voice, exit becomes a viable alternative. 
 
This dissertation studies voice, choice, and governance in the case of Tanzania's 
Fairtrade coffee co-operatives. Its contribution to academic fields concerns the complex 
task of facilitating ‘stronger voices’ within Fairtrade while touching on areas such as 
governance, capacity building, and gender studies, and it should be of interest to 
practitioners and policymakers engaged in related work. Further research is needed in 
order to learn more about whether or not these findings hold true for additional 
commodities in other countries. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Research Map 	  
 
H 
I 
S 
T 
O 
R 
Y 
Research 
Element 
Research Focus and 
Objectives 
Key Methods Theoretical 
considerations 
Context Focus: Participation and 
representation in the 
international development 
context 
Research objectives: To 
set the experiences of rural 
producers in a 
socioeconomic context 
-Systematic 
Literature 
Review 
 
- Development 
studies 
- Sociology 
- Political Economy 
- Gender studies 
- Postcolonialism 
Setting Focus: Fairtrade Co-
operatives 
Research objectives: To 
determine whether current 
conceptualizations of 
participation, representation 
and empowerment 
adequately explain producer 
experiences 
-Systematic 
Literature 
Review 
-Key 
informant 
interviews 
- Development 
studies 
- Co-operative 
theory 
- Fairtrade literature 
- Sociology 
- Political Economy 
- Feminist theories 
 
Situated 
Activity 
Focus: Tanzanian Fairtrade 
Coffee Co-operatives 
Research objectives: To 
examine the opportunities 
for participation in 
decision-making, while 
considering exclusion from 
these processes 
-Systematic 
Literature 
Review 
-Key 
informant 
interviews  
-Document 
review 
- Agricultural Co-
operative theory 
- Fairtrade literature 
- Sociology 
- Anthropology 
 
Self Focus: Experiences and 
perceptions of the 
participants of the study 
Research objectives: To 
examine the manner in 
which Fairtrade enables 
voice in decision-making 
-Interviews 
-Observation 
-Focus Groups 
 
- Co-operative 
theory 
- Collaborative 
governance theories 
- Exit, voice, and 
loyalty theory 
 
 
Source: Author’s own based on Layder (1993)  
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Appendix 2: The ICA’s Seven Co-operative Principles 
 
Principle Description 
1st Principle: 
Open and 
Voluntary 
Membership 
Co-operatives are voluntary organisations, open to all persons 
able to use their services and willing to accept the 
responsibilities of membership, without gender, social, racial, 
political or religious discrimination. 
2nd Principle: 
Democratic 
Member Control 
Co-operatives are democratic organisations controlled by their 
members, who actively participate in setting their policies and 
making decisions. Men and women serving as elected 
representatives are accountable to the membership. In primary 
co-operatives members have equal voting rights (one member, 
one vote) and co-operatives at other levels are also organised in 
a democratic manner. 
3rd Principle: 
Member 
Economic 
Participation 
Members contribute equitably to, and democratically control, 
the capital of their co-operative. At least part of that capital is 
usually the common property of the co-operative. Members 
usually receive limited compensation, if any, on capital 
subscribed as a condition of membership. Members allocate 
surpluses for any or all of the following purposes: developing 
their co-operative, possibly by setting up reserves, part of 
which at least would be indivisible; benefiting members in 
proportion to their transactions with the co-operative; and 
supporting other activities approved by the membership. 
4th Principle: 
Autonomy and 
Independence 
Co-operatives are autonomous, self-help organisations 
controlled by their members. If they enter to agreements with 
other organisations, including governments, or raise capital 
from external sources, they do so on terms that ensure 
democratic control by their members and maintain their co-
operative autonomy. 
5th Principle: 
Education, 
Training, and 
Information 
 
Co-operatives provide education and training for their 
members, elected representatives, managers, and employees so 
they can contribute effectively to the development of their co-
operatives. They inform the general public - particularly young 
people and opinion leaders - about the nature and benefits of 
co-operation. 
6th Principle: Co-
operation 
amongst Co-
operatives 
Co-operatives serve their members most effectively and 
strengthen the co-operative movement by working together 
through local, national, regional and international structures. 
7th Principle: 
Concern for 
Community 
Co-operatives work for the sustainable development of their 
communities through policies approved by their members. 
 
Source: International Co-operative Alliance (2012) 
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Appendix 3: Fairtrade Africa 
 
This producer network is open to all Fairtrade Certified producer organizations on the 
continent, including hired labour situations, and comprises regional organizations in the 
north, east, west, and south of the continent. There are also product groups for coffee, 
cocoa, and tea, as well as country partnerships that aim to allow organizations in various 
regions to create a more unified voice. Fairtrade Africa (2011a) claims to work through 
primary structures such as product groups, country partnerships, and regional networks 
which “enable our members to have a strong voice in the governance and management 
of the organization.” According to FLO (2013b), Fairtrade Africa has grown 
consistently to become a major stakeholder within the Fairtrade system. Today 59 per 
cent of all Fairtrade producers and workers live in Africa (Fairtrade International, 
2012b). As of December 2012, Fairtrade Africa comprised over 700,000 farmers and 
workers at 300 organizations, selling 47 products from 29 countries (Fairtrade Africa, 
2011b). In 2011, Fairtrade sales revenue on the continent, for both farmers and workers, 
increased to USD $175 million. On top of this, producers received more than USD $18 
million in Fairtrade premiums. Of the ten largest Fairtrade producer organizations in the 
world, nine are in Africa and seven are in East Africa (Fairtrade International, 2012b). 
 
Fairtrade Africa was born out of the East Africa Fairtrade Regional Coordinating Body 
that began in 1999 and was formed by Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Rwanda and Ghana joined in 2003 and the 
group became the African Fairtrade Network in 2005. The network’s first members’ 
meeting took place in Moshi, Tanzania in June 2006, and the name was changed in 
2010 in order to reflect the network’s strong affiliation with the Fairtrade International 
system. According to FLO (2013b), Fairtrade Africa exists to do the following: ensure 
that Fairtrade standards and policies reflect the needs of its members; increase member 
productivity and capacity through technical, organizational, and financial support; fuel 
intra-African trade through networking and partnerships; and promote trade justice in 
Africa. Regular operations are overseen by a steering committee, and policy and 
governance decisions are made every two years at the Regional Producers’ Assembly 
(Bennett, 2013). 
 
A steering committee is responsible for basic duties and a Regional Producers’ 
Assembly is held biannually where policy and governance decisions are made. The 
Secretariat is located in Nairobi, Kenya and a Fairtrade Africa Forum for producers and 
stakeholders takes place annually. A Members Meeting held every two years is the 
highest decision making body, where members have the right to participate and vote for 
the election of the Fairtrade Africa Board through their regional representatives. The 
Board comprises one representative from each regional network and one elected 
member to represent Fairtrade Africa on the Fairtrade International Board. As of 2013, 
Fairtrade Africa was in the process of linking up with FLO’s Producer Support and 
Relations Unit (PSR) to form a new strategy partnership called Team Africa. 
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Appendix 4: The CLAC as Countervailing Power 
 
One example of a countervailing power in Fairtrade is the CLAC, the regional producer 
network in Latin America and the Caribbean, and its recent development of a Small 
Producer Symbol through FUNDEPPO (Foundation of Organized Small Producers). 
The CLAC has unique roots and came into existence prior to the creation of FLO, with 
origins in the Latin American Network of Small Coffee Producers and the Latin 
American Network of Beekeepers. The CLAC was developed in 1996 in order to 
protect the interests of small farmers in the region, and became legally registered in 
2004 (CLAC, 2012). This network consists of nearly 300 small producer organizations 
in twenty countries of the region and estimates that the number of families of affiliated 
small producers exceeds 200,000 (Fairtrade Canada, 2012). 
 
The CLAC is typically viewed as the most political of the three producer networks, and 
only allows small organizations to become members (as opposed to Fairtrade Africa and 
the NAPP, which include hired labour members). The network’s mission is aimed at 
strengthening the development of democratically organized small producers and their 
grassroots organizations, whilst engaging in advocacy and promoting products from 
these groups (CLAC, 2012). As the CLAC’s Coffee Network (Red Café) noted in a 
2011 position paper opposing Fair Trade USA’s decision to allow coffee plantations, 
Fairtrade does not benefit all small producers who participate in the system and there 
remains a great deal to be done to strengthen and improve the position of these farmers 
(CLAC Red Cafe, 2011). Barrett (2010) observes: “The CLAC is just the kind of 
provocative organization of co-ops that one would hope would emerge in the fair trade 
movement as it matures. It is a reflection of the movement's success in creating a self-
reflective and self-critical democratic landscape that brings producers, and I would 
argue co-ops, to the fore.” 
 
Interestingly, and somewhat controversially, the network recently created its own 
identification symbol within Fairtrade: the Small Producer Symbol. This certification 
mark is designed to distinguish products from small producer organizations on the 
market and Raynolds et al. (2007, 229) note that it is “a move intended to validate the 
position of small producers in Fair Trade.” In order to establish this mark and guarantee 
its appropriate usage, a foundation named FUNDEPPO (Foundation of Organized Small 
Producers) was created. The symbol is also now available to organizations in Africa and 
Asia, as well as several countries in the global North. This symbol is, in many ways, 
designed to challenge those “powerful actors with privileged access to decision-making 
venues” that Fung and Wright (2003, 260) reference. 
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Appendix 5: Tanzania Country Overview 
 
With a population of 44 million, life expectancy of 58 years, a per capita Gross National 
Income of US$1,328,and a maternal mortality rate of 790 per 100,000 live births in 
2008, Tanzanian ranked 152 of 186 countries on the UNDP’s 2013 Human 
Development Index (UNDP, 2013). In 2007, 37.4% of the rural Tanzanian population 
was below the national rural poverty line; the national average was 33.4% (World Bank, 
2012a). Despite being one of the poorest countries in the world, due to strong gold 
production and tourism Tanzania averaged 7% GDP growth between 2000 and 2008, 
and annual GDP growth was 6% annually between 2009 and 2011 (Central Intelligence 
Agency, 2012).  
 
Located in Eastern Africa, Tanzania borders the Indian Ocean between Kenya and 
Mozambique. The country’s climate ranges from temperate in the highlands to tropical 
along the coast, and the highest elevation point of 5,895 meters is at Mount Kilimanjaro, 
the continent’s highest point. There are two main seasons: the long rains (masika) in 
March to June, and the short rains (vuli) from October to January. The country’s natural 
resources include iron ore, tin, coal, diamonds, gemstones, gold, and copper. Kiswahili, 
the mother tongue of the Bantu people who compose 95 per cent of Tanzania (and 
consist of over 130 different ethnic groups), is one of two official languages. The 
second is English, which is the primary language of commerce, administration, and 
higher education.  
 
In 2012 Tanzania hosted over half a million refugees, more than any other African 
country, primarily from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi. Forced 
labour and human trafficking are rife, with girls often forced into domestic service or 
prostitution, and boys typically engaged in forced labour on farms or in mines. This 
clearly illustrates the importance of labour standards and the ongoing monitoring of 
these practices for Tanzania’s natural resources through schemes such as Fairtrade. 
Fairtrade standards in Tanzanian currently pertain to coffee, tea, flowers, and cashews, 
and the Fairtrade Gold program is in the process of expanding into Tanzania.  
 
President Jakaya Kikwete, the country’s fourth democratically elected leader, has been 
in office of the United Republic of Tanzania since 2005 with the Chama Cha Mapinduzi 
or CCM (Revolutionary Party), and from 2008 to 2009 acted as Chairperson of the 
African Union. While Kikwete’s government has been praised for fighting corruption, 
investing in education, and developing national voluntary HIV/AIDS testing, there 
remains ongoing corruption and nepotism. Tanzania received a score of 33 on 
Transparency International’s 2013 Corruptions Perceptions Index (where 0 means that 
a country is perceived as highly corrupt and 100 means it is perceived as very clean), 
placing it 111th out of 177 countries in terms of perceived levels of public sector 
corruption (Transparency International, 2013).  
 220	  
Appendix 6: SWOT Analysis of the Tanzanian Coffee Sector  
 
Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats 
Abundant suitable 
land for coffee 
production 
Low productivity Tanzania is in 
Colombian mild 
group 
Climate 
change/Weather 
fluctuations 
Favourable growing 
conditions 
Inadequate 
extension and 
advisory services 
Potential to gain 
price premiums 
Increasing costs of 
inputs 
Excellent potential 
coffee quality 
Inadequate credit 
and supply systems 
Coffee is traded in 
USD 
Outbreak of new 
pests and diseases 
Availability of 
improved coffee 
varieties resistant to 
CBD, CLR, and 
CWD 
Unstable local 
currency 
Extend stakeholder 
funding of shared 
functions in the 
industry 
Fluctuations of 
world coffee market 
prices 
Liberalized coffee 
market 
Poor infrastructure Potential to develop 
washed Robusta 
Emergence of 
additional 
certification 
standards 
Willingness of 
stakeholders to 
support and fund 
coffee research 
Inadequate 
dissemination of 
market information 
Potential to increase 
local consumption 
Competition with 
other crops 
Political stability Business 
environment can be 
improved 
Training of 
institutions on crop 
husbandry 
High interest rate 
 
Source: TCA & TCB (2012) 
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Appendix 7: Arabica and Robusta Coffee Processing 
 
KNCU’s Arabica farmers use the wet process for their coffee, while KCU and KDCU’s 
farmers use dry processing for their Robusta and hard Arabica coffee. In most cases, a 
curing company then husks the coffee, which entails removing the shell over the green 
bean, before sorting and grading the coffee. This diagram outlines the two processes: 
 
 
 
 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2000) 
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Appendix 8: The Moshi Coffee Auction 
 
The coffee auction occurs every Thursday morning in Moshi’s Kahawa (Coffee) House. 
The Tanzania Coffee Board (TCB) administers the auction and distributes information 
on suppliers, grades, and volumes ahead of the auction. Buyers also receive graded 
samples ahead of time (determined by the TCB based on quality, moisture content, and 
the size of the bean) that they test in their own coffee cupping labs. Even coffee that 
owners intend to export themselves must go through the auction. Coffee is traded in 
dollars and a reserve price is set by the TCB in accordance with futures markets. Final 
bids must be higher than this reserve price and these bids are made during a silent 
auction. Companies purchase coffee by the bag (equivalent to 60 kilos). The price 
increases according to the grade of coffee, as well as whether or not it is Fairtrade 
and/or organic. 
 
Observers are permitted in the auction room, and I attended on two separate occasions 
in May 2012 and August 2012.  On both visits I sat in a room with between 20 and 30 
buyers and three auctioneers on stage. The buyers are primarily male foreigners, from 
organizations based in France, Germany, the UK, Kenya, and Tanzania, amongst other 
countries.  A red screen lights up the front of the room. A loud scratching sound is heard 
every so often, but other than it and the sound of hot coffee being poured from large 
thermoses, the room is quiet. 
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Appendix 9: List of Interviewees – Group 1 Fairtrade Key Informants 
 
Respondent Organization Position Location Date 
G1 R1 Fairtrade 
International 
Ex Board Member of 
Fairtrade International 
London, UK 08/08/11 
G1 R2 RSTGA Senior Account 
Executive 
Tukuyu, 
Tanzania 
22/08/11 
and 
26/08/11 
G1 R3 RSTGA General Manager Tukuyu, 
Tanzania 
29/09/11 
G1 R4 Ndumberi Co-
operative 
Producer/ Delegate Kiambu, 
Kenya 
30/09/11 
G1 R5 Ndumberi Co-
operative 
General Manager Kiambu, 
Kenya 
30/09/11 
G1 R6 Fairtrade 
Africa 
Communications 
Specialist 
Nairobi, Kenya 30/09/11 
G1 R7  Fairtrade 
Africa 
Regional Coordinator 
Eastern Africa 
Nairobi, Kenya 30/09/11 
09/05/11 
G1 R8 ADAPS, 
Madagascar 
General Manager Accra, Ghana 08/11/11 
G1 R9 Tea Factory 
Manager 
WATCO  Tukuyu, 
Tanzania 
25/08/11 
G1 R10 Fairtrade 
Foundation 
Producer Relations London, UK 05/04/12 
GI R11 Cafédirect Head of Strategic 
Development 
London, UK 22/05/12 
(with R12) 
G1 R12 Cafédirect 
Producer Fund 
Project Manager London, UK 22/05/12 
(with R11) 
G1 R13 Fairtrade 
Africa 
Acting Executive 
Director 
Nairobi, Kenya 09/05/12 & 
01/10/12 
G1 R14 Fairtrade 
Africa 
Executive Director Nairobi, Kenya 01/10/12 
G1 R15 Fairtrade 
Africa 
Monitoring & 
Evaluation Manager 
Skype  09/11/12 
G1 R16 Fairtrade 
Africa 
Head of Africa PSR Nairobi, Kenya 02/10/12 
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Appendix 10: List of Interviewees – Group 2 Tanzanian Key Informants 
 
Respondent Organization Position Location Date 
G2 R1 KNCU Acting General 
Manager  & Technical 
Services Manager 
Moshi, 
Tanzania 
20/08/11 & 
10/05/12  
G2 R2 KNCU Tour Guide Moshi, 
Tanzania 
20/08/11 
G2 R3 KNCU Tour guide Moshi 
Tanzania 
22/08/11 
G2 R4 KCU Assistant Export 
Manager 
Moshi, 
Tanzania 
11/05/12; 
24/09/12 
G2 R5 KCU Export Manager Moshi, 
Tanzania 
11/05/12; 
18/05/12 
G2 R6 KNCU Acting General 
Manager 
Moshi, 
Tanzania 
14/05/12 
G2 R7 KNCU Fairtrade Liaison 
Officer and Export 
Marketing Officer 
Moshi, 
Tanzania 
15/05/12; 
26/07/12; 
24/09/12 
G2 R8 KNCU Acting Agricultural 
Farming Technical 
Services Officer 
Moshi, 
Tanzania 
15/05/12; 
28/09/12 
G2 R9 KNCU Senior Procurement 
Officer 
Moshi, 
Tanzania 
15/05/12; 
26/07/12; 
25/09/12 
G2 R10 Tanzania 
Coffee Board 
Director of Coffee 
Quality and Promotions 
Moshi, 
Tanzania 
15/05/12 
G2 R11 MUCCobs Director, Postgraduate 
Affairs 
Moshi, 
Tanzania 
12/05/12 & 
14/05/12 
G2 R12 KDCU Export Manager Moshi, 
Tanzania 
18/05/12 
G2 R13 The 
Tanganyika 
Coffee 
Curing Co. 
Ltd. 
Acting Export Manager 
& Statistician 
Moshi, 
Tanzania 
17/05/12 
G2 R14 KDCU FT and Organic 
Coordinator 
Accra, Ghana 
& Kayanga, 
Karagwe 
22/11/11 & 
17/09/12 
G2 R15 Dormans Country Sales Manager  
 
Moshi, 
Tanzania  
29/07/12 
G2 R16 Mambo 
Coffee 
Accountant Moshi, 
Tanzania 
29/07/12 
G2 R17 G32 General Manager Moshi, 
Tanzania 
30/08/12 & 
31/08/12 
G2 R18 Tanzania 
Coffee 
Association 
Executive Secretary Moshi, 
Tanzania 
30/08/12 
G2 R19 MUCCoBS Lecturer Moshi, 
Tanzania 
31/08/12 
G2 R20 MUCCoBS Lecturer Moshi, 31/08/12 
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Tanzania 
G2 R21 KCU FT Coordinator Bukoba, 
Tanzania 
06/09/12 & 
15/09/12 
G2 R22 KCU Board Chair  Bukoba, 
Tanzania 
06/09/12 
G2 R23 Bukoba 
Municipal 
Office 
District Cooperative 
Officer 
Bukoba, 
Tanzania 
07/09/12 
G2 R24 KCU Organic Coordinator Bukoba, 
Tanzania 
07/09/12 & 
15/09/12 
G2 R25 KCU KCU Marketing 
Manager/Acting 
Manager 
Bukoba, 
Tanzania 
07/09/12 
G2 R26 KCU General Manager Bukoba, 
Tanzania 
10/09/12; 
11/09/12; 
14/09/12’ 
21/09/12 
G2 R27 KDCU Organic Coordinator Kayanga, 
Karagwe 
17/09/12 
G2 R28 KDCU General Manager Kayanga, 
Karagwe 
18/09/12 
G2 R29 KDCU Agricultural and 
Environmental Officer 
Kibimba Pine 
Farm 
18/09/12 
G2 R30 KDCU Factory Manager Kayanga, 
Karagwe 
19/09/12 
G2 R31 KNCU Board Chair Moshi, 
Tanzania 
24/09/12 
G2 R32 TACRI Programme Manager, 
Technology Training 
and Transfer 
Machame, 
Tanzania 
26/09/12 
G2 R33 Moshi 
District 
DCO Moshi Moshi, 
Tanzania 
28/09/12 
G2 R34 Moshi 
District 
DALDO Moshi, 
Tanzania 
28/09/12 
G2 R35 KNCU Field Officer 
Supervisor 
Moshi, 
Tanzania 
29/07/12 & 
28/09/12 
G2 R36 Café Africa Country Manager Moshi, 
Tanzania 
28/09/12 
G2 R37 Moshi 
District 
DCSMS Moshi, 
Tanzania 
28/09/12 
G2 R38  KCU Bukop Manager Bukoba 07/09/12 
G2 R39 KDCU Nyaishozi School 
Principal 
Kayanga 19/09/12 
G2 R40 KCU Tanica Factory 
Manager 
Bukoba 15/09/12 
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Appendix 11: List of Interviewees – Group 3 Primary Society Managers and Leaders 
 
Respondent Organization Position Location Date 
G3 R1 Kyengia PCS, 
KNCU 
Chairwoman Kyengia 01/08/12 
G3 R2 Mamsera Deputy Secretary-
Manager 
Mamsera 28/08/12 
G3 R3 Mamsera SM Mamsera 29/08/12 
G3 R4 Old Moshi PS, 
KNCU 
Chairman Old Moshi 01/09/12 
G3 R5 Keryo, G32 SM Keryo, Rombo 03/09/12 
G3 R6 Lukani/Losaa, 
G32 
Board & G32 Board Lukani Losar, 
Hai 
04/09/12 
G3 R7 Lukani/Losaa, 
G32 
G32 Board and 
Board of Lukani-
Losar 
Lukani Losar, 
Hai 
04/09/12 
G3 R8 Izigo, KCU SM  Izigo, Muleba 10/09/12 
G3 R9 KCU Field Officer Izigo, Muleba 10/09/12 
G3 R10 KCU Field Officer Izigo, Muleba 10/09/12 
G3 R11 Katoro, KCU SM Katoro, Bukoba 12/09/12 
G3 R12 Kasharu, KCU SM Kasharu, Bukoba 14/09/12 
G3 R13 Mabira, KDCU Chairwoman Mabira, Karagwe 18/09/12 
G3 R14 Nyakayanja 
PCS, KDCU 
Board Chairman Nyakayanja 19/09/12 
G3 R15 Nyakakika PCS, 
KDCU 
SM Nyakakia 20/09/12 
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Appendix 12: List of Interviewees - Group 4 Producers 
* Note: If a role other than ‘farmer’ is specified, this individual is also a farmer 
  
Resp. Union Primary 
Society 
District Gender Age Role Date 
 
G4 R1 KNCU Uru North 
Njari 
Moshi 
Rural 
M 56 Tour 
guide 
28/07/12 
G4 R2 KNCU Uru North 
Msuni 
Moshi 
Rural 
M 50 Secretary
-Manager 
28/07/12 
G4 R3 KNCU Uru North 
Msuni 
Moshi 
Rural 
M 54 PCS 
Board 
28/07/12 
G4 R4 KNCU Uru North 
Msuni 
Moshi 
Rural 
F 58 PCS 
Board 
28/07/12 
G4 R5 KNCU Kibosho 
Central 
Moshi 
Rural 
F 45 Secretary
-Manager 
30/07/12 
G4 R6 KNCU Kibosho 
Central 
Moshi 
Rural 
F 75 Farmer 30/07/12 
G4 R7 KNCU Kibosho 
Central 
Moshi 
Rural 
M 61 Farmer 30/07/12 
G4 R8 KNCU Kibosho 
Central 
Moshi 
Rural 
M 70 PCS 
Board 
30/07/12 
G4 R9 KNCU Kibosho 
Central 
Moshi 
Rural 
M 75 PCS 
Board 
30/07/12 
G4 R10 KNCU Kibosho 
Central 
Moshi 
Rural 
M 78 PCS 
Board 
30/07/12 
G4 R11 KNCU Kibosho 
Central 
Moshi 
Rural 
M 45 Farmer 30/07/12 
G4 R12 KNCU Kibosho 
Central 
Moshi 
Rural 
M 57 Farmer 30/07/12 
G4 R13 KNCU Kibosho 
Central 
Moshi 
Rural 
F 42 Farmer 31/07/12 
G4 R14 KNCU Kibosho 
Central 
Moshi 
Rural 
F 45 Farmer 31/07/12 
G4 R15 KNCU Kibosho 
Central 
Moshi 
Rural 
F 57 Farmer 31/07/12 
G4 R16 KNCU Kibosho 
Central 
Moshi 
Rural 
F 58 Farmer 31/07/12 
G4 R17 KNCU Kibosho 
Central 
Moshi 
Rural 
F 78 Farmer 31/07/12 
G4 R18 KNCU Kibosho 
Central 
Moshi 
Rural 
F 47 Farmer 31/07/12 
G4 R19 KNCU Kyengia Hai F 52 PCS 
Board 
01/08/12 
G4 R20 KNCU Kyengia Hai M 75 Farmer 01/08/12 
G4 R21 KNCU Kyengia Hai M 46 PCS 
Board 
01/08/12 
G4 R22 KNCU Kyengia Hai M 60 Farmer 01/08/12 
G4 R23 KNCU Kyengia Hai F 46 Farmer 01/08/12 
G4 R24 KNCU Kyengia Hai M 72 Farmer 01/08/12 
G4 R25 KNCU Uru North 
Njari 
Moshi 
Rural 
F 52 Farmer 02/08/12 
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G4 R26 KNCU Uru North 
Njari 
Moshi 
Rural 
F 57 Farmer 02/08/12 
G4 R27 KNCU Uru North 
Njari 
Moshi 
Rural 
F 53 Farmer 02/08/12 
G4 R28 KNCU Uru North 
Njari 
Moshi 
Rural 
F 65 Farmer 02/08/12 
G4 R29 / Mamsera Rombo M 65 Farmer 28/08/12 
G4 R30 / Mamsera Rombo M 38 Farmer 28/08/12 
G4 R31 / Mamsera Rombo F 52 Farmer 28/08/12 
G4 R32 / Mamsera Rombo M 60 Farmer 28/08/12 
G4 R33 / Mamsera Rombo M 51 Farmer 28/08/12 
G4 R34 G32 Keryo Rombo F 54 Farmer 03/09/12 
G4 R35 G32 Keryo Rombo M 73 Farmer 03/09/12 
G4 R36 G32 Keryo Rombo F 63 Farmer 03/09/12 
G4 R37 G32 Lukani/ 
Losaa 
Hai M 76 Farmer 04/09/12 
G4 R38 G32 Lukani/ 
Losaa 
Hai F 48 Farmer 04/09/12 
G4 R39 G32 Lukani/ 
Losaa 
Hai F 37 Farmer 04/09/12 
G4 R40 G32 Lukani/ 
Losaa 
Hai M 65 PCS Board 04/09/12 
G4 R41 KCU Izigo Muleba M 66 Farmer 10/09/12 
G4 R42 KCU Izigo Muleba F 54 PCS Board 10/09/12 
G4 R43 KCU Izigo Muleba M 56 Farmer 10/09/12 
G4 R44 KCU Izigo Muleba M 54 Farmer 11/09/12 
G4 R45 KCU Izigo Muleba M 84 Farmer 11/09/12 
G4 R46 KCU Izigo Muleba M 44 Farmer 11/09/12 
G4 R47 KCU Izigo Muleba M 42 Farmer 11/09/12 
G4 R48 KCU Izigo Muleba F 59 Farmer 11/09/12 
G4 R49 KCU Katoro Bukoba M 53 Farmer 12/09/12 
G4 R50 KCU Katoro Bukoba M 45 PCS Board 12/09/12 
G4 R51 KCU Katoro Bukoba F 65 Farmer 12/09/12 
G4 R52 KCU Katoro Bukoba M 55 Farmer 12/09/12 
G4 R53 KCU Katoro Bukoba F 40 Farmer 12/09/12 
G4 R54 KCU Katoro Bukoba F 56 Farmer 12/09/12 
G4 R55 KCU Kasharu Bukoba M 36 Farmer 13/09/12 
G4 R56 KCU Kasharu Bukoba M 47 PCS Board 13/09/12 
G4 R57 KCU Kasharu Bukoba F 42 Farmer 13/09/12 
G4 R58 KDCU Mabira Kitintu M 56 Farmer 18/09/12 
G4 R59 KDCU Mabira Kitintu F 65 Farmer 18/09/12 
G4 R60 KDCU Mabira Kitintu M 62 Farmer 18/09/12 
G4 R61 KDCU Mabira Kitintu M 42 Farmer 18/09/12 
G4 R62 KDCU Nyakayanja Bugene/ 
Nyashori 
F 49 PCS Board 19/09/12 
G4 R63 KDCU Nyakayanja Bugene/ 
Nyashori 
M 61 Farmer 19/09/12 
 229	  
 
G4 R64 KDCU Nyakayanja Bugene/ 
Nyashori 
M 33 Farmer 19/09/12 
G4 R65 KDCU Nyakakika Nyabionza M 45 Farmer 20/09/12 
G4 R66 KDCU Nyakakika Nyabionza M 40 Farmer 20/09/12 
G4 R67 KDCU Nyakakika Nyabionza F 32 Farmer 20/09/12 
G4 R68 KDCU Nyakakika Nyabionza F 45 Farmer 20/09/12 
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Appendix 13: Interview Guide for Groups 1 & 2 
 
Type of 
Questions 
Researcher Info Interviewer Topic 
Warm-Up Demographics Name 
Gender 
Location 
Background Info Organization and role 
General Fairtrade Fairtrade Knowledge About Fairtrade 
Fairtrade premiums 
Challenges of Fairtrade 
Delegates 
 
Delegate election process 
Role of representatives 
Co-operatives Principles Knowledge amongst members 
Benefits of the co-op model 
Challenges to Private traders etc. 
Governance Collaboration How decisions are made 
How information is shared 
Diversity (women, youth) 
Capacity Building Training  
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Appendix 14: Group 3 Interview Guide 
 
1. General 
 
Name: 
Gender: 
Age: 
Organization: 
 
Can you tell me about your organization? 
 
What is your role? 
 
 
2. Co-operatives 
 
What does it mean to be a co-operative? 
 
How are delegates elected? 
 
How many female producers are there? 
 
Who attends meetings? 
 
How often are meetings held? 
 
Do you have secondary data on meetings, quorum, and women? 
 
Are people leaving the co-operative? 
 
Is there increased competition? 
 
Any other comments? 
 
 
3. General Fairtrade 
 
What do you know about Fairtrade? 
 
How important is the Fairtrade price? 
 
What are the Fairtrade premiums? 
 
What is the impact of Fairtrade on producers? 
 
Are there other projects here you can tell us about? 
 
How many children are in schools paid for by Fairtrade premiums? 
 
Any other comments? 
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4. Governance 
 
How is the primary society structured and governed? 
 
How are managers and Board members selected? 
 
Do women get Board and management roles? 
 
 
 
5. Capacity Building 
 
Who gets trained? 
 
Do members have access to capacity building? 
 
Are there groups here (like the village cooperative bank)? 
 
Do you think capacity building is important? 
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Appendix 15: Group 4 Interview Questionnaire 
 
QMUL Fairtrade Co-operative Governance Study18 
Producer Interviews 
 
Date:__________________________________ 
 
Primary Society:________________________ 
 
Union: ________________________________ 
 
Name (optional):________________________ 
 
Gender (M/F): __________________________ 
 
Position:_______________________________ 
  
Research Code:_________________________ 
 
CONSENT 
 
READ TO RESPONDENT (English/Swahili) 
My name is x and I am conducting a study on Fairtrade for Queen Mary, University of 
London. We are interested in the impact of Fairtrade for Tanzania’s coffee farmers, as 
well as how producers participate in Fairtrade.  
 
We would like to invite you to be part of this research project. This interview is 
confidential, and your name will not be used. You should only agree to take part if you 
want to; it is entirely up to you. If you choose not to take part you will not be in any 
way disadvantaged. You are, of course still free to stop the interview at any time, or to 
ask me to skip a question. You do not need to provide a reason. 
 
At this time, would you like to ask me anything about the survey? 
May I begin the interview now? 
 
Signature/oral consent of respondent: __________________________________ 
 
Investigator’s Statement:  
I ___________________________________________ confirm that I have carefully 
explained the nature, demands and any foreseeable risks (where applicable) of the 
proposed research to the volunteer. Date: 
 
 
I.   General Information 
 
 
1.  How old are you? _______________ years 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 This survey is based on previous field research by Granville & Telford (2013, 330-339). 
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2.  What is your marital status? 
a) Single 
b) Married 
c) Divorced 
d) Partner Deceased 
e) Co-habiting 
 
 
3.  How many children do you have? ________________ 
 
 
4.  How much formal education did you receive? (Circle the highest level) 
a) No formal education 
b) Primary school – Standard 7 (incomplete) 
c) Primary school – Standard 7 (complete) 
d) Secondary school – Forms up to 6 (incomplete) 
e) Secondary school – Form 6 (complete) 
f) College/university ________________ 
 
 Why did you leave school? 
 
 
II. Coffee Farming 
 
5.  Do you own a coffee farm?    Y/N 
 
If NO, who owns the farm that you work on (name and relation)? 
 
_____________________________________ 
   
 
6.  How large is your farm?  ________________ acres 
 
 
7.  How many coffee trees do you have? ________________ 
 
Of these, how many are old and how many are new? __________ 
 
 
8.  What is the level of coffee production in kilos (kg) per season? 
 
  ________________ kilo/season 
 
 
9.  Do you hire people to work for you? Y/N 
 
If YES please elaborate:___________________________________________ 
 
 
10.  Do you pulp the coffee yourself?  Y/N  
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If NO, where does it go for pulping? 
 
___________________________________________ 
 
 
11.  Who do you sell your coffee to? (Private buyers) 
 
___________________________________________ 
  
 
12.  What price did you receive for your coffee last season? 
 
___________________________________________ 
 
 
13.  What other crops do you grow? 
 
_____________________________________ 
 
 
14. Do you ever work elsewhere (for the government, private company, etc.)?  Y/N 
 
If YES, please elaborate: ___________________________________________ 
 
 
 
III. Co-op Membership 
 
15.        In which year did you join the co-operative?______________________ 
 
 
16.  Why did you join the co-operative?  
 
___________________________________________ 
 
 
17.  Are you/have you ever been in a leadership position at the co-operative? Y/N 
 
If YES please describe:___________________________________________ 
 
 
18.  How do you participate in your primary society? (Circle all that apply) 
a) As a Board member 
b) Vote for a Board member 
c) Frequently attend meetings 
d) Occasionally attend meetings 
e) No participation 
 
 
19.      How often are primary society meetings held?______________________ /year 
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20.  How many people attend these meetings? __________________ 
 
 
21.       Do you speak at meetings? Y/N 
            Why or why not? _______________________________ 
 
 
22.  How do you receive information from your primary society?  
a) Board members 
b) Secretary-Manager 
c) Newsboard 
d) Training sessions 
e) Other 
f) Unsure 
 
 
 23. Who makes decisions at meetings of your primary society? 
a) Producers 
b) Secretary-Manager 
c) Board members 
d) Other 
e) Unsure 
 
 
24.  Do you know who your delegate/representative is? Y/N 
 
If YES, please name: ___________________________________________ 
 
 
25.  Do you know how primary society Board members are chosen? Y/N 
 
 If YES please describe:___________________________________________ 
 
 
26.      Do you have confidence in your primary society Board members? Y/N 
 
Please elaborate: ___________________________________________ 
 
 
27.  Do you have confidence in the management of the union? Y/N 
 
Please elaborate: ___________________________________________ 
 
 
28. Do you have confidence in the Management Board of the union? Y/N 
 
Please elaborate: ___________________________________________ 
 
 
29.  Are there many female producers in the co-operative? Y/N 
  
Why or why not?______________________________ 
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30.  Are there many women in leadership positions at the co-operative? Y/N 
 
Why or why not?_________________________________ 
 
 
31.  Are there many young people at the co-operative? Y/N 
 
Why or why not?_________________________________ 
 
 
32.  Do you receive any training or technical assistance? Y/N 
  
If YES, please elaborate: ______________________________________ 
 
 What would you like to learn that you haven't yet learned? 
 
 
33.       Are there other ways in which you learn (from a neighbor, friend, etc)? Y/N 
 
If YES, please elaborate: ______________________________________ 
 
 
34.  Do you have access to loans? Y/N 
 
If YES, please elaborate: ______________________________________ 
 
 
35.  Are you a member of another group? (Village Community Bank etc.) Y/N 
 
If YES, please elaborate: ______________________________________ 
 
36.  Do you vote in local, regional, and national elections? (Circle all that apply) 
a) Yes, Local Elections 
b) Yes, Constituent Elections 
c) Yes, National Elections 
d) No 
e) Not eligible 
f) Unsure 
 
 
V. Fairtrade  
 
37.  Do you know what Fairtrade is? Y/N 
If NO, end interview. 
 If YES, can you tell me a bit about Fairtrade?___________________________ 
 
 
38.  Has your standard of living increased due to Fairtrade? Y/N 
 
If YES, please elaborate: ___________________________________________ 
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39.  Do you know what the Fairtrade premiums are? Y/N 
If NO, end interview. 
 
If YES, please describe: 
 
 
40.  How are the Fairtrade premiums used within the co-operative? (Do you know of 
any social projects within your cooperative?) 
 
___________________________________________ 
 
 
41.  Who decides how the Fairtrade premiums will be spent? 
a) Producers 
b) Delegates 
c) Managers 
d) Board 
e) Other  
f) Unsure  
 
42.  Is there anything you would like to add about anything we’ve discussed? 
 Challenges? 
 
___________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
END INTERVIEW: 
Thank you very much for your time. We will be sharing our results with the co-
operative so you should hear more about this study once it is complete. 
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Appendix 16: Group 4 Interview Guide – Swahili version 
 
Mwongozo wa mahojiano 
Shannon Sutton 
02/08/2012 
 
                Qmul soko la haki na utawala 
                               Mahojiano ya wakulima  
 
Tarehe:--------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Chama cha msingi-------------------------------------------- 
 
Chama kikuu cha msingi:----------------------------------- 
 
Jina (waweza kujaza au la):--------------------------------- 
 
Jinsia (me/ke):------------------------------------------------- 
 
Nafasi :--------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Namba ya mahojiano----------------------------------------- 
 
 
1.Taarifa binafsi 
 
Tafadhali anza kwa kueleza taarifa zako binafsi  (jaza maswali yaliyobakia hapa chini) 
− una umri gani?------------------------------ 
 
2 Hali ya ndoa 
ο sijaolewa/sijaoa 
ο nimeolewa/nimeoa 
ο kutengana 
ο mwenzi amekufa 
ο mahusiano bila ndoa 
 
3.Je! Una watoto wangapi?--------------------------- 
 
4.Je !umepata elimu rasmi kwa kiwango gani?(weka alama kwenye kiwango chako cha 
juu cha elimu) 
 
sikupata elimu ya darasani 
Darasa la saba (sikumaliza) 
Darasa la saba (nilikamilisha) 
Elimu ya sekondari kidato cha sita 
Chuo/chuo kikuu 
 
Je!nini kilikuzuia kumalizia masomo yako? 
 
II.Kilimo cha kahawa 
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5.Je!unamilikiki shamba la kahawa! N/H 
 
kama jibu ni hapana,je!ni nani anamiliki shamba uinalolima? 
--------- 
 
6.je!shamba lako lina ukubwa gani? 
 
7.je!una miti mingapi ya kahawa?------------------ 
 
Kati ya miti unayomiliki ni mingapi  ya zamani na mingapi mipya?------------------
--- 
 
8.je!nini kiwango cha uzalishaji (kwa kilo) kwa msimu? 
Kilo---------kwa msimu 
 
9.Je!unaajiri watu/vibarua kukusaidia?N/H 
 
Kama jibu ni ndiyo toa maelezo zaidi-------------------------------------------------- 
 
10.je!unapukuchua kahawa yako mwenyewe? N/H 
 
Kama siyo unapukuchulia wapi kahawa yako? 
 
 
11.Je!unamuuzia nani kahawa yako?(wauzaji binafsi) 
 
 
12.je!ulipokea bei gani kwa kilo ya kahawa msimu uliopita? 
 
 
13.je!ni mazao gani mengine unayootesha shambani mwako mbali na kahawa? 
 
 
14.je!umewahi kuajiriwa mahali pengine popote?(serikalini,kampuni binafsi n.k)?N/H 
 
kama ndiyo tafadhali toa maelezo :------------------------------------------------- 
 
III.Uanachama wa ushirika 
 
15.je!umejiunga na chama cha ushirika mwaka gani?----------------------- 
 
16.Sababu gani ilipelekea kujiunga na chama cha ushirika? 
 
 
17.je!wewe ni kiongozi au umewahi kushika nafasi yeyote ya uongozi kwenye chama? 
N/H 
 
Kama ndiyo tafadhali toa maelezo-------------------------------------------------- 
 
18.je!unashiriki kwa namna gani kwenye utendaji wa chama chako? 
g) Kama mjumbe wa bodi 
h) Kuwachagua wajumbe wa bodi 
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i) Kuhudhuria mikutano ya chama  mara kwa mara 
j) Kuhudhuria mikutano ya chama kwa msimu 
k) Sishiriki kwenye shughuli za chama 
 
19.je!mikutano ya chama cha msingi inaitishwa mara ngapi kwa mwaka?------------------
------------ 
 
20.je!ni wastani wa watu wangapi huudhuria mikutano hiyo?-------------------- 
 
21.je!unatoa mchango wako wa mawazo kwenye mikutano ya chama?N/H 
 
Kama ndiyo kwa nini na kama siyo kwa nini? 
 
22.Je unapokea taarifa za chama cha msingi kwa njia gani? 
 
− Kupitia wajumbe wa bodi 
− Katibu –meneja 
− Mbao za matangazo 
− Kwa njia ya mafunzo 
− Kwa njia nyingine 
− Sina uhakika 
 
 
23.Je ni nani hufanya maamuzi kwenye chama chako cha msingi? 
 
• Wakulima   
• Katibu meneja 
• Wajumbe wa bodi 
• Njia nyingine------------------------------- 
• Sina hakika 
 
24.Je unawajua wawakilishi wako?N/H 
 
Kama ndio,wataje------------------------------------ 
 
25.Je unajua wajumbe wa bodi wanavyochaguliwa?N/H 
 
Kama ndio toa maelezo------------------------------------------------------- 
 
26.Je unawaamini wajumbe wako wa bodi? 
 
Toa maelezo---------------------------------------------------- 
 
27.Unaamini wasimamizi wa chama kikuu cha ushirika?N/H 
 
Toa maelezo------------------------------------ 
 
28.je!uaiamini bodi ya usimamizi ya chama kikuu cha ushirika?N/H 
 
Toa maelezo---------------------------------------------------- 
 
29.je!wanachama wakulima  wanawake ni wangapi  kwenye chama?N/H 
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Kwa nini ndio au la? 
 
30.je!Kuna wanawake wengi kwenye nafasi za uongozi kwenye chama?N/H 
 
Kwa nini ndio au la? 
 
31.je!kuna vijana wanachama wengi kwenye chama? 
 
Kwa nini ndiyo au la? 
 
32.je!mnapokea mafunzo au msaada wowote wa kitaaluma? 
 
Kama ndiyo,toa maelezo:---------------------------------- 
 
Je!ungependa kujifunza nini ambacha bado hukijui? 
 
33.je! kuna njia gani nyingine unazotumia kujifunza?(mf. Jirani,rafiki n.k)N/H 
 
Kama ndiyo toa maelezo------------------------------------------ 
 
34.Je!unafikiwa na mikopo? 
 
Kama ndio toa maelezo----------------------------------- 
 
35.Je! wewe ni mjumbe wa kikundi kingine chochote kijijini?(kikundi cha wakulima,au 
vikundi jamii vya kijiji) 
 
Kama ndiyo toa maelezo------------------------------------------ 
 
36.je!chama chako kina miradi mingine yeyote ya kijamii? 
 
 
Je!unashiriki kwenye uchaguzi waserikali za mitaa,jimbo au serikali kuu? 
 
 
V.Soko la haki  (Fair Trade) 
 
37.je! unajua soko la haki ni nini? N/H 
Kama ndiyo ,tafadhali eleza kwa ufupi kuhusu soko la haki-----------------------------
------------------------------ 
 
38.je!maisha yako yameboreka kutokana na soko la haki?N/H 
Kama ndio eleza----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
39.je!unavijua viwango vinavyolipwa na soko la haki (fair Trade premiums)? 
 
40. je fedha inayolipwa na soko la haki  kwenye chama hutumikaje?(je!unaijua miradi 
yeyote ya kijamii inayoendeshwa na chama chako cha msingi? 
 
 
41.Je!ni nani hufanya maamuzi jinsi ya kutumia fedha zitokanazo na soko la haki? 
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•  Wakulima 
•  Wawakilishi 
•  Meneja 
•  Bodi 
•  Wengine,taja------------------------------------- 
•  Sina hakika 
 
42.Je!ni changamoto gani unazokutana nazo kama mkulima ? 
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Appendix 17: Translation Contract 
 
Project Information: 
Research Study: Participation and Representation at Tanzanian Fairtrade Co-operatives 
Queen Mary, University of London 
Ethical Clearance Reference: QMREC2011/54 
 
Principal Researcher Information: 
Shannon Sutton, PhD Student, Queen Mary, University of London 
0714298853, sutton.shannon@gmail.com 
 
Translator Information: 
Ms. Rose Mtei, MA Student, MUCCoBS 
0714465860, 0769377369 
mteirose@gmail.com 
 
Purpose: 
To provide translation services for the duration of the Moshi segment of the field 
research. This work includes, but is not limited to, oral translation services, written 
translation services, field visits, meeting observation, and de-briefing sessions. 
 
Duration: 
For the period of July 27, 2012 to October 10, 2012, for an anticipated total of 20 days. 
Days will be approximately 8 hours in duration, and  typically between the hours of 
8:30 am and 4:30 pm. Overtime may be required, and the translator will be 
compensated accordingly. 
 
Payment (Daily): 
 
Item Daily rate 
Transportation 2,000 TSh 
Subsistence 8,000 TSh 
Daily Rate (per 8 hours) 30,000 TSh 
Overtime rate (per hour) 5,000 TSh 
 
Daily Rate: 40,000 TSh/day + overtime 
 
Principal Researcher: 
Signature        Date 
  Shannon Sutton 
 
Translator: 
Signature        Date 
  Rose Mtei 
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Appendix 18: Confidentiality Agreement for Translators  
 
This Agreement was made on the 27 day of July, 2012. 
 
BETWEEN: 
 
Rose Mtei 
 
AND: 
 
Shannon Sutton (Principal Researcher) 
 
I, the undersigned, hereby undertake to respect the following conditions of 
confidentiality concerning all documents that may be supplied to me for the purposes of 
translation and/or interviewing. I commit to the following: 
 
a) To keep strictly confidential all information that may be communicated to me 
verbally, in writing, or in any other form for the purposes of translation or 
interviewing. I undertake to take all precautions necessary to prevent knowledge 
of this information from reaching any unauthorized third parties. "Information" 
comprises any and all knowledge, know-how, information, and/or techniques 
relating to the research project inclusive of: 
 all research data; 
 interviewees’ information; 
 plans, drawings, prototypes, models; and 
 records. 
b) I undertake not to use any information provided for any other purpose than to 
provide the translations/interviews required by the client.  
c) I undertake not to keep any copies, summaries, or transcripts of the confidential 
documents provided, in any form, and to return all such documents to the client 
upon completion of the field research. 
d) The present agreement is valid for two years from the date of signature of this 
document.  
 
Signature        Date  ____________ 
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 Appendix 19: Focus Group Guide – Key Themes 
 
 
1. General 
 
Name and gender: 
 
Can you tell me about your organization? 
 
What is your role? 
 
 
2. Coffee  
 
What is your main challenge as a coffee farmer? 
 
Is there increased competition? 
 
 
3. Co-operatives 
 
What does it mean to be a co-operative? 
 
How are delegates elected? 
 
How are managers and Board members selected? 
 
How often are meetings held? 
 
Who attends meetings? 
 
 
4. General Fairtrade 
 
Have you heard of Fairtrade? 
 
If so, what is the impact of Fairtrade for you? 
 
Are there any social projects here? 
 
 
5. Capacity Building 
 
Do you have access to capacity building (like training and technical assistance)? 
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Appendix 20: List of Focus Groups 
 
Number Participants Location Union Date 
1 6 male 
0 female 
Kibosho 
Central 
KNCU 30/07/2012 
2 0 male 
6 female 
Kibosho 
Central 
KNCU 31/07/2012 
3 4 male 
1 female 
Kyengia KNCU 01/08/2012 
4 3 male 
3 female 
Mamsera Mamsera 29/08/2012 
5 4 male 
3 female 
Kasharu KCU 13/09/2012 
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Appendix 21: Ethical Approval Phase 1 
 
  
 
 
Queen Mary, University of London 
Room E16  
Queen’s Building 
Queen Mary University of London 
London E1 4NS
Queen Mary Research Ethics Committee 
Hazel Covill 
Research Ethics Administrator                                                                                                                         
Tel: +44 (0) 20 7882 2207 
Email: h.covill@qmul.ac.uk 
 
Professor Brigitte Granville 
Room FB4.25D, The Francis Bancroft Building 
School of Business and Management 
Queen Mary, University of London 
Mile End Road 
London, E1 4NS  
 
         12th September 2011 
To Whom It May Concern: 
 
Re: QMREC2011/54 – Add Producers and Stir?  Participation and 
Representation in Fairtrade. 
 
The first stage of the above study (consisting of elite interviews) was 
conditionally approved by The Queen Mary Research Ethics Committee on the 
8th June 2011.  Full approval was ratified by Chair’s Action on the 13th July 2011.  
 
This approval is valid for a period of two years, (if the study is not started before 
this date then the applicant will have to reapply to the Committee). 
 
Yours faithfully 
 
 
Ms Elizabeth Hall – QMREC Chair.   Patron: Her Majesty the Queen  
Incorporated by 
Royal Charter as 
Queen Mary and 
Westfield College, 
University of London 
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Appendix 22: Ethical Approval Phase 2 
 
  
 
 
Queen Mary, University of London 
Room E16  
Queen’s Building 
Queen Mary University of London 
London E1 4NS
Queen Mary Research Ethics Committee 
Hazel Covill 
Research Ethics Administrator                                                                                                                         
Tel: +44 (0) 20 7882 2207 
Email: h.covill@qmul.ac.uk 
 
Professor Brigitte Granville 
Room FB4.25D, The Francis Bancroft Building 
School of Business and Management 
Queen Mary, University of London 
Mile End Road 
London, E1 4NS  
 
         3rd May 2012 
 To Whom It May Concern: 
 
Re: QMREC2011/54 – Add Producers and Stir?  Participation and 
Representation in Fairtrade (Stage II). 
 
The second stage of the above study (consisting of general interviews) was 
conditionally approved by The Queen Mary Research Ethics Committee (Sub-
Board A) on the 18th April 2012.  Full approval was ratified by Delegated 
Member’s Action on the 3rd May 2012.  
 
This approval is valid for a period of two years, (if the study is not started before 
this date then the applicant will have to reapply to the Committee). 
 
Yours faithfully 
 
 
Ms Elizabeth Hall – QMREC Chair.   Patron: Her Majesty the Queen  
Incorporated by 
Royal Charter as 
Queen Mary and 
Westfield College, 
University of London 
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Appendix 23: Information Sheet for Interview Respondents Groups 1-3 
 
 
Information sheet 
Research study: Fairtrade Governance in Tanzania 
We would like to invite you to be part of this research project. You should only agree to 
take part if you want to; it is entirely up to you. If you choose not to take part you will 
not be in any way disadvantaged. Please read the following information carefully before 
you decide to take part; this will tell you why the research is being done and what you 
will be asked to do if you take part. Please ask if there is anything that is not clear or if 
you would like more information.  It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If 
you do decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked 
to sign a consent form. You are, of course still free to withdraw at any time and without 
giving a reason. 
 
About the research: 
Title of Study: Fairtrade Governance in Tanzania 
Queen Mary Research Ethics Committee Ref: QMREC2011/54 
Researcher: Shannon Sutton, PhD Student, Queen Mary, University of London 
 
This study explores the nature of participation in Fairtrade governance at both the 
institutional and organizational level. I hope to learn more about how producers receive 
information about Fairtrade and to what extent they participate in decision-making at 
various levels of the Fairtrade system. I am particularly interested in who participates and 
the manner in which people participate, as well as issues of representation, such as 
gender equity and the rights of landless workers. This research includes key informant 
interviews (with experts, members of Fairtrade International and members of Fairtrade 
Africa) participant observation, and interviews and focus groups with producers, 
delegates, managers, and members of the Board at KNCU and KCU in Tanzania. 
 
This project was reviewed and received ethics clearance by the Research Ethics 
Committee at Queen Mary, University of London. Participants with concerns or 
questions about their involvement in the study may contact the ethics committee, as 
follows: 
 
Ms. Hazel Covill 
Research Ethics Administrator 
Room E16, Queens' Building 
Queen Mary, University of London 
Mile End Road 
London E1 4NS 
Email: h.covill@qmul.ac.uk 
Tel: +44 (0) 20 7882 2207   
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Appendix 24: Consent Form for Interview Respondents Groups 1 to 3 
 
Consent form (All interviews) 
 
Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet and/or listened to an 
explanation about the research. 
 
Title of Study: Fairtrade Governance in Tanzania 
Queen Mary Research Ethics Committee Ref: QMREC2011/54 
 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organizing the 
research must explain the project to you before you agree to take part. If you have any 
questions arising from the Information Sheet or explanation already given to you, please 
ask the researcher before you decide whether to join in. You will be given a copy of this 
Consent Form to keep and refer to at any time.  
 
Consent: 
• I understand that if I decide at any other time during the research that I no longer 
wish to participate in this project, I can notify the researchers involved and be 
withdrawn from it immediately.  
• I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this 
research study. I understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential 
and handled in accordance with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998.  
 
Participant’s Statement:  
I ___________________________________________ agree that the research project 
named above has been explained to me to my satisfaction and I agree to take part in 
the study. I have read both the notes written above and the Information Sheet about the 
project, and understand what the research study involves.  
Signed: Date:  
 
Investigator’s Statement:  
I ___________________________________________ confirm that I have carefully 
explained the nature, demands and any foreseeable risks (where applicable) of the 
proposed research to the volunteer. 
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Appendix 25: Back-translation of Questionnaire 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Shannon   Sutton 
02/8/2012 
 
Interview with Farmers 
Date………………………………………………………………………… 
Primary part of education……………………………………………………. 
Secondary part of education……………………………………………. 
Name (It is not compulsory)……………………………………………….. 
Gender (Male/Female)………………………………………………………. 
Position…………………………………………………………………………….. 
Number of interviewer……………………………………………………. 
 
I.PERSONAL  INFORMATION 
1-How old are you? 
2-Marital  status 
             a) Single 
             b) Married 
   c) Divorced 
             d) deceased/widowed 
             e) in  a relationship 
 3.  How many kids do you have?........................................................ 
 4.  What is your level of education ?(tick from the list below) 
               a) not educated 
               b) I did not finish class seven. 
               c) I finish class  seven 
               d) Form six 
               e) University 
            Why did you not finish your education?............................................. 
 
II. COFFEE FARMING 
 5.   Do you own any coffee farm?yes/no 
               If no who owns the land?...................................................................  
 6.   How big is your farm?......................................................................... 
 7.   How many coffee trees do you have?............................................... 
              How many trees were recently planted and how many were planted  
              before? 
 8.   What is the output in kg per season? 
              Kg……………………………………per season 
 9.   Do you employ labourers for assistance?yes/no 
10.  Do you process/grind coffee alone? 
               If no where do you grind your coffee? 
 11.  Who are your customers? 
 12.  How much money did you receive from coffee last season per kg? 
 13.  What else do you grow in your farm apart from coffee?.................... 
 14.  Have you ever been employed elsewhere (by the Government or NGO)   
              No/yes 
              If yes please explain 
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III.  UNION19   
  15. When did you join the union?    ………………………………. 
  16. Why did you join the union?       ……………………………… 
  17. Are you a leader ? have you ever been a leader or in a senior position in 
          the union ?yes/no 
          If yes explain……………………………………………………………… 
  18. What is your position in the primary union? 
           a) Board member 
           b) Recruiting board members 
           c) Attending union meetings  from time to time 
           d) Attending  union meetings seasonally 
           e) I don’t involve myself in any party organizations 
  19. How many times do you hold primary union meetings per year?........... 
  20. What is the average no of farmers who attend the meetings? 
  21. Do you give your views at the meetings? 
           If yes why…………………………………………………………… 
           If no why……………………………………………. 
  22.How do you receive information from the union? 
           a) from board members 
           b) through the manager 
           c) posters 
           d) seminars, 
           e) through  other means 
           f) I am not sure 
 23. Who makes decisions in primary union party? 
           a) farmers 
           b) manager 
           c) Board members 
           d) any other  
           e) I am not sure  
  24. Do you know your representatives?yes/no 
         If yes quote them 
  25. Do you know how the board recruits? 
         If yes please explain 
  26. Do you trust your board members? 
         Explain…………………………………………………………………… 
  27. Do you trust the supervisors from the union? 
          Explain………………………………………………………………….. 
  28. Do you trust the board of trustees in the union? 
           Explain…………………………………………………………… 
  29. How many members are women? 
          Why…………………………………………………………………….. 
  30 . Are there many women in senior positions at the union? Yes /no 
           Why……………………………………………………………………… 
  31 . Are there many youths in the union party ? yes  /no 
      Why………………………………………………………………………….. 
  32.  Do you get/receive any form of knowledge/training? yes/no 
       If yes  explain………………………………………………… 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 While the word ‘union’ did not correspond directly to ‘co-operative’, the individual completing the back-
translation was not highly familiar with co-operatives. I was assured by my translator that the Swahili word 
would be understood as ‘co-operative’ by research subjects. 
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       What would you like to learn that you don’t understand? 
  33. How else do you receive your training?(through neighbours,friends , etc) 
          If yes explain…………………………………………………………………. 
  34.  Do you get any loans? 
         If yes explain 
  35.  Are you a board member in any other party in the village? 
          If yes explain 
  36.  Do you involve yourself in any government  elections  in the village,district 
          or senior government?yes/no 
 
IV. FAIR TRADE 
   37.  Do you know what is fair trade? If yes explain (brief summary) 
      ………………………………………………………………………………… 
   38.  Has your life improved from fair trade? yes/no 
            If yes explain ……………………………………………………. 
   39.  Do you know how much the premium pays? yes/no 
   40.  How does the money released from fair trade  operate? 
             (do you know any project in the community)? 
   41.  Who does budgeting for premium? 
             a)  farmers 
             b) manager 
             c) representatives 
             d) board of trustees 
             e) others, mention 
             f)  I am not sure 
 
42.     Other 
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Appendix 26: KCU’s Letter to Farmers 
 
 
 
Source: Izigo Primary Society, KCU 
 
English Translation (by Rose Mtei): 
14 May 2012 
From the Fairtrade Coordinator 
 
Concerning how to use 8,466,000 TSh (what every PS gets in premiums this season). 
Previously we told you every PCS should have a budget of 5 million every year and you 
did this. Because you have a good amount we are happy to report that the previous 
budget is cancelled, and it's now 8 million TSh. You need to call a meeting to arrange a 
new budget. 
 
Ideas for premium usage: 
• building classes (in school) 
• building hospitals 
• implement electricity 
• buy computers 
• buy chairs for meeting 
• salaries for Secretary-Manager and security guard 
• water tank reserve 
• etc. (any others) 
 
You should plan for 8.5 million TSh for the next 2 years to come. Allow 2000 TSh per 
member attending meeting as compensation. You need 100 people to vote. 
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Appendix 27: Research Photos 
 
 
1: Focus Group in Kibosho Central 
 
 
 
 
2. Mamsera Rural Co-operative Society 
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3. An interview with a KNCU farmer (with translator Rose Mtei) 
 
 
 
 
4. Old Moshi Co-operative Meeting 
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5. Coffee farm interviews 
 
 
 
 
6. Women sorting coffee at KDCU factory 
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7. Interview with a KDCU farmer 
 
 
 
 
8. A KNCU farmer with coffee cherries 
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